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Abstract
The exit-voice model of the labour market hypothesises that employees who 
experience a deterioration in working conditions will face a choice between exit or voice. 
This thesis uses case study and statistical material to analyse recourse to exit and to voice in 
the UK over the period 1979-2000. A major contribution of the thesis comes in its use of 
unique data for both statistical and case study analysis. The introductory chapter lays out 
the data sets which are employed and discusses their uniqueness.
Chapter 2 illustrates how voice channels have changed over time, before looking at 
correlations between collective and individual voice channels and, respectively, satisfaction 
with work and labour turnover. The next chapter uses a case study of a food manufacturer 
with particularly high absenteeism to test the stylised facts of absence and to investigate 
whether absence is a form of voice, indicating unhappiness with conditions of work, or a 
form of exit. The fourth chapter examines the strength of voice over time, as illustrated by 
trade unions’ and unrepresented employees’ ability to influence workplace change. We 
hypothesise that change implies greater employee effort, which should therefore be 
accompanied by enhanced remuneration. The link between trade union recognition and the 
linking of change and rewards is pursued.
As we discuss in the conclusion, representation in the UK has changed profoundly 
over the last twenty five years. Our data confirms the continuation of union influence where 
they retain recognition rights, but that this is less common. However, our analysis of new 
direct forms of voice shows that they can have positive outcomes for employees and firms. 
The thesis makes another contribution in challenging the stylised facts of the phenomena of 
job satisfaction, quits and absence, emphasising the need to explore new sources of data.
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Chapter 1. Introduction and Summary
Introduction
The exit-voice model of deteriorating relationships argues that consumers or 
members of an institution have two options when faced with a decline: they can use voice 
to restore the quality of the product or the position of the organisation; or they can choose 
to exit the relationship (Hirschman: 1970). This model has an obvious application to the 
labour market, suggesting that employees who experience a deterioration in working 
conditions face a choice between exit or voice (Freeman: 1976, 1978, 1980). Whilst 
Hirschman (1970) originally argued that the choice would reflect the individual’s loyalty, 
in the case of an employee the decision will reflect the availability and costs of using voice, 
and the availability of alternative work. This thesis uses case study and statistical material 
to analyse employees’ recourse to exit and/or voice in the UK over the period 1979-2000. 
This period saw a reduction in trade union recognition and membership, and the 
development of human resource management emphasising direct communication between 
employees and managers and direct involvement schemes designed to capture employees’ 
tacit knowledge. These changes may have transformed the range of voice options and 
affected the cost of choosing to exercise voice. The period also saw two periods of high 
(double digit) unemployment and an increase in female labour market participation (Nolan 
and Walsh: 1995). These changes may have altered both access to and the cost of exit.
We examine the changing patterns of UK voice mechanisms and the scope of 
employee voice using large nationally representative data sets. The pattern of voice across 
five national companies is reported, and then data from the same companies is used to 
explore the relationship between access to different voice mechanisms and both job 
satisfaction and quits. A particularly rich case study explores the issue of absenteeism at a 
medium sized food manufacturer in North West London and investigates whether absence 
can be construed as a form of exit or a form of voice.
In the tradition of industrial relations, literature from a wide range of disciplines is 
used to explore the themes of exit and voice and the associated phenomena of job 
satisfaction, absence and quitting. The discussion blends arguments from psychology,
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sociology, economics, political economy and business history, whilst the techniques are 
largely those of a labour economist. A range of data sources are exploited to draw a rich 
picture of exit and voice in the UK over the last twenty five years. All chapters rely on the 
Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys (WIRS) to provide a sense of context. Drawing on 
personnel managers’, financial managers’, trade union representatives’ and, since 1998, 
employees’ experiences, the WIRS offer a widely used, rich bank of information. These 
surveys represent a collaborative attempt to provide a snapshot of the state of employment 
relations at the time of each survey, but also use panel elements to chart changes in 
organisational practices. The CBI settlement databank is used to explore the pattern of 
workplace change and associated remuneration. Whilst this focuses purely on the private 
sector, it offers detailed information on between 950 and 1750 settlement groups for each 
year. The survey records changes to working practices, the annual pay settlement and 
associated pressures, and organisational characteristics. The sample was based originally 
upon the 1978 Census of Production and hence is much broader than members of the CBI 
organisation, and has a strong panel element. The surveyors strive to replace organisations 
that leave with ones of the same industry and region, to retain the representative nature of 
the source.
Another data set is used to explore the pattern of voice mechanisms and their 
relationship with job satisfaction and quitting: a five company sample of firms who were 
clustered in the bottom quarter of the earnings distribution at the time of data collection, 
1996. This sample is interesting not merely for covering workers on relatively low wages, 
an area not commonly researched; four of the five also represent the service sector, which 
also tends to be neglected. The companies are in the fast food restaurant, leisure, hotel, 
retail and food manufacturing industries, and details were provided for plants in six 
regional clusters: the South West, North West, West Midlands, the Wales border, North 
West London and West Yorkshire. Payroll and personnel information was supplemented 
with staff questionnaires recording educational, household composition information and 
aspects of job satisfaction. Three firms provided time series information, the retail and hotel 
chains and the food manufacturer, which enabled us to pursue issues in greater depth. The 
food manufacturer in particular disclosed information on a range of issues leading to the
12
development of a case study of their problems with absenteeism. Each chapter discusses at 
length the data used for analysis.
Summary
The first substantive chapter illustrates how voice channels have changed over time, 
before looking at correlations between collective and individual voice channels and, 
respectively, satisfaction with work and labour turnover. The exit-voice model of the labour 
market suggests that providing workers with a channel for grievances and demands may 
reduce their propensity to exit. Voice mechanisms also provide workers with opportunities 
to offer comments on the work environment and labour process, and may lead them to offer 
productivity enhancing suggestions. Such outcomes offer benefits to employers and their 
workers. However, unions have been in decline in the UK for more than 20 years, whilst 
new individually-oriented voice mechanisms, such as newsletters, quality circles, 
appraisals, and team briefings, are increasingly visible. This paper examines the changing 
pattern of voice mechanisms in the UK using Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys 
(WIRS) for 1980, 1990 and 1998, and in particular looks for evidence that these individual 
mechanisms are replacing collective ones. Whilst individual or direct forms of voice have 
multiplied, collective forms remain accessible to more than 50 per cent of the surveyed 
employees. This chapter then takes a data set of five national UK companies, employing 
predominantly female workers in low paid jobs. The picture of voice in this primary data 
set is contrasted with that of WIRS. Next, the relationship between different institutional 
fora for expressing voice and worker satisfaction is analysed. Job satisfaction is positively 
related with the use of direct communication mechanisms, but in contrast to previous work, 
there is no evidence of a negative relationship between collective voice and job satisfaction. 
Finally, the chapter reinvestigates the relationship between exit and voice using a range of 
communication mechanisms as independent variables. Again in contrast to previous work, 
union recognition is strongly, positively related to labour turnover, whilst direct financial 
involvement is negatively related to quits.
The next chapter uses a case study of a food manufacturer, Bun Factory, with 
particularly high absenteeism to investigate whether absence is a form of voice, indicating 
unhappiness with conditions of work, or a form of exit. The relationship between
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demographic and workgroup characteristics is explored, with many relationships running 
counter to the stylised facts of absenteeism. Longitudinal analysis, covering a series of 
improvements to working conditions, finds no evidence that absence is used to express 
voice. However, whilst the discrete improvements have little differential impact across the 
skill groups, a decline in absence is exhibited as the changes are rolled in, suggesting that 
the outcome was an improved industrial relations climate. The final aim of this chapter is to 
identify whether absenteeism is used as a form of exit. A range of “withdrawal” models are 
examined, which posit that absenteeism behaviour spills over in to quitting, or that those 
who are absent progress to quitting or that absence and exit are alternative forms of 
behaviour. Our data suggest that absence may be a form of exit, with employees 
progressing from absenteeism to quitting.
The final substantive chapter examines the strength of voice over time, as illustrated by 
both trade unions’ and unrepresented employees’ ability to influence workplace issues. 
Data from the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys are used to chart how trade union 
negotiation over a range of workplace issues has become less common over time. In the 
CBI data set, evidence of the introduction of workplace change, as part of the annual pay 
deal, falls over time. This may indicate that managers have been able to shift the frontier of 
control in their favour and are able to introduce change without negotiation or alternatively, 
that there is little room for further productivity enhancing measures. Given evidence from 
other sources, the latter explanation is unlikely. Focusing on negotiations over the rewards 
associated with workplace change, the paper hypothesises that change implies greater 
employee effort. Therefore it should be accompanied by enhanced remuneration. 
Employees’ ability to extract wage compensation for changes has fallen only a little over 
the sample period, though recently employees are more likely to be “rewarded” with 
improved holidays or working hours arrangements than with enhanced pay rises. Trade 
union recognition is positively associated with a greater probability of obtaining 
compensatory remuneration at the time of workplace change.
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Chapter 2. An Examination Of Voice Institutions Over Time; With An 
Analysis Of The Impact Of Different Voice Institutions On Workers’ 
Satisfaction And Quit Rates
1. Introduction
The exit-voice dichotomy was first discussed by Hirschman in the context of the 
declining performance of organisations in 1970. Although the theory was originally 
conceived of to explain changes in consumer-buyer relations, this theory lends itself well to 
analysis of the labour market. Freeman (1976, 1978, 1980) pioneered the application of 
exit-voice theory to the employment relationship, and it has subsequently been used by a 
number of academics to illuminate the decision of workers to terminate their employment. 
The existence of voice may be of benefit to employees if they feel able to raise grievances 
and issues which trouble them. This may feed through to a beneficial effect on morale, their 
utility or satisfaction, their productivity and of course the probability of exit. The employer 
may benefit if the outcome of voice results in something tangible such as lower labour 
turnover, and if the costs of rehiring and training are non-negligible (Mowday et al: 1982). 
In the firms examined later in this chapter, employers claim to spend between £200 and 
£700 on hiring and training each new recruit. Therefore, voice may offer real benefits in 
terms of reducing turnover. Different voice channels may also benefit the employer if they 
encourage workers to share their tacit knowledge about the production or service provision 
process.
Most existing work focuses on the trade union as the mouthpiece for voice, and 
analyses the success of the union as this mouthpiece using nationally representative data 
sets. Most of these studies use American data (Freeman: 1976, 1978, 1980; Borjas: 1979): 
few have been conducted on the impact of voice mechanisms in the UK. However, it has 
been well documented that trade union recognition and membership in most developed 
nations has fallen over the last twenty years or so, so relying on trade unions to exercise 
voice may no longer be the only option. In the UK, the focus of this study, membership and 
recognition have declined substantially from 1980 until very recently. Over the same period
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there has been a shift from a pluralistic view of industrial relations to a more unitarist 
approach, most notably on the part of employers Poole and Mansfield (1993). So whilst 
during the 1970s voice mechanisms tended to be formal participatory structures, relying on 
representatives, such as shop stewards, worker directors and members of consultative 
committees (Marchington et al: 1992a), there has been a substantial growth in interest in 
new forms of communication between employers and their staff over the 1980s and 1990s 
(Tillsley: 1994). These mechanisms are often more direct, choosing to bypass the use of 
labour representatives, and there is a much greater support for schemes to increase the 
complexity of the financial relationship between employer and worker.
We are interested in the current pattern of voice and the effects associated with 
direct communication channels, as compared to indirect forms of voice. This chapter will 
examine the changing incidence of collective and individualistic voice mechanisms in the 
UK over the last twenty years using the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys (WIRS) 
series. A five-company data set, comprising regional clusters of sites of nationally 
established companies, will be examined for a cross sectional picture of voice mechanisms. 
This primary data set has two major strengths. It provides information on sizeable 
groupings of employees within identifiable workplaces, so we can choose between 
controlling for firm or site specific factors. Additionally, this data can further add to our 
knowledge of voice in the UK, as it focuses on service sector workplaces, employing 
mainly women and relatively low paid labour. Having offered a picture of the incidence of 
different voice mechanisms in branches of these five companies, cross sectional analysis 
will be employed to examine the relationship between voice and worker utility or 
satisfaction. It may be that satisfaction is a possible stepping stone between voice and exit. 
This chapter also uses time series data to re-examine the relationship between voice and 
exit in two of the service sector companies.
There are three hypotheses underpinning this research. The first hypothesis is that 
voice mechanisms have shifted over time from being collective, representative fora to more 
individualistic communication methods. Next we predict that worker utility or satisfaction 
is likely to be higher under more direct, company controlled communication mechanisms, 
not least because the employer is better able to ensure that the right message is passed on or
16
down to workers with this type of mechanisms than through trade union representatives. 
These might also satisfy the demand of increasingly better educated workers for both 
greater information and more immediate disclosure. Finally, collective procedures give 
greater protection to workers, and union recognition often indicates a degree of real power- 
sharing. Therefore we hypothesise that employees will be less likely to separate from a 
given job if they enjoy some form of collective voice. The structure of the chapter is as 
follows: the next section outlines the theoretical work of Hirschman and the application of 
his model to the labour market by Freeman. Section 3 discusses literature on employee 
voice, and its links with both satisfaction and separations, and generates some testable 
hypotheses. The data section introduces both the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys 
and the primary data set and considers methodological issues arising from the choice of data 
and techniques, section 4. Section 5 outlines both a longitudinal and cross sectional pattern 
of voice mechanisms, before exploring the relationships between voice and satisfaction and 
voice and separation. Conclusions are offered in Section 6.
2. Exit-Voice in the Labour Market
Hirschman’s (1970) thesis first presented the dichotomy between exit and voice. 
He was concerned primarily with developing a model which could predict behaviour when 
the quality of a product one consumed deteriorated. Whilst he did not touch upon analysis 
of labour market relationships, he did suggest that the model could be applied to the 
behaviour of members of an organisation, such as a trade union, which was in the midst of a 
period of decline. Existing competitive theory did not touch upon the behaviour within a 
firm, and predicted that an organisation in decline would lose customers, almost 
immediately go out of business and be replaced by a more successful operator. This would 
restore the competitive nature of the industry, and the speed of adjustment would ensure 
that there was little loss in utility to consumers. Hirschman sought to bring a little realism to 
economic models and argued that consumers need not exit from their relationship with a 
supplier. Instead they could choose to exercise voice in order to encourage an improvement 
in the firm’s performance, and presumably the quality of the good. Similarly members of an 
institution could chose to remain so and fight for a restoration of previous performance 
from within. At this time voice was a phenomenon associated with political science rather
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than economics, and the exercise of voice did not appear a particularly rational economic 
activity.
Hirschman believed that the deciding factor when faced with the choice between 
voice and exit was loyalty. Whilst loyalty to a product might seem a little unlikely unless an 
alternative was rare, this concept makes more sense when considering membership of an 
institution. If individuals feel a sense of loyalty, he argues, then it is more likely that they 
will stay to press for a restoration of previous high standards or good performance. 
However, it is not made clear whether the use of voice at this stage is an alternative or a 
prelude to exit. This reference to loyalty is one of the weak spots of Hirschman’s model. 
Whilst loyalty is used to explain the choice between the use of exit or voice, he also argues 
that the use of voice increases inversely to the probability of exit. This ignores any 
consideration of the importance of the ability to articulate grievances for voice, and the 
degree of mobility for exit. In the case of employees it seems no more likely that those who 
are trapped in a particular job or a situation which deteriorates, will use voice than those 
who are mobile. Without the right forms of protection, such as the right to express concerns 
through a spokesperson, exercising voice might make this employee’s situation worse -  an 
outcome which could deter them from making criticisms or contributions. In a critique of 
the exit-voice model as applied to the labour market, Boroff and Lewin (1997) suggest that 
rather than choosing voice over exit, those who are loyal will stay silent despite their 
grievances or dissatisfaction. However, whilst this is a valid criticism their own 
interpretation of this model also has flaws. They continue to overlook the issue of 
constrained employee mobility, and their data set is comprised of individuals who have 
filed a grievance, making their test one of ex-post loyalty. The probability of choosing voice 
over exit will also be affected by the costs of voice compared to exit and the probability of 
success. Both of these probabilities are increased when several individuals combine 
together to exercise their voice, with the caveat that as the group grows larger there may be 
a greater probability of free riding. In the case of a membership of an institution, rather than 
consumption of a product, forming a group protects individuals from retaliation and hence 
they may be more willing to make complaints. Formalisation of the role of voice will also 
help to reduce the costs of a response each time action is required to improve performance 
or standards. Consideration of mobility is often missing from discussions of Hirschman’s
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model. Those with little ability to find another source for the product (or another job) 
locally, or to relocate have little chance to exit the relationship. This lack of an exit option 
is likely to limit their use of voice. A final weak spot in the original Hirschman model, and 
one that is not touched upon in more recent discussions of exit-voice, is the assumption that 
voice should or can be used to restore conditions or performance to the original level. This 
implies that the original situation was pareto-optimal and that voice has no role in the fight 
for continued improvements, be they in products, services or working conditions.
The exit-voice model has an obvious application with respect to labour turnover; 
this application of Hirschman’s model was first explored by Freeman in the 1970s (1976, 
1978, 1980). By extending the model to the analysis of dissatisfied group members and 
their choice of voice or exit to employees, Freeman (1978) justified the examination of a 
subjective variable such as worker satisfaction by economists. Freeman’s work contains 
little direct engagement with the philosophical underpinnings of Hirschman’s model. Yet, 
whilst within the Hirschman model there is no conception of collective action, Freeman’s 
application takes for granted the impossibility of individual activity to improve conditions. 
Applied to the labour market, a fall in utility leads to a choice between exit - quitting - or 
using a trade union to exercise voice.
Therefore the existence of, and choice between, voice mechanisms is of interest to 
both workers and their employers. The existence of voice mechanisms within a workplace 
presents the dissatisfied worker with a choice. Exit may entail costs in the form of lost 
economic rents and the need to search for a new position, so they may prefer to rely on 
voice to raise grievances, bring new issues to the bargaining agenda and establish a system 
of jurisprudence or regimen for dealing objectively with situations. Through these differing 
roles the trade union can come to represent a “dual authority channel”, (Freeman: 1980, p 
647). Firms can also benefit from the provision of voice channels. Vroom (1964) argues 
that encouraging participation can bring benefits because generating a greater sense of 
democracy will lead to coherent norms and therefore create a unified team. Worker 
satisfaction may be higher in the presence of a mechanism for manifesting discontent, and 
this may in turn feed into more tangible economic benefits for the firm. If the purported 
inverse relation between satisfaction and exit exists, then turnover may be reduced through
19
the establishment of voice mechanisms. Therefore, the firm will retain its firm-specific 
human capital and save on hiring and training costs. Turnover has indirect costs too; those 
involved in training and mentoring recruits are likely be less productive than when engaged 
in their normal tasks, a problem which is lessened by fewer separations.
Whilst trade union presence has traditionally been seen as necessary to persuade 
employers to treat employees fairly and offer the best terms and conditions, Freeman (1990) 
points out that it is not inconceivable that non-unions firms will offer their workers positive 
personnel and labour relations. This may form part of an anti-union strategy or a policy to 
improve industrial relations. Similarly the type of institution best suited to expressing voice 
may have changed over time. The history of the trade union movement in the US reveals 
the importance of creating independent voice mechanisms in order to generate employee 
confidence. Whilst works councils or company unions were not uncommon in US firms 
during the 1920s they did not embody the degree of independence desired by the workforce 
(Fairris: 1997), and dealt with shopfloor issues rather than collective bargaining. These 
mechanisms were associated with higher productivity and lower rates of injury, but during 
the depression employees saw that these forms of voice were limited and offered no chance 
to improve job security. As involuntary exit slowed so discontent grew. The New Deal of 
the mid 1930s gave support to workers’ demands for independent voice. Fairris views post 
World War II developments in industrial relations negatively. He claims that relations 
became more formalised, which reduces the cost of exercising voice, and that trade union 
leaders became more instrumental. The government intervened again, though this time in 
favour of capital, to identify areas which they considered should definitely be subject to 
discussion, such as wages, and those which need not be, such as technical change. The 
1990s, he claims, have seen the end of adversarial relations in the US, and unions are no 
longer the only suitable channel for voice. This is due to a change in technology and a more 
co-operative approach to industrial relations from employers.
The UK, and indeed many other nations, have seen employers attempt to foster a 
sense of unitarism within their workplaces (Boxall and Purcell: 2003). New approaches to 
employee involvement are evident, involving direct forms of employer-worker 
communication, indirect consultation, and financial involvement schemes. It is possible that
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this shift in communication methods to more direct methods represents a desire to sideline 
trade unions; Morgan and Sayer (1985) argue that this was particularly true of Foreign 
Direct Investment plants springing up in 1980s. However, the drive for change may have 
come from both workers and employers, indicating a broader agenda than the side lining of 
trade unions. Representative mechanisms in particular may discourage high levels of 
involvement, whilst the new types of voice mechanism reflect a change in the 
characteristics of the workforce: employees may be less inclined towards mechanisms 
which treat them as a homogeneous mass, being more demographically diverse and better 
educated. At the same time the passing of the 1999 UK Employment Relations Act, with its 
(limited) support for employees’ right to trade union recognition, indicates that trade unions 
are once again viewed as an important channel for voice.
Whatever mechanisms are used to channel voice it is vital that they command the 
confidence of workers. Whilst the type of voice mechanisms associated with Japanese 
industrial relations, such as quality circles and team working, have become widespread Park 
(1983) dismisses such fora as being purely motivated by the desire to boost profits without 
any form of power sharing:
“participation in Japan aims at mobilising workers at shop-level and enhancing 
productivity (micro-economic goals). The participation in Germany is expected to 
reach equal distribution of power and influence in the whole society (macro- 
economic goals)“ (1983: p i3).
Kelly and Kelly (1991) point to the historically low levels of trust between workers and 
employers to explain poor industrial relations in the UK. New voice mechanisms, which 
offer more direct communication or gain sharing can theoretically result in a positive sum 
gain, but they may not live up to the theory (Ramsay: 1985). New more direct methods of 
communication, emphasising employee involvement, may conceal a desire to subjugate 
employees (Delbridge and Tumball: 1994). Communication mechanisms which fail to 
protect workers who raise grievances or concerns cannot reduce the costs of voice relative 
to exit. Schemes or plans which do not involve power sharing, and fail to instil confidence 
that any gains from improved performance will be shared, are unlikely to continue to
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capture tacit knowledge. Terry (1999) reports on the collapse of non-union works councils 
in the UK, as a worsening of economic conditions resulted in redundancies, illustrating the 
need for employees to have independent voice mechanisms.
Hirschman’s theory of exit-voice, though flawed, can usefully be applied to analysis 
of the employment relationship. The theory suggests that voice can bring benefits for both 
the employer and workers, though as emphasised, channels for voice must operate 
independently of managers to gain confidence and should at least act as a restraint to the 
arbitrary exercise of power by management. Failure to observe these requirements will 
make exit relatively more attractive. The discussion will now move on to look at the pattern 
of voice mechanisms in the UK over the last 20 years.
3. Themes and Hypotheses
a) The Pattern Of Voice
A number of typologies of voice mechanisms have been devised, grouping 
together separate communication and involvement channels on the basis of their 
characteristics, or potential benefits, or the degree of power sharing they entail. Of course, 
the simplest application of exit-voice to the employment relationship, as per Freeman in the 
late 1970s, would only consider trade unions. This reflects the assumption that voice can 
most successfully be exercised collectively, through formal power-sharing channels. 
However, trade unionism has been decreasing in many developed counties for some time 
and a number of new forms of voice have come to the prominence. Levine and Tyson 
(1990) made a thorough analysis of the benefits of different participation or voice 
mechanisms, devising a typology encompassing four categories: consultative; substantive; 
financial; and representative. Fora such as joint consultative committees (JCCs) and 
possibly team briefings represent consultative mechanisms, offering the employees chance 
to mention grievances and suggestions without any degree of power sharing. The trade 
union differs from the JCC in that it has a right to negotiate, at least over issues such as pay 
and working conditions. In this way it represents Freeman’s “dual authority” (1980: p647) 
and falls into both the substantive and representative categories. Other forms of voice might 
be classed as substantive too, depending on their degree of influence. One such example
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might be autonomous work teams, though this represents a narrow form of direct voice on 
quality related issues. The final category, financial schemes, has become increasingly 
prevalent in the UK, in the form of bonuses, profit share, share ownership or merit pay.
Marchington et al (1992a) developed a similar typology to classify employee 
involvement schemes, in that they too devised categories for representative and financial 
schemes. They also introduced two different categories, having identified a number of 
“downward” channels for communication of management edicts, such as use of the 
management chain, newsletters or cascade meetings. The corresponding “upward” category 
covered mechanisms such as quality circles, and possibly team briefings, designed to 
encourage problem solving and pass information up the hierarchy.
The trade union is the traditional channel for expressions of worker voice, 
constituting an indirect, representative form of communication between employees and 
their employer. The trade union has two roles: that of a vested interest; and to act as a sword 
of justice. To defend its vested interests the union undertakes to bargain collectively over 
wages at the establishment, and in acting as a sword of justice its shop floor representatives 
act as a channel for grievances and demands, and challenge any perceived unfairness. This 
does not seem to leave much room for the exchange of productivity enhancing ideas, which 
suggests that the benefits from using a trade union as the voice channel accrue solely to 
labour. However, as Freeman and Medoff explain :
“[OJne reason for the lower quits under unionism is the dilution of managerial 
authority over workers by a system of negotiated rules and procedures in which 
workers have a right to appeal and obtain reversals of management decisions.” 
(1984: p i07),
which indicates that employers may benefit indirectly from a reduction in workers choosing 
the exit option. These lower quit rates will reduce companies’ costs and should theoretically 
feed in to higher productivity levels. The jurisprudence role of unions identified by Freeman 
and Medoff (1984) probably goes further towards satisfying the sword of justice role of 
unions than the mere provision of grievance procedures.
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JCCs are an indirect voice forum, which emerged in Britain following the 
recommendations of the Whitley Committee in the 1920s. These can operate on a company- 
wide or on a plant basis, in that way resembling the Works Council which is commonly 
seen in many mainland European counties. However, whilst Works Councils in Europe are 
legally mandated, and in many countries have powers of co-determination, the British JCC 
is typically a voluntarist institution. The rules of operation tend to be laid down by 
management, and the JCC traditionally only enjoys consultation not negotiating rights. This 
form of voice may offer tangible benefits to the employer, without the power-sharing 
associated with a trade union. For example, Morishima’s (1991) study of the effects of 
Japanese consultative committees found information sharing positively affected firm 
profitability and employee productivity. However, workers may gain something from the 
presence of a JCC, grievances can be conveyed by representatives rather than having to be 
expressed openly, and after all:
“[tlhe voice of a legally mandated works council may be weak compared to that of a 
union but it is still a voice that management will hear” (Freeman: 1990, p331).
The decisive factor in determining whether such an institution can work without 
legal support is the level of trust which develops between the employer and the workforce. 
The workforce is unlikely to use the JCC to raise grievances or offer suggestions for 
improvements if these fail to result in job security and gain sharing. Council representatives 
will be less well equipped to negotiate with employers than trained union stewards, so non­
union councils facing crisis face two potential fates: union take over, or collapse (Terry: 
1999). UK health and safety committees represent a form of JCC. They operate at the level 
of the establishment, but where unions have recognition their presence is mandatory 
(ACAS: 1994). By providing a formal arena for the expression of safety related concerns 
they are likely to satisfy a limited voice role.
As outlined by Freeman and Medoff (1984), US grievance procedures are most 
commonly found in unionised establishments, though they may be introduced by employers 
as part of a union-resistance campaign. The Donovan commission advocated a greater
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formalisation of UK industrial relations, so it seems likely that W1RS will show a every 
high rate of incidence of formal grievance policies. The provision of grievance policies to 
enable dissatisfied workers to pass their complaints upwards is of fundamental importance 
in creating room for voice. However, without some form of supporting institution, or means 
to guarantee anonymity, the costs of exercising voice in this way will be too high for some 
individuals.
Changes in the type of voice mechanisms employed can be explained by the 
increase in product market competition, by the changing composition of labour - away from 
a homogeneous mass of males open to union recruitment, or more simply by a desire of 
managers to follow the latest trend in communication schemes. Others argue that the choice 
of voice channels follows cycles or waves of influence, according to whether employers or 
workers hold the upper hand in the employment relationship (Ramsay: 1977; Marchington 
et al: 1992b). During the 1980s a host of new types of employee involvement mechanisms 
were introduced (Leighton et al: 1991; IRS: 1993). The immediate aim of employers was to 
improve productivity by encouraging workers to share their ideas (Tillsley: 1994), but it 
was in part driven by the desire to generate a more unitarist atmosphere within firms. This 
unitarist approach to industrial relations was linked to the rise of human resource 
management and this required that firms moved away from reliance on representative fora 
in favour of direct communication, both upward and downward. This emphasis on direct 
communication fits with the increased role of line managers in running both production 
issues and personnel matters. The abandonment of collective voice channels was something 
that the UK government actively encouraged during the 1980s.
Drago (1988) defines quality circles as voluntary meetings between workers to 
discuss, analyse and solve problems common to the group, performing a role distinct from 
that of unions. As such they appear to be substantive, upward voice mechanisms, offering 
employers the opportunity to “heighten the contributions made by employees” (Tillsley: 
1994, p211), and any tacit knowledge which is shared can strengthen the response to 
intensified product market competition. The realisation that workers have valuable 
knowledge is relatively new, prior to the 1980s managers throughout British manufacturing 
typically disregarded workers’ knowledge of the labour process in problem solving
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(Morgan and Sayer: 1985). Mechanisms such as quality circles may enable employees and 
managers to interact in an informal manner, and might suit a more highly educated 
workforce, suspicious of, or impatient with, representative fora. The use of quality circles 
has been criticised by Delbridge and Tumball (1994) on the grounds that there is no room 
for power sharing and concern for quality may translate into increased work intensity and 
pressure on labour. Cooke (1992) found that quality enhancement programmes were most 
successful, in raising value added per employee, when combined with union involvement as 
this guaranteed some benefit would accrue to the workforce.
Team briefings represent another new type of communication channel. Though 
they do not readily fit in to the Levine and Tyson (1990) typology, under the Marchington et 
al (1992a) classification, they probably act as both an upward and downward direct voice 
mechanism. However, there are no substantive rights attached to membership of a team, 
which is likely to deter full and frank communication. In line with this judgement, 
Marchington et al. (1992a) found that the vast majority of workers who took part in team 
briefings did not feel more committed to their organisation. In contrast the use of 
autonomous teams for production purposes indicates a degree of power sharing over a rage 
of issues. However, whilst teams have increased in use in the UK (WIRS: 1998), they are 
rarely granted autonomy.
Some employers make use of the management chain or newsletters to convey 
information. These downward voice mechanisms offer workers no substantive rights and 
seem unlikely to elicit worker suggestions or allow dissatisfaction to be manifest through 
voice rather than exit. Using the management chain or newsletters has the benefit of being 
cheap, and a quick means of passing information down the hierarchy though they are 
relatively unpopular with employees (IRS: 1993; Gallie and White: 1993). Marchington et 
al (1992a) found that the incidence of upward voice mechanism such as suggestion schemes 
and surveys was less common than downward forms. Whilst these have the benefit of 
providing protection through anonymity, again they do not offer substantive influence, nor 
the opportunity for direct exchange. However, Green and McIntosh (1998) found that these 
mechanisms were associated with greater effort, particularly as part of a package including 
representative fora.
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Alongside their encouragement for individualised communication schemes, during 
the 1980s the UK government also encouraged greater financial involvement of workers in 
their firms (Marchington et al: 1992b). Organisations have continued to move away from 
collectively bargained non-contingent pay in order to reward individuals for their 
performance and align the management of human resources with pursuit of organisational 
goals (Heery: 2000). Employee voice may also be manifested through employee ownership 
of the organisation (Bonin et al: 1993). Greater financial involvement by workers has been 
established to boost firms’ financial performance particularly where unions are involved in 
monitoring the distribution of benefits (Cooke: 1994). The involvement of trade unions 
ameliorates some of the ethical problems, lack of regard for equal opportunities and the 
transference of risk to employees, associated with contingent pay (Heery: 2000).
The findings of an NOP survey conducted in 1993 for the Department of 
Education and Employment found that 85 per cent of workers were covered by one type of 
voice scheme (Tillsley: 1994), but that many workers had access to multiple channels 
within their workplace. As new types of involvement schemes are devised and publicised it 
seems likely firms will introduce a range of mechanisms to deal with different workplace 
issues. But do all provide an opportunity for voice, a means of raising grievances and do 
they contribute to a sense of jurisprudence? Distinct from their typology, Marchington et al 
(1992a) break down these communication mechanisms into two contrasting groups: 
employee involvement schemes and participation mechanisms. They suggest that the 
motivations behind the introduction of institutions in each of these categories will differ. 
Participation implies a concern for democracy and power sharing. Employee involvement 
(El) schemes will be chosen where employers seek to gain greater commitment and effort 
or to improve recruitment and retention, and where their use “do[es] not involve any de jure 
sharing of authority or power” (Marchington et al.: 1992a, p7). In support of this view, 
Gallie and White (1993) report that more than one of half employees surveyed believed that 
they exercised a low level of influence through El at their workplace. In contrast, any firm 
wishing to successfully establish a collective fora must be prepared to hand over substantive 
responsibility.
a) Hypotheses On The Pattern Of Voice
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The literature surveyed suggests that the analysis of the W1RS series will find a 
shift in voice mechanisms from collective to individually orientated over time. This will be 
mirrored by a higher incidence of direct schemes than representative fora in the cross 
sectional primary data. Financial participation will have become more common, and firms 
are likely to be using more than one involvement scheme.
b) Voice And Employee Satisfaction
Locke (1976) stresses that in addition to an emphasis on links between satisfaction 
and economic outcomes such as absenteeism and turnover and, potentially, productivity 
improvements, the relationship between worker satisfaction and well-being should also be 
explored. Positive levels of satisfaction have been associated with good mental health and 
longevity. Initially, interest in job satisfaction was concentrated amongst psychologists, 
with a number of studies conducted between the 1930s and late 1970s. Three separate 
schools of thought developed from psychologists’ work: firstly, that extrinsic factors such 
as the physical and economic environment would determine satisfaction; secondly, the 
Hawthorn studies suggested that social and human relations would play an important role; 
thirdly, contemporary analysts have argued that the nature of work itself is important. This 
suggests that studies should clearly identify which aspect of job satisfaction they are 
examining. One of the complicating issues that arise from the approach typically taken by 
psychologists is that studies often rely on a comparison between actual outcomes and 
expectations when examining satisfaction levels. Such a comparison throws up the issue of 
recall bias if the expectations information is gained retrospectively. One way to deal with 
this issue is to use time series data.
Economists showed little interest in satisfaction as a dependent variable until the 
1970s. Freeman (1978) was possibly the first economist to argue for the validity of 
subjective variables, such as self-reported satisfaction, on the grounds that this variable may 
capture non-quantifiable influences, perhaps related to labour market alternatives, physical 
conditions of work, or supervision, which otherwise would be missed in an estimation. 
Subsequently, many economists have explored the relationship between job satisfaction and 
relatively intangible outcomes such as commitment, as well as more quantifiable outcomes. 
Greater autonomy may generate higher job satisfaction and so lead to intensified efforts on
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the part of the workforce (Miller and Monge: 1986; Hammer: 1988; Femie and Metcalf: 
1995). Satisfaction levels have also been shown to be correlated with future quits (Freeman: 
1978; McEvoy and Cascio: 1985), and productivity levels (Clegg: 1983; Mangione and 
Quinn: 1975).
Some data sets permit job satisfaction to be disaggregated in to contentment with a 
variety of aspects of the job. Clark (1996, 1997) took such an approach using British 
Household Panel Survey data to examine demographic influences on forms of satisfaction. 
He confirmed the stylised fact of higher satisfaction for women, which is generally 
attributed to their lower expectations and a sample selection effect flowing from the fact 
that being the secondary breadwinner (usually) permits them greater freedom to exit 
unsatisfactory jobs. Taking this more discriminate approach to satisfaction, Clark found that 
women derive satisfaction from intrinsic job attributes and men from extrinsic, see Brown 
and McIntosh (2003) for a similarly detailed analysis of facets of job satisfaction. The 
success of this disaggregated approach should lead to similar caution when considering the 
impact of voice mechanisms on satisfaction. Different voice mechanisms may elicit higher 
satisfaction with specific aspects of the job. For instance union provision might be related 
to satisfaction with promotion and pay, whereas more modem, direct, communication 
methods may lead to greater satisfaction with the employer, or levels of autonomy.
Overall,
“(T)here is hardly a study in the entire literature which fails to demonstrate that 
satisfaction at work is enhanced or that other generally acknowledged beneficial 
consequences accrue from a genuine increase in workers’ decision-making power” 
(Blumberg, 1968 pl23).
However, whilst this quote suggests that voice is an incontrovertibly positive idea, most 
empirical work associates the presence of trade unions with lower satisfaction. It has often 
been claimed that there is a causality issue underlying this association between higher job 
dissatisfaction and union recognition. The US system for gaining recognition often entails a 
hard fought struggle between the union and managers, during which time the union will
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emphasise the problems inherent in the workplace to justify their role. Similarly within the 
UK, it is rational for unions to stress the negative to generate higher membership. The irony 
is that whilst the presence of an independent forum for the exercise of voice is theoretically 
likely to boost dissatisfaction, it is only within pluralistic working environments, with some 
degree of power sharing, that the causes of dissatisfaction can be confronted. Bender and 
Sloane (1998) examine whether it is this form of politicisation in the UK which drives low 
satisfaction amongst union members; do unions spring up in the “worst” types of 
workplaces or do the least satisfied employees self-select into unions? Their results suggest 
that the industrial relations climate, which is shaped by the struggle for recognition and 
legitimacy, is the major explanatory factor of low satisfaction amongst union members. 
According to Borjas (1979) the dissatisfaction felt by union members in the US intensifies 
as they age. He offers two reasons for this: firstly, the effects of politicisation are 
cumulative; and secondly, the progressive flattening of the age-eamings profile exacerbates 
employees’ dissatisfaction. He suggests that this should lead to the diminishment of the 
beneficial union influence on the quit rate after around 25 years of service. However, in 
view of the seniority bias in US remuneration packages, particularly the provision of 
pensions (Freeman and Medoff 1984), this seems unlikely.
There is little empirical work on the impact of non-union voice channels on job 
satisfaction, and what there is suggests a limited impact. Clark (1996) built on earlier work 
(Locke: 1976), exploring the importance of relative pay in determining satisfaction, 
concentrating on the impact of bonuses and share ownership. Whilst in cross tabulations 
bonuses and share ownership were positively associated with satisfaction with pay, this 
result disappeared under parametric analysis. The introduction of quality circles was linked 
with higher levels of satisfaction and a fall in the intention to quit in US workplaces 
(Griffin: 1988). However, the effect lasted only 18 months at which point levels of 
satisfaction fell to their original level. In the UK 76 per cent of managerial respondents to 
an IRS survey (1993) believed that the use of some form of voice had increased job 
satisfaction. At the same time workers surveyed by Marchington et al (1992a) seemed to be 
more cynical; 44 per cent of employees surveyed believed their employer used 
communication mechanisms to boost efficiency, whereas only 15 per cent thought it was
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driven by the desire to boost satisfaction. This underlines the importance of trust if voice is 
to have a beneficial impact.
b) Hypotheses About Voice And Employee Satisfaction
Different voice mechanisms are likely to convey differential benefits to workers and 
their employers but collective voice channels tend to have a negative relationship with 
satisfaction. Therefore the emergent hypothesis is that individualistic measures will have a 
more positive relationship with satisfaction than collective ones.
c) Voice And Employee Turnover
The exit-voice model of the labour market suggests that labour turnover can be 
reduced through the use of certain communication channels. This concern for exit assumes 
that labour turnover is a negative outcome. If there are substantial costs to hiring and 
training recruits, and an associated impact on productivity levels, then it is likely that 
employers will seek ways of reducing voluntary quits. Low labour turnover is a beneficial 
outcome if it encourages firms to invest in human capital, increasing the flexibility with 
which labour can be employed, thereby potentially improving financial performance and the 
interest level of tasks. Employers may also be interested in reducing the probability of poor 
job matches, and thereby lowering exit (McEvoy and Cascio: 1985). This however, requires 
the use of clear communication or voice before the match is made. Workers may also seek 
means of expressing and rectifying low utility as an alternative to exit, and as a means of 
defending any economic rents or returns to job-specific skills which they have amassed in 
their posts.
A host of studies, predominantly carried out by psychologists, have examined the 
impact of worker satisfaction on the propensity to quit. These studies often use the reported 
intention to quit, rather than an actual separation, primarily because they do not have time 
series information, though this intention is likely to be inflated by disgruntled employees. 
Generally satisfaction and quits are negatively related, however this relationship is not 
found in this data set. A review of these studies, and a discussion of the issue of 
endogeneity between satisfaction and turnover, is provided in Brown and McIntosh (1999).
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Such was the weight of evidence from existing studies that Locke (1976) argued further 
research on the relationship would only be valuable where it disproved the relationship. 
This chapter will not attempt to model the relationship between satisfaction and exit, but 
concentrates on the relationship between forms of voice and quits.
Eiger and Smith seem convinced of the benefits provided by a voice alternative to 
exit. The lack of voice in Telford workplaces:
“while giving managers undisputed authority in the workplace, [it] left exit as the 
only obvious option for the workers and could also feed into festering grievances amongst 
those workers who remained” (1998, p283).
The result being manifested as high absenteeism, and a lack of commitment as well as 
quits.
Freeman (1980) has conducted a number of investigations into the relationship 
between exit and voice, represented by trade unions, and was the first to take individual 
data rather than more aggregated data. He also took widest possible interpretation of exit: 
looking at separations, voluntary quits and tenure. The US union wage differential is 
sizeable, and so it is necessary to control for this monopoly or vested interest effect, when 
looking at unions and quits. Freeman and Medoff (1984) also introduced a number of 
controls for the union impact on the provision of fringes, such as pensions, which is also 
very sizeable in the US. The voice effect outweighed the monopoly wage and fringe effect 
for all workers, but especially for older labour. Of course the apparent effect of unions in 
dampening separations could be due to a selection effect: more stable individuals may be 
more likely to join unions. Using longitudinal analysis of the same group as they move 
between different environments, Freeman (1980) was able to prove that exit was reduced by 
voice rather than a selection effect. Having found repeatedly that unions lowered turnover, 
Freeman (1980) and Freeman and Medoff (1984) emphasised the importance of unions in 
establishing jurisprudence and grievance systems within the workplace. Freeman (1980) 
emphasised the important role grievance procedures play in allowing the exercise of voice. 
Rees (1991) develops this theme, testing the impact of different strength grievance
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procedures in the US. Only very strong mechanisms, incorporating automatic recourse to 
binding arbitration, reduce exit significantly. This emphasises the need for a degree of 
power sharing if voice is to reduce exit.
Miller and Mulvey (1991) undertook a similar analysis with data on young 
Australian males. Despite the formal nature of the Australian industrial relations network 
they argue that there was still a role for trade unions. Whilst pay awards in Australia cover 
all workers, the protection afforded by the grievance system is only enjoyed by members, so 
this is a particularly robust test of the voice effect. They found that one third of the 
difference between quit rates in unionised and non-union plants was attributable to voice 
and, as found by Freeman and Medoff for the US (1984), the impact of unions was even 
stronger where workers expressed dissatisfaction. They repeated their analysis, controlling 
for voluntary and involuntary quits. Most of the reduction in exit comes from the ability of 
unions to suppress lay-offs rather than lowering worker-initiated quits. Wooden and Baker 
(1994) also used Australian data to explore the exit-voice relationship. They argued that 
with multiple unionism in Australian workplaces, and the free riding of non-members, 
recognition or membership may not be the most accurate reflection of the strength of union 
voice. Instead they used density and the number of representatives as measures of union 
voice. Whilst unions were associated with lower separations, non-union forms of voice of 
El had no influence. This implies that it is not just the presence of voice mechanisms but 
their power which is important. Gordon and Denisi (1995) are also concerned to control for 
the possibility that the benefits unions offer may accrue to non-members, for instance in the 
US unions are forced to deal with the grievances of non-members. They therefore use 
workplace level data to contrast intention to quit and quit rates of unionised and non­
unionised employees. Their results suggest that the industrial relations’ climate was less 
favourable in the presence of unions, and that union membership did not affect either quits 
or the intention to quit.
As illustrated by Freeman (1980) and Freeman and Medoff (1984), another 
approach to the issue of exit is to look at tenure. Using tenure as an explanatory variable in 
a separation equation brings problems of endogeneity, unless the variable can be 
instrumented. Both Blau and Kahn (1981) and Jovanovich (1979) identified an inverse
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relationship between tenure and exit. It seems likely that those who are dissatisfied or who 
have made a poor job match will exit relatively early. Cahuc and Kramarz (1997) analysed 
the impact of the French accord d’enterprise, a voluntary workplace agreement which gives 
labour a degree of autonomy over hiring and training and working conditions. This is 
associated with longer tenure.
Early interest in the role of non-union forms of voice was shown by Kraft (1986). 
This chapter is distinctive in examining the impact of voice in German workplaces, using 
individual level data on males from the 1970s. In contrast to most evidence, he found that 
individual rather than collective voice was likely to lower exit. Yet overall he stressed the 
importance of workplace climate and the quality of managers, arguing that good managers 
could communicate successfully anywhere and using any system. Briefing groups constitute 
a more individualised, direct form of voice than offered by unions. Three quarters of UK 
respondents claimed there was no relationship between the use of briefing groups and 
labour turnover (IRS: 1993).
Wilson and Peel (1990) look at the relationship between exit and voice, using both 
representative and financial forms of voice, with a sample of blue-collar workers in UK 
engineering plants from the late 1970s and early 1980s. Arguing that recognition does not 
give enough information about the strength of voice, they develop a complex index for 
unionisation, reflecting the presence of a closed shop, multiple unions and levels of density. 
Financial involvement is proxied by the existence of share option schemes or profit share. 
Exit was lowest in the presence of strong union voice, although financial schemes have a 
weaker though significant relationship with quits. The data did not allow for analysis of the 
direction of causality: did the financial schemes arise from or assist lower exit rates? 
Wooden and Baker (1994) also found evidence that individualised voice and profit sharing 
could reduce exit where they increased worker identification with the firm. In order to 
encourage the exercise of voice rather than exit, the relative costs of voice must be lower 
than those of exit and there must be some hope of successfully improving conditions or 
achieving change. This will require that voice be channelled through formal, power-sharing 
schemes. The relative lack of empirical work on the link between new forms of individually
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oriented voice and exit as compared to the work on exit and unions could reflect a sense 
that these are not really substantive mechanisms.
c) Hypotheses About Voice And Employee Turnover
We predict that collective voice mechanisms, which offer protection, relatively low 
costs and - if unionised - wield some power, will be associated with lower quits as they 
offer an alternative to exit. Whilst financial forms of involvement are likely to be associated 
with lower quits, other individual voice mechanisms will be unrelated to separations.
4. Data 
WIRS
The Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys (WIRS) series comprises four in-depth 
analyses of workplace practices and conditions undertaken in 1980, 1984, 1990 and 1998. 
These surveys were funded by a consortium of the Department of Trade and Industry, the 
Economic and Social Research Council, the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service 
and the Policy Studies Institute. In this chapter the management questionnaires from three 
separate Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys, those of 1980, 1990 and 1998 are 
analysed for evidence of a shift from collective to individualised voice mechanisms. These 
Surveys are well known in Britain, and represent the major source of secondary evidence on 
workplace change over the last twenty years. Whilst a detailed explanation of the sampling 
frame and methodology is provided for each individual survey, one major factor of note is 
the shift to include smaller workplaces in the most recent, 1998, survey. Whereas the 
sampling frame was comprised of organisations with at least 25 employees in the surveys of 
1980, 1984 and 1990 that of 1998 broadened the pool of workplaces to include those with 
ten or more staff. Smaller workplaces have traditionally been less likely to have formalised 
voice procedures, such as trade unions or direct methods of communication (Gallie et al: 
1998), although it is likely that they will have some form of grievance procedure. In order 
to generate comparable samples over time those establishments with fewer than 25 workers 
in the 1998 survey will be excluded.
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We investigate the incidence of unions, JCCs and health and safety committee 
representing collective fora. Direct methods are represented by fora which encourage 
employee contributions: quality circles, surveys, suggestion schemes; and schemes to 
formalise communication: team briefings, newsletters, cascade meetings, or systematic use 
of the management chain. The use of appraisals indicates a direct relationship between 
employer and employee, and offers opportunities for personal exchange of ideas, so the 
pattern of their use is reported. Share ownership/profit share schemes also represent a 
channel to increase employees’ engagement, and so their incidence is presented. There are 
some changes in the range of issues put to managerial respondents across the surveys. In 
particular the direct mechanisms above were added to the questionnaire for the first time in 
1990. The change in questions reflects the expected change in the mechanisms used in 
establishments, indicating a shift from collective to individual voice. In order to look clearly 
for a shift from collective to individual voice, two hybrid variables are constructed. The 
collective hybrid variable indicates whether the establishment uses a JCC, a health and 
safety committee or recognises a trade union. The presence of such fora would give 
employees anonymity when making complaints or suggestions, and the collective weight of 
employees should wield greater influence over the employer. The individual or direct 
hybrid variable indicates the establishment uses one or more of the following: profit share 
or share ownership; newsletters; quality circles; team briefings; surveys; suggestion 
schemes; cascade meetings; or systematic use of the management chain.
Primary Data
The primary data was originally collected in order to monitor the implementation of 
the UK’s first national minimum wage, a full background is given in appendix A l. This 
data set is fantastically rich in information and looks at a section of the labour market not 
usually studied: low paying firms using mainly women. It contains 52 branches of the five 
national companies in the hotel, food retail, food manufacturing, leisure and quick service 
restaurant (QSR) industries, which are spread across five geographic regions: West 
Midlands, Yorkshire, the South East, South West and North West. What makes this data set 
particularly interesting is that it is comprised of predominantly service sector 
establishments, in contrast to the continued focus on male manufacturing workers within
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industrial relations research. These companies are clustered at various points in the lower 
quarter of the earnings distribution, which again makes the data set distinctive. A wealth of 
data are available. Access was granted to the computerised payroll records of each site for 
all but the leisure company, providing information on start dates, occupational grades, 
tenure, pay rates, working hours and where applicable leave dates and reasons for leaving. 
Data concerning other personal characteristics such as education, ethnic and parental status 
and previous economic state were collected using employee questionnaires, distributed in 
late 1996 and early 1997 to workers at each site. These have then been mapped in to 
company payroll data. Each site manager also completed a survey outlining industrial 
relations procedures at their site, particularly the voice mechanisms used, and offering 
comparisons of their wage and labour turnover rates with similar local employers.
The site managers’ surveys tell us whether team briefings, cascade meetings, 
newsletters, appraisals, and any form of bonus scheme are used. Whilst in general firms 
may make a decision centrally about whether or not to recognise trade unions, this is not 
universally true of this data set. Other voice mechanisms are also selected at local level. The 
issue of union presence is more complicated. As will be shown in later analysis of the 
WIRS data, union recognition has traditionally been very low in both the hotel and 
restaurant sectors, and quite low for the leisure industry. This influenced the question that 
was put to site managers. Those managers at the leisure and restaurant chains were merely 
asked if they had any union members at their site. Uncharacteristically for the food 
manufacturing industry, the company from this sector did not recognise unions until 1999, 
so they were asked the same question. Whilst the presence of union members does not 
imply a form of voice, the legal support afforded to members, whether their employer 
recognises a union or not, may make them willing to speak out about grievances and 
problems. In contrast, managers from the retail and hotel chains were asked if they 
recognised trade unions, reflecting that their companies do not hold a policy of across the 
board refusal to recognise.
In their exhaustive study of union effects, Freeman and Medoff (1984) illustrate that 
it may be necessary to control for the fringe benefits which unions may bring, in addition to 
the wage differential accruing to their monopoly wage power. Most of the industries
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covered in this chapter are not traditionally associated with widespread fringe benefit 
provision. The site managers’ survey outlines whether or not they offer such fringes as free 
or subsidized meals, transport or childcare. Childcare provision was not offered at any site 
in the sample and few enjoyed fringes in the form of transport or meals. No information on 
pensions is available. Therefore no control is made for union monopoly power, other than 
to control for relative wages.
Whilst no claims are made for the representativeness of this study for the whole 
economy, it may be reassuring and interesting, to contrast this primary data set with a larger 
sample. Table 1 compares the data set used in this chapter with information for the same 
sectors from the 1997 quarter 1 Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is a nationally 
representative survey of around 60,000 households, sponsored by the Department for 
Education and Employment, which is repeated every quarter. The companies used in this 
chapter are not particularly representative of their sectors. Tenure in particular is shorter in 
the primary data set. This is probably explained by their greater use of young workers. 
Retail, hotels and the QSR chain employ younger workers than suggested by industry-wide 
figures, though again the QSR deviates further from the LFS industry means. Whilst the 
proportion of female workers employed by our hotel firm is roughly equal to that of the 
hospitality industry as a whole, the QSR chain employs more males than predicted; retail 
and leisure use more women than the LFS mean. The payroll characteristics for food 
manufacturing also diverge markedly from those of our national data sample. Workers at 
the food manufacturing company are younger, and are far more likely to be male than 
predicted by LFS. Employee surveys also show that the food manufacturer is a much greater 
user of previously unemployed labour than the other four firms. This reflects their greater 
use of male labour: males being much more likely to be registered unemployed between 
jobs than women.
Table 2 presents the mean hourly wage of each of the five firms. The table 
emphasises the spread of wages across sectors within services and illustrates the low paying 
nature of the firms in our sample, reflecting the lack of skill required for most of the jobs 
offered in these firms. The LFS hourly rates for these industries are on the whole 
significantly higher, excepting the hotel industry which is roughly equal. Wages for food
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manufacturing and leisure tend to be far higher than those offered by the firms studied here. 
The low level of wages probably reflects the high use of female and young labour across the 
service sector firms in the primary sample. The food manufacturer uses a large number of 
workers from ethnic minorities which could explain their very low pay rates. As we discuss 
later, both actual and relative wages are likely to impact on both workers’ satisfaction and 
their decision to stay with the employer. Information from the individual site managers 
provides us with a view about the level of relative wages offered by each employer. Across 
the five firms more managers view their wages as higher than their rivals’ than lower, but 
there are those who believe their wages are much worse than average in their local area. 
These tend to be in workplaces in the North West. The retail chain reports its relative wage 
levels more favourably than other firms; their managers view their wages as a little or a lot 
better than those offered by rival employers in 55 per cent of cases. Wages are likely to vary 
with location. The same questionnaire asked managers to classify their site as city/town 
centre, on the edge of town, semi-rural, or other. The probability of reporting wage 
performance greater than average is 9 per cent higher for sites on the edge of town rather 
than in the centre, though this may reflect the tendency of large retail stores to cluster on the 
outskirts of towns.
The questionnaires elicited information about workers’ job satisfaction. As argued 
by Clark (1996), levels of satisfaction will vary according to the exact question which is put 
to workers. There are numerous aspects of any job with which they may be differentially 
content. This questionnaire asked for measures of satisfaction against eleven specific 
aspects of the job, and a question relating to overall satisfaction. These were measured 
against a likert scale, taking a value of one for strong agreement with the statement to five 
for strong disagreement. Higher numbers therefore represent higher levels of dissatisfaction 
(with the exception of the tiredness question, which is clearly a negative job attribute). The 
full range of questions relating to satisfaction are presented in table 3, along with the mean 
response to each by company. The first five questions correspond to the context of the job, 
the next five the content, and the final two straddle both categories. The context questions 
have higher, more positive ratings than content questions. This suggests that such workers 
are looking for work which satisfies their need for social interaction rather than a 
challenging career. This may be due to the nature of the sample: it is a low wage, largely
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female data set. This chapter employs the statement “All in all I am satisfied with the job” 
as its one measure of satisfaction. A detailed discussion of the variation in satisfaction 
according to the aspect of the job considered, using a version of this data set, is offered by 
Brown and McIntosh (2003). An examination of mean responses to this question reveals 
that workers at the restaurant and retail chains are the most satisfied overall. However, it is 
worth noting that the mean level of satisfaction at each company is positive. As outlined, 
the information on overall satisfaction takes the form of a categorical variable. In order to 
make the results comparable to those of other studies on satisfaction (Bender and Sloane: 
1998), the responses to the question “how satisfied are you overall” are conflated into a 
dummy variable for regression analysis. This provides coefficients which are easier to 
estimate and to interpret. This new variable, “satover”, takes the value one for those 
respondents who are very or quite satisfied overall. As the dependent variable is a dummy 
variable, we are calculating the probability of a positive response given other 
characteristics, so ordinary least squares regression will not be appropriate. The decision to 
use logit or probit generally reflects convenience and the assumed distribution of the 
dependent variable. This chapter will use probit techniques.
Most previous studies of satisfaction have relied upon national samples which cover 
workers across a variety of different industries and workplaces. Wooden and Baker (1994) 
reassert that workplace level study is the most appropriate as non-union workers will 
benefit from a union wage premium and policies such as grievance systems which maybe 
introduced at the behest of unions. This highlights another strength of this data set; by using 
a data set of individuals across a limited number of companies and sites it maybe possible 
to capture the effect of workplace characteristics, such as working environment. In 
particular using a data set of this nature means that we have access to information about the 
voice mechanisms operating at each site. However, in mapping site level data to individual 
data we are mixing the level of aggregation. Thus the incidence of voice mechanisms will 
be correlated within a site but not across sites. Whilst this will not affect the size or sign of 
the coefficients, to ensure that this does not bias the standard errors, it is necessary to 
specify in regression commands that the data are clustered by site.
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In choosing to look at labour turnover one must decide which definition to use. 
Mowday et al (1982: pl09-110) find that there are seven possible dependent variables to 
use when examining the turnover issue. In his own analyses of this phenomenon, Freeman 
(1976, 1978, 1980) chose to look at separations, quits and tenure to underpin the robustness 
of his approach. In particular, many studies have highlighted the difficulty in distinguishing 
between involuntary and voluntary turnover, see Lucifora (1998). McEvoy and Cascio 
(1985) suggest this is due to data limitations. As the turnover costs to a firm are the same 
whether the individual quits or is dismissed, separations are generally undesirable. A 
second round of payroll data was obtained from both the retail and the hotel chains 
approximately 18 months after the first. This revealed which of the original respondents to 
the questionnaire had separated from the firm, when they had left and most importantly it 
provided the reason offered for leaving. The conclusion of a temporary contract is classified 
as a voluntary termination, as is the departure of an employee who feels the employer has 
“forced” them to resign, however, it must be remembered that it is not always possible to 
distinguish between genuine voluntary separations and those that have been forced. 
Therefore, for robustness two different separation variables are estimated. The first is a 
standard dummy taking the value of one for all who left between the two data points, results 
for which are reported but not fully discussed. The second distinguishes between those who 
left “voluntarily” from those who did not and re-estimates the probability of separation. It 
seems likely that the two results will differ. Both the companies in this smaller more 
detailed sample are amenable to union recognition, so the union variable is a straight 
dummy representing recognition by site. As unions are customarily able to prohibit 
discriminatory actions on the part of employers and unjustified redundancies, we expect to 
see a negative union association with overall separations. The relationship with voluntary 
turnover may be weaker. Another voice mechanism variable has to be changed at this point. 
All the remaining branches use team briefings to communicate with their staff, so this 
variable cannot be used in the estimation. However, the original site questionnaires in 
which managers outlined which of the voice mechanisms they used, provide information on 
the frequency of team briefings. Therefore we generate a new variable that indicates weekly 
or fortnightly use of such meetings, which is named “regular team meetings”.
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The quality of this reduced data set is superior to the first; much more payroll 
information is available. Sample means for the larger, satisfaction, and smaller, separations, 
versions of the data set are presented in table 4. Although we have lost three firms from the 
original sample, according to the 1997 Labour Force Survey, the proportion of the 
employed labour force employed in the sector represented by the two remaining firms is 
around 15 per cent. In order to exploit this additional data fully two additional pieces of 
information were mapped in, replacing the regional proxies used in the satisfaction 
estimations. The median wage for each travel-to-work area, from the 1996 New Earnings 
Survey, was added allowing the exact calculation of the hourly wage relative to the median 
in the same travel to work area. Information on the local unemployment rate for that travel 
to work area was also added from the JUVOS data set. This is helpful because voluntary 
separations will be influenced by the range of alternatives, which tend to move pro- 
cyclically (Burgess and Nickell: 1990).
5. Results
a) The Patterns Of Voice In WIRS
Table 5 reports on the incidence of a number of voice mechanisms, both collective 
and individual, across all industries using WIRS 1980, 1990 and 1998. This suggests that 
collective voice measures have fallen whilst individual ones have increased, most notably 
financial schemes. Tables 6 and 7 then examine the patterns of voice mechanisms in the 
sectors used later: retail, leisure, food manufacturing, hotels and restaurants. The patterns 
across the firms used vary, and are quite different to that across the economy as a whole, 
with financial schemes proving very popular with all but the leisure organisation.
The 1980 Survey was dominated by concern for union institutions and their 
influence in workplaces, indicating that recognition was taken for granted and that 
industrial relations was assumed to be based on collective relationships. Collective voice 
mechanisms such as trade union recognition or JCCs were relatively common, being 
exhibited in two thirds and one half of the sample respectively. Given the mandatory 
requirement to consult over health and safety where unions enjoyed recognition, it is not
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surprising that well over one half had a designated committee for such matters. The 
incidence of the hybrid variable, constructed to indicate employee access to a representative 
voice forum, shows 84 per cent of establishments recognised a union, or used a JCC, or a 
health and safety committee. Around 90 per cent of establishments had schemes to deal 
with collective or individual grievances. Following the Donovan committee’s 
recommendation that firms formalise their industrial relations this is only to be expected. 
Very few survey questions broached the subject of more direct forms of communication 
between workers and their employers, or mentioned the concept of employee involvement. 
The one direct form of involvement which is explicitly covered in the 1980 survey is the 
use of either a profit share or share ownership scheme; only 11 per cent of establishments 
had either. The survey did ask managers if they had made efforts to boost employee 
involvement over the last three years. Whilst it is not made explicit what these measures 
might entail, one third of the sample had seen an effort to increase employee involvement.
By the time of third survey, 1990, the landscape of industrial relations had changed 
quite markedly. Trade union density had fallen sharply and government legislation1 in 1985 
had helped to make the concept of employee involvement much more familiar. Therefore a 
raft of questions looking at formal, direct forms of communication were introduced to the 
questionnaire, along with mechanisms to involve employees and capture their tacit 
knowledge. Perhaps spurred by government encouragement for the concept of employee 
involvement, half of all respondents claimed to have taken measures to increase the 
involvement of their staff over the last three years. The survey asked about the usage of 
direct communication mechanisms such as the management chain, newsletters, team 
briefings, and cascade meetings. These were employed by between one half and two thirds 
of respondents. There was less usage of methods to elicit workers’ ideas: between a quarter 
and a third used suggestion schemes, surveys or quality circles. Share ownership or profit 
sharing schemes had become much more common, increasing fourfold. Overall, 95 per cent 
of establishments used at least one direct form of communication or involvement. 
Collective voice mechanisms had become slightly less common, which Gallie and White 
(1993) argue reflected the changing composition of workplaces, with new sites unlikely to 
establish fora such as JCCs. However, 82 per cent of organisations still used at least one 
form of collective voice.
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Union recognition declined between 1990 and 1998, as did the incidence of health 
and safety committees. However, the same proportion of workplaces claimed to have a JCC 
in both surveys and overall more than 70 per cent of establishments used one form of 
collective voice. Establishments did however reduce reliance on collective grievance 
policies. Whilst almost all plants used one or more forms of direct voice, there is variation 
by form: some mechanisms became more common and others less so. The use of team 
briefings and surveys rose very sharply, with almost 90 per cent and 55 per cent of 
respondents, respectively, stating that these were used in their workplace. Cascade meetings 
and suggestion schemes were less common, but use of other methods proved fairly stable 
across the two surveys. Again around 50 per cent of respondents claimed to have taken 
efforts to boost employee involvement, though this time the question referred to the last 
five years. This suggests employers are thinking hard about the best way to get their 
message to employees and to use workers’ ideas to improve operations. The most striking 
difference is in the use of staff appraisals. The 1980 survey did not ask about their usage, 
but incidence rose from 38 per cent of establishments in 1990 to more than three quarters in 
1998. Again, this suggests a desire to get the most from employees and to develop direct 
relationships between staff and employers.
We use WIRS data to set the context for the following company level analysis. The 
incidence of voice mechanisms across the five sectors, retail, food manufacturing, leisure, 
hotels and restaurants has varied widely, see tables 6 and 7. Retail has consistently had a 
slightly lower incidence of collective mechanisms than the general picture given in table 5. 
The latter two surveys show that the use of direct communication and involvement methods 
was more popular than the use of collective fora. Data for 1990 show the retail industry 
introduced direct methods sooner than others, however by 1998 they were in line with 
average usage in all but one area. Profit share and share ownership use is much higher in 
retail than in other industries, and has been so across all three surveys. The major 
supermarkets all emphasise the importance of financial involvement in their recruitment 
literature. Initially food manufacturing exhibited a high reliance on collective fora, with all 
far more common that the WIRS average. Although this reliance has dropped over time, the
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incidence of union recognition, JCCs and health and safety committees still exceeds the 
average pattern. This is unexpected given the steep decline in recognition of unions in 
manufacturing (Cully et al: 2000). The most divergent pattern in this industry is in the use 
of share ownership or profit share schemes. Usage of financial involvement was much 
higher than the average in 1980, and remains more common. Other forms of direct voice 
and communication are not far out of line with the WIRS averages. The hotel and restaurant 
sectors fall within the same industry classification. Both these two sectors and leisure are 
areas traditionally associated with very low union recognition, but the tables show they 
have also continually exhibited a low usage of JCCs or Health and Safety committees. All 
three sectors show a lower than average effort to boost employee involvement, so it is 
unsurprising that their use of direct communication and employee involvement mechanisms 
lags behind the average. Share ownership or profit share schemes are well used however, 
particularly in the hotel/restaurant sector. The use of formal procedures for both individual 
and collective grievances within hotels and restaurants and leisure lagged behind the overall 
pattern, though there has been some convergence over time. This suggests a lack of 
sophistication on the part of employers in these sectors.
These tables indicate that use of individualised forms of voice mechanisms has 
increased rapidly. However, the WIRS data fail to confirm one of the major hypotheses. 
The use of individualised forms of communication and engagement does not seem to have 
increased hand in hand with a fall in collective fora and procedures. Overall, whilst union 
recognition had fallen, most establishments in the sample seemed to be increasing their 
reliance on direct voice mechanisms and retaining some forms of collective representation. 
We categorise the establishments with union recognition, a JCC or a health and safety 
committee as having some form of collective voice. Those with direct channels to 
management or formal communication mechanisms are categorised as having 
individualistic voice. In 1980 the only direct involvement method covered by WIRS was the 
use of share ownership or profit share schemes. Correlation coefficients reveal that these 
individual and collective hybrid variables were insignificantly correlated in 1980 . By 1990 
the hybrid individual voice variable was more meaningful, given the addition of questions 
about direct communication. The correlation coefficient is small but significantly positive, 
which suggests that establishments were likely to use both collective and individual
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methods of voice. By 1998 this positive correlation had increased slightly, suggesting that 
establishments often choose to increase methods of communication rather than to substitute 
new more direct methods for more traditional representative mechanisms. This accords with 
the view that direct communication and involvement is not a replacement for trade unions, 
but reflects the reality that organisations which see the advantages of collective fora will 
appreciate the benefits of new direct mechanisms (Gallie et al: 1998). At the same time it 
leaves a sizeable proportion of workplaces who choose not to develop any formal voice 
mechanisms.
The Pattern of Voice Across the Primary Data
This data set covers five different employers operating nationally in the food 
manufacturing, retail, leisure, hotel and fast food industries. Table 8 reports the pattern of 
different voice mechanisms across the five companies and 52 different sites as reported in 
1997. Using categories consistent with the most recent WIRS data set, information is 
available on the usage of team briefings, cascade meetings, newsletters, appraisals. Whilst 
the use of bonus schemes is not strictly comparable with WIRS information about profit 
share and share ownership schemes, it does at least provide some insight into the spread of 
financial involvement across these firms and will have a similar motivational effect. As 
mentioned previously, the issue of union recognition is more difficult to address with this 
data set than with WIRS. Only the hotels and retail chain managements consider union 
recognition, so managers at sites of the other companies are asked whether they have any 
union members amongst their staff.
The most common form of communication is the appraisal. Whilst the most recent 
WIRS found around four in five establishments had introduced appraisals, only one of the 
52 sites under study here, one of the food manufacturing sites, do not use this form of 
employer-employee communication. However, whilst this is a popular communication 
channel it is not a meaningful channel for voice. Appraisals allow for discussion about an 
individual’s performance and development, they do not cover wider issues, and without the 
protection of a representative the employee may well limit their critical comments. Use of 
bonus schemes as a form of involvement is popular with the hotel, leisure and restaurant
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chains, however, none of the food manufacturing plants use one. All the non-union forms of 
voice in the primary data set correspond more closely to Marchington et al’s (1992a) 
downward forms than any other category. The use of team briefings is extremely common, 
with across the board usage in the hotel, retail and leisure chains. The incidence of cascade 
meetings, meetings where management pass down information to the entire workforce, 
varies quite widely. The baseline WIRS figure for the use of cascade meetings was around 
40 per cent, which is approximately the same rate of usage as shown by the hotel chain. 
Both the restaurant chain and food manufacturer show a higher rate of incidence than this, 
whereas the leisure chain is much less likely to use them. The retail chain does not appear 
to use cascade meetings at all, which might reflect the difficulty in getting all staff together 
away from the store. The use of newsletters to convey information to staff falls well below 
the economy wide average, 60 per cent, suggested by WIRS. Only the food manufacturer 
makes good use of this method of communication.
Recall that we have two distinct questions relating to unionisation: one about 
recognition and one about the presence of members amongst the staff. Union recognition is 
higher than average at the retail chain but about the figure we would expect at the hotel 
chain. The figures for the membership amongst employees at the food manufacturer and 
leisure chain look plausible, but the finding that there are no union members across the staff 
at all 26 quick service restaurants is surprising and may reflect the youth of their employees.
We hypothesised that WIRS data would show that collective voice mechanisms had 
been replaced by institutions for direct communication and employee involvement. This 
was not the case. There was some fall in the use of collective fora, and a very significant 
rise in direct channels of communication and involvement. However, organisations which 
use collective fora tend to use direct mechanisms too. The industries corresponding to firms 
in the primary data sample used fewer collective mechanisms than the average, and most 
showed greater use of profit share and share ownership schemes. Food manufacturing 
differed in that it was more reliant on trade unions and committees than the economy-wide 
average. The primary data set had information on a limited number of voice channels: 
unions, team briefings, cascades, newsletters, appraisals and bonuses. Direct forms in 
general were more common than union membership or recognition, though the methods
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used are downward and limit the contribution of employees. Appraisals were almost 
universally used, though we do not focus on these as they have not featured in the voice 
literature before. As predicted, bonus schemes were popular across the four service industry 
firms, and most sites are choosing to use more than one form of voice mechanism.
b) Voice And Employee Satisfaction
We now examine how overall job satisfaction is related to the presence of different 
voice mechanisms. Table 3 reported satisfaction rates in response to a range of question 
about aspects of the job. This showed that employees were enthusiastic about most aspects 
of the job, with the notable exception of their pay. Answers to the statement “all in all I am 
satisfied with the job”, ranged between 2 and 3 which represent slightly positive responses. 
In table 9 the mean responses to this statement are presented, according to whether or not 
the employees have access to each voice mechanism in turn. The mean satisfaction scores 
of those with and without each form are then subject to t-tests. The t-test values in column 3 
indicate that overall job satisfaction is significantly lower where sites use cascade meetings 
and newsletters to communicate and involve their employees. The use of bonuses however, 
is significantly associated with a higher level of job satisfaction. It is interesting to note that 
neither of the union variables shows any significant relation to levels of job satisfaction. 
Table 10 provides a more detailed analysis of satisfaction levels by voice mechanisms. We 
are now able to see the proportion scoring satisfaction as 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 according to 
whether they have access to each voice mechanism. Responses tend to be neutral, but the 
table is of interest mainly because it shows that a higher proportion of respondents claim to 
be very satisfied with their work where the site has union members or recognition than any 
other form of voice. So whilst the use of direct voice and communication is more common 
than union recognition in this data set, unions are positively related to the highest level of 
satisfaction with work.
The final analysis, before commencing parametric estimation, is to look at 
correlation coefficients for the relationship between satisfaction and voice. Responses to the 
question “how satisfied are you overall” are conflated into a dummy variable taking the
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value one for those respondents who are very or quite satisfied overall. This newly 
constructed dichotomous satisfaction variable, satover, is used in our correlations. The 
coefficients and standard errors are reported in the top row of table 11. The results are 
inconsistent with the cross tabulations of tables 9 and 10. Whilst high levels of satisfaction 
were reported in sites with union members or recognition in the previous table, there is no 
significant correlation between the two variables. Bonus schemes and cascade meetings are 
both significantly positively associated with worker satisfaction. Bonus schemes can 
provide a tangible reward for hard work, so this relationship is to be expected. However, 
cascades do not offer a mechanism for two-way dialogue, merely the chance to receive 
information from managers. Newsletters also represent a downward channel for information 
yet their use is negatively correlated with satisfaction. These results are inconsistent with 
those found previously. They suggest that direct mechanisms are more likely to be 
positively related to satisfaction, and that there is no relationship between collective voice 
and satisfaction. It will be interesting to see if parametric investigation clarifies the 
influence of unions on satisfaction.
As stated above, in order to make the results comparable to those of other empirical 
studies of satisfaction we use a dummy dependent variable, therefore ordinary least squares 
regression will not be appropriate. Instead the estimation will take a probit format. The 
equation to be estimated takes the form:
Prob (sat) = aX + bY + CZ + e Equation 1
where X is a vector of personal characteristics, Y represents a vector of external influences 
such as the relative wage and region - which can proxy for unemployment, and Z represents 
the vector of voice mechanisms, e represents the disturbance term, which we assume to be 
normally distributed to justify the choice of a probit over a logit function. We also include 
dummies to indicate which is the employer in the voice mechanism vector. Whilst the 
coefficients from this regression will indicate which explanatory variables yield a 
significant influence on worker satisfaction, they cannot tell us of the exact size of the 
influence. Therefore we are required to also calculate the marginal effects, which will 
indicate the true strength of significant independent variables, column 1 table 12. Probit
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coefficients are presented in appendix A2. The majority of the explanatory variables are 
dummy variables, so the marginal effects show the change in the probability of reporting 
positive levels of job satisfaction separation for a discrete change in the dummy from 0 to 1. 
The coefficients on the continuous variables, such as tenure, reflect the change in the 
probability for a one unit deviation from the mean of the explanatory variable.
We are focusing on the relationship between satisfaction and five voice channels: 
union recognition/members, newsletters, bonus schemes, team briefings and cascade 
meetings. Appraisals have to be dropped as they are too widely used to provide the 
necessary variation. The predicted probability of a positive level of satisfaction is 0.67. The 
marginal coefficients on cascade meetings and newsletters are small and positive, whilst 
that for unions is small and negative; none is significant. Surprisingly, given the weight of 
evidence suggesting financial involvement is important, the coefficient on bonuses is also 
small and insignificant. Perhaps this reflects the lack of employee control associated with 
schemes offering financial incentives. The only mechanism that is significantly related to 
satisfaction is the use of team briefings. The use of such meetings is associated with a 15 
percentage point reduction in the likelihood of reporting high or fairly high levels of job 
satisfaction. This accords with the discrepancy between employers’ views of the benefits of 
direct communication channels (IRS: 1993), and those of employees (Marchington et al: 
1992a). Whilst team briefings offer an opportunity for direct dialogue between workers and 
supervisors or managers, Marchington et al (1992a) report that a sizeable proportion of 
employees believe such mechanisms are a means to boost efficiency not their satisfaction.
Other control variables are significantly related to satisfaction. Company dummies 
are most strongly related to satisfaction. All groups are more likely to report positive 
satisfaction than those employed by the food manufacturer, with levels highest for 
employees of the retail and leisure firms. Most studies of workers satisfaction employ some 
control for wage levels. We look at relative wages, as it seems likely that workers judge 
their position to that of individuals they know in the local labour market. Those earning a 
lot or a little more than the local average are no less satisfied than the default, but those 
earning a little less have a predicted probability of 0.79 of being satisfied. Region too is a 
significant influence. As we controlled for relative wages this is likely to capture the
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influence of unemployment and the ability to find other employment. Workers in the South 
East and West Midlands are significantly less likely to report positive levels of satisfaction. 
Of the demographics two yield interesting results. Employees with degrees have a much 
lower probability of reporting job satisfaction. It is likely that jobs with these employers do 
not fulfil their expectations. In support of this, Tsang et al (1991) suggest that over- 
qualification was a likely cause of dissatisfaction with one’s job. Whilst young workers are 
less likely to be satisfied, age squared is positively related to satisfaction. As workers age 
their mobility is reduced by family and financial commitments, which may force them to 
remain in a job they do not like. However, as they age their commitments reduce enabling a 
move, inactivity or even early retirement. Females generally have higher levels of 
satisfaction than men in the literature (Clark: 1997), but there is no relationship here. This 
may be due to the richness of the data set, allowing us to control for the presence of a 
partner and children.
Much information may be lost by conflating respondents’ satisfaction into a dummy 
variable, so ordered probit analysis is also undertaken using the categorical satisfaction 
variable. The observed level of satisfaction is given by n=l if n*<ci, n=2 if Ci<n*<C2 , n=3 if 
C2 <n*<C3 , n=4 if C3<n*<C4 , n=5 if C4 <n*, where the c's are the cut-off points between which 
the latent variable falls. Then, the probability that a bargaining group belongs in the first 
category, n=l, can be given as:
Pr (n=l) = Pr (n*< Ci) Equation 2
= Pr (Px + u < Ci)
= Pr (u < ci -  px)
= O ( ci -  px)
O is the cumulative normal distribution. Similarly,
Pr (n = 2) = O ( C2 -  px) - O ( Ci- px)
Pr (n = 3) = O ( C3 -  px) - €> ( C2  -  Px)
Pr (n = 4) = O ( C4  -  px) - O ( C3 -  px)
Pr (n = 5) = 1 - O ( C4 -  px)
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The same control variables are used as in equation 1, and the coefficients in the 
final column of table 12 indicate which independent variables are significantly related to 
satisfaction, but do not measure the strength of the relationship. For ease of interpretation 
we employ further statistical techniques to create a ‘benchmark employee’. The model is 
then adjusted to provide information as to the influence of the voice mechanisms on 
satisfaction. The first column of table 13 reports the probability of reporting different levels 
of job satisfaction for the default employee, John, a male worker earning around the average 
local wage, based in Yorkshire, with GCSE level qualifications, working for the food 
manufacturer. All continuous variables are set to their mean values. In the second column 
we perform the same exercise using a cohabiting woman, Angie, a much more common 
type of employee in this dataset. The probability that this benchmark respondent will report 
the highest level of satisfaction has now risen from 0.06 to 0.08. The probability that John 
will be very or quite satisfied is 0.37 percentage points, compared to 0.42 for Angie. John 
has a 0.11 probability of being very dissatisfied, compared to 0.08 for Angie.
The subsequent columns adjust for the presence of each form of voice mechanism 
in turn. The predicted probability of reporting very high satisfaction actually falls when 
team briefings are used at the site, to 0.05. All other voice mechanisms are associated with 
an improved probability of being very satisfied. The predicted probability that Angie will be 
very satisfied is 0.09 if newsletters are added, 0.10 if cascades or bonuses are introduced, 
but 0.11 if there are union members or union recognition. This indicates that some form of 
union presence outweighs even the positive influence of a bonus scheme. This indicates that 
there might be some benefit, in terms of positive levels of employee satisfaction, from 
collective representation or procedures.
We hypothesised that direct or individualistic voice mechanisms would have a more 
positive relationship with satisfaction than collective ones. The evidence from this dataset is 
contradictory: the ordered probit benchmark effects suggest unions are related to a greater 
probability of reporting very high levels of satisfaction, but this was not supported by other 
techniques. Both ordered probit benchmark effects and correlations suggest that bonus 
schemes are related to greater satisfaction, but this variable was insignificant in a probit
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regression. The only significant voice mechanism in the probit analysis is team briefings, 
the use of which is negatively related to satisfaction. Yet this does not achieve significance 
in other analyses. The inconsistency of results suggests that none of the mechanisms 
available in this dataset contributes greatly to employee satisfaction. The original 
hypothesis therefore is disproved.
c) Voice And Employee Turnover
The bottom row of table 11 provides correlation coefficients for the relationship 
between the probability of separating and the different voice mechanisms. Both cascade 
meetings and the use of newsletters are very strongly positively related to the probability of 
separation. The relationship between separations and union recognition is less surprising. In 
line with the weight of evidence, union recognition and separation are very strongly 
significantly negatively related.
The final analysis in this chapter is a multivariate analysis of the probability of 
separation, where the separation variable takes the value one for those respondents who 
depart from the retailer or hotel chain in the 18 month period between data dumps. Again as 
the dependent variable is a dummy variable, the estimation will take a probit format. The 
equation to be estimated takes the form:
Prob (separation) = aP + bQ + cR + e Equation 3
where P is a vector of personal characteristics, Q represents a vector of characteristics 
reflecting employment alternatives, R represents the vector of voice mechanisms, and e 
represents the disturbance term, which we assume to be normally distributed to justify the 
choice of a probit function. The marginal coefficients are presented in table 14, with probit 
coefficients presented in appendix A2. In this estimation we control for the same personal 
characteristics as in the satisfaction model, but add in some additional control variables. 
Whereas the union dummy for the satisfaction analysis represented recognition in some
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firms and the presence of members in others, the two companies used for separation 
analysis were only asked about recognition. The team briefings variables has also been 
amended to reflect the widespread use of this channel of communication; the dummy used 
now indicating weekly or fortnightly meetings.
Column 1 of table 14 reports results using total separations as the dependent 
variable, column 2 uses voluntary turnover. Table 4 presented the sample means for the 
parametric testing: 23.6 per cent of employees had left their jobs between the two data 
dumps; 19.6 per cent had quit. Voluntary turnover, or quits, is the theoretically appropriate 
measure to use, and this is supported by the diagnostics. We look first at the relationship 
between the five variables indicating the use of voice mechanisms and voluntary 
separations. The predicted probability of quitting is 0.11. Union recognition and regular 
team briefings are positively related to quits, leading to respective probabilities of 0.17 and 
0.16. This is obviously undesirable given the costs of hiring and firing, and in the case of 
union recognition is contrary to the body of evidence. Although the information on which 
voice mechanisms are used by site predates the labour turnover data, this is not conclusive 
proof that union recognition and team briefings lead to higher labour turnover. This is an 
area where it would be useful to know more about the chain of causality. In the case of team 
briefings, it may be that the use of regular meetings acts as a form of pressure on staff 
causing them to seek alternatives, or these meetings may have been introduced to help deal 
with a high rate of labour turnover. Bonus schemes and newsletters are associated with 
lower quit probabilities. In the case of bonus schemes, this is not surprising, there is a body 
of evidence linking financial participation to lower quits (Wilson and Peel: 1990; Wooden 
and Baker: 1994). Additionally, bonus schemes boost take home pay and may improve 
gross income as compared to other available jobs. The impact of newsletters is significantly 
negative, whereas cascade meetings are negatively though insignificantly related to 
separations.
A range of demographic and workplace variables are significantly related to quits. 
As with job satisfaction the relationship between age and quitting is quadratic: as 
employees age they are less likely to quit, a relationship which is reversed once they pass 
prime age. There are six educational categories, but the only group significantly related to
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quits is degree holders, with a predicted probability of quitting of 0.26. Highly qualified 
employees such as these should enjoy greater mobility than others, and can move on if the 
job fails to stimulate them. The lower predicted probability of quitting for professionals 
and junior managers seems to contradict this hypothesis. However, the highly qualified who 
quit may be those in low skill jobs. Employees in the unskilled and trainee category have a 
higher predicted probability of quitting, but this may be picking up selection effects from 
trainees who recognise their unsuitability for the job. Such an interpretation accords with 
the negative coefficient on tenure. Two final results warrant discussion. Information on the 
median wage is available at the travel to work area level. The coefficient on wages relative 
to the local median is positive, which is counter intuitive indicating as it does that those 
earning more are more likely to quit. As we have controlled for skill and education level it 
is not clear what is driving this result. Finally, retail employees have a much lower 
predicted probability of quitting than hotel staff. Few significant variations emerge 
comparing the quits and the undifferentiated turnover model. Crucially, union recognition 
is insignificant in the full turnover model. This too is counterintuitive. Trade union 
recognition reduces the ability of employers to dismiss employees at will, so it should be 
negatively related to the overall separation rate. Three demographic variables have 
different effects: full time status; vocational qualifications; and cohabitation.
The relationship between voice and quits varies according to the method of analysis. 
Correlations implied that unions were negatively related, and newsletters and cascades 
positively related to separations, which is the reverse of regression results. The regression 
results for quits, both unions and team meetings are significantly positively related to 
voluntary separations. As quits lead to hiring and training costs, £560 and £710 (for full­
time staff) for the retail and hotel firms respectively, voice institutions which may 
encourage quits are undesirable. Newsletters hardly constitute a meaningful channel of 
voice, yet whilst the use of newsletters was related to lower satisfaction scores, this 
communication method shows a sizeable negative relationship with separations. The one 
relationship which corresponds to extant theory is that between bonuses and quits. The use 
of bonuses is associated with a predicted quit probability of 0.06, compared to 0.11 at 
sample means. Voice mechanisms have inconsistent associations across satisfaction and 
quits too. None of the voice mechanisms in the primary data set has a consistent
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relationship with satisfaction. One method of analysis showed a positive relationship 
between unions and satisfaction, and another suggested team briefings were the only 
significantly related institution, and they were negatively related. It may be that the type of 
employee represented in this data set is looking for something other than a meaningful 
career and a high level of involvement in decision making. The data set covers low paid 
industries, has a high proportion of young people and many women who are married with 
children. Trade union recognition and team briefings may imply a greater level of 
engagement than they have time for or are interested in.
Section 6: Conclusions
This chapter investigated the pattern of voice in British workplaces over the last 
twenty four years, and pursued the relationship between different forms of voice and both 
satisfaction and quits. The context was described using information from three Workplace 
Industrial Relations Surveys, whilst a unique data set representing employees in low paying 
firms was used to explore the issues of voice and satisfaction and quits.
The industrial relations landscape has changed significantly since the first WIRS, 
and the development of human resource management in the UK, with its emphasis on 
unitarist relations, has been accompanied by a drive for better organisational performance. 
These influences make it important to achieve clear communication between employers and 
employees and to allow employees to make contributions to the success of the organisation. 
We hypothesised that WIRS data would show that collective voice mechanisms had been 
replaced by institutions for direct communication and employee involvement. We predicted 
that employers in the primary data set would be using schemes which bring home to 
workers how their performance is tied to that of the organisation, and so would favour 
direct communication, and that they would be swayed by innovation and use a variety of 
schemes simultaneously. WIRS data showed that whilst there has been a limited fall in the 
use of collective fora, and a very significant rise in direct channels of communication and 
involvement, organisations which use collective fora tend to use direct mechanisms too. 
The primary data set is made of five firms in the hotel, quick service restaurant, food 
manufacturing, retail and leisure industries. WIRS data shows that these service industries
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used fewer collective mechanisms than the average, whilst food manufacturing was more 
reliant on trade unions and committees than the average. All industries represented in the 
primary data make greater than average use of profit share and share ownership schemes. 
The primary data set had information on a limited number of downward communication 
channels: team briefings; cascades; newsletters; appraisals; and bonuses. Union recognition 
is the only voice mechanism which offers even a chance of power sharing, and only two 
firms allowed site managers to consider recognising unions locally. Channels for direct 
communication and involvement are more common than collective voice in the primary 
data set. As predicted, sites in the primary data tended to use multiple channels for 
communication, and financial involvement through bonuses was very common.
The satisfaction levels of employees in the primary data set were generally positive, 
especially for the contextual aspects of their jobs. Given their low pay levels and the 
relatively unskilled nature of the work, this tells us that these employees have very limited 
expectations. Unions are traditionally associated with lower employee satisfaction, though 
this may reflect the emphasis unions place on the negative aspects in workplaces in order to 
justify their existence. WIRS data showed a rise in direct communication mechanisms, 
channels which enable employers to get their message across in the manner they choose. 
These mechanisms might also satisfy the demand of increasingly better educated workers 
for more both greater information and more immediate disclosure. We hypothesised that 
direct or individualistic voice mechanisms would have a more positive relationship with 
satisfaction than collective ones. The evidence from this dataset is contradictory: no 
communication mechanism proved to be consistently related to satisfaction, either 
negatively or positively. Financial involvement, in the form of bonus schemes, is the most 
positively associated voice channel. In contrast to the stylised fact about unions and 
satisfaction, unions were not negatively related to job satisfaction; having a benign or 
positive association with employee contentment. Overall, the inconsistency of results 
suggests that none of the mechanisms available in this dataset contributes greatly to 
employee satisfaction.
The exit-voice model predicts that employees, faced by problems such as a 
deterioration in working conditions, will chose between quitting or complaining. Whilst
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Hirschman (1970) believed such a choice reflected their loyalty, we hypothesise that it 
reflects the relative costs of using either and whether a voice mechanism or alternative job 
is even available. It was specifically hypothesised that as collective procedures and 
communication fora give greater protection to workers, and indicate a degree of real power- 
sharing they will be negatively related to quits. Financial schemes are also linked to lower 
quit rates in the literature, so it was hypothesised that they would be negatively related in 
this data set. Again, the results contradict previous evidence and no voice or 
communication channel was consistently related to labour turnover; unions again defying 
our expectations. Whilst confirmation of a negative relationship between bonuses and quits 
in regression analysis corresponds to our expectations, the positive relationship between 
union recognition and quits arising from regression analysis does not.
It is not immediately apparent why these results should be so different from existing 
evidence, though this does reinforce the need to test out stylised facts on new data sets. This 
chapter uses a distinctive primary data set: payroll and questionnaire data are available 
across 1,700 individuals and 52 workplaces. It covers five nationally established UK 
companies, four of whom are service sector employers. The workers are predominantly 
women in low paying, low skill jobs, many of women are married with children; the quick 
service restaurant, which has a higher proportion of male workers, uses very young 
employees, many of whom are still studying. The distinctive nature of the data may be 
crucially important. It may be that the type of employee represented in this data set is 
looking for something other than a meaningful career and a high level of involvement in 
decision making in their current position. Whilst financial schemes that reward them for 
their effort may be welcome, communication schemes which require them to generate ideas 
or to absorb company performance targets may be more than they are looking for. Quits 
bring costs and disruption to an organisation. The exit-voice model has been used to 
illustrate how the introduction of voice mechanisms can reduce quits. Evidence from this 
data suggests quits are generally unrelated to the type of voice options on offer, which we 
argue reflects the type of employees and workplaces we have examined.
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Endnotes
1 In 1985 the government passed a requirement that all large companies, those with an annual turnover of more 
than £2.8 million or more than 250 employees, list the measures they had taken to boost employee 
involvement in their annual report. Whilst this did not require that they undertake change it did encourage 
such moves.
2 The correlation coefficients and significance levels for the simultaneous use of collective and individual 
mechanisms of voice are for 1980: -0.048 (0.072), for 1990: 0.144 (0.000), and in 1998: 0.184 (0.000). 
Therefore the relationship is insignificantly negative in 1980 and significantly positive in the two subsequent 
periods at the 1% level.
59
Table 1. A Comparison Of Average Workforce Characteristics In The Primary
Sample With Those In The Labour Force Survey
Sector Labour Force Survey (1997ql) Payroll sample
Hospitality*
Proportion female, % 61.5 56.8/66.8*
Average age 31.8 years 22.5/29.4*
Tenure 5 years 1.25/2.8*#
Food manufacturing
Proportion female, % 34.6 17.7
Average age 38 years 30.6
Tenure 8 years 3.25
Retail
Proportion female, % 36.8 79.5
Average age 33.5 years 24.2
Tenure 6 years 6
Leisure
Proportion female, % 48.9 71.6
Average age 36.7 years 33
Tenure 7 years 6
This table uses information from LFS 1997, quarter 1.
*The payroll sample figures for the hospitality industry are split to display values for the quick service 
restaurant and hotel sector respectively.
# Tenure figures for hotels only relate to staff who do not exit during the study.
No payroll data was made available by the leisure firm, so information is derived from the satisfaction 
questionnaire sample.
Table 2. A Comparison Of Firm And Industry Wage Means
Measure Leisure Hotels Retail Food
Manufacture
r
Quick Service 
Restaurant
Firms’ mean 
wage, £
3.64 3.93 4.04 3.91 3.37
Industry mean 
using
information 
from LFS 
1997ql, £
7.94 3.99 4.64 6.95 3.99
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Table 3. Worker Satisfaction With Different Aspects Of The Job, By Company
Question Quick
Service
restaurant
Retail Leisure Food
Manufacturer
Hotels
I get along well with Supervisors 1.85 1.92 1.80 2.00 1.83
I get on well with other workers 1.53 1.53 1.85 1.70 1.56
The company is a good employer 2.41 2.30 3.01 3.04 2.58
The hours suit me 2.25 2.09 1.84 2.99 2.22
Getting to work is not a problem 1.76 1.74 2.18 2.07 1.75
Promotion prospects are good 3.31 3.45 3.03 3.54 3.51
I could stay in the job forever 3.37 3.35 3.37 3.36 3.59
Tired when get home from job 2.21 2.21 2.47 2.26 2.23
I find the job challenging 2.85 2.95 2.81 2.87 2.82
Interested in this type of business 2.87 2.66 3.03 2.65 2.35
The pay is good 3.36 2.75 3.92 3.51 3.70
All in all I am satisfied with the job 2.41 2.42 2.50 2.87 2.51
Responses are based on a Likert scale, with 1 representing strong agreement with each statement and 5 strong 
disagreement. Therefore the lower scores represent greater levels of satisfaction.
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Table 4. Sample Means Of Primary Data Set
Variable Satisfaction analysis Turnover analysis
Hotel chain 
(proportion of sample)
21.5 43.8
Food manufacturer 
(proportion of sample)
14.3 Not used
Quick service restaurant 
(proportion of sample)
14.4 Not used
Food retailer 
(proportion of sample)
16.6 56.2
Leisure firm 
(proportion of sample)
33.1 Not used
Female 61.7 73.8
Age 32.3 34.6
Age2/100 12.1 13.9
Ethnic minority 25.0 9.1
CSEs 7.9 16.1
GCSEs 34.2 31.5
A levels 8.5 8.9
Degree 8.6 4.1
Vocational qualifications 15.9 10.9
No qualifications 24.9 28.5
Married/co-hab 48.5 16.7
One kid 19.4 15.0
Two or more kids 26.6 28.5
Much more than other local 
wages
16.4 n/a
A little more than other local 
wages
14.6 n/a
Paid about the same as other 
local jobs
32.3 n/a
A little less than other local 
wages
23.2 n/a
A lot less than other local wages 13.4 n/a
Hourly wage relative to median 
wage of travel to work area
n/a 0.7
Yorkshire and Humberside 16.2 n/a
South East 15.5 n/a
South West 10.9 n/a
West Midlands 25.1 n/a
North West 32.3 n/a
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Table 4. Sample Means Of Primary Data Set Cont.
Variable Satisfaction analysis Turnover analysis
Unemployment in travel to work 
area 1997ql
n/a 7.3
Tenure 60 months 63 months
Unskilled or trainee position n/a 18.5
Semi-skilled position n/a 43.8
Semi-skilled position with some 
responsibility
n/a 13.0
Skilled or supervisory n/a 12.4
Junior management or 
professional
n/a 12.3
Full time (30 hours or more per 
week)
n/a 48.8
Voice mechanisms
Union recognition or presence 
of members*
36.1 44.2
Newsletter 40.3 37.7
Bonus schemes 58.2 61.4
Team briefings 88.8 n/a
Very regular team briefings** n/a 52.7
Cascade 32.1 22.7
Appraisals 92.1 100
Very or quite satisfied with the 
job overall
52.0 n/a
Number who separate from their 
position
n/a 23.6
Number who chose to separate n/a 19.6
Sample size 909 660
The table reports the samples used for regression analysis. The total number of questionnaires returned 
was around 1,700. Information from all of these is used in non-regression analysis.
*The question asked of the two companies used in the separation analysis referred to union recognition 
not the presence of any union members.
**A11 branches of the two companies examined in the separation analysis used some team briefings, so the 
sample was split between those who used such meetings regularly (weekly or fortnightly) and those who 
used them less frequently.
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Table 5. The Incidence Of Voice Mechanisms Over Time, Work Industrial
Relations Surveys 1980/90/98
Mechanisms 1980 1990 1998
Union recognition 65.9 68.8 55.9
JCC or similar 50.7 45.3 45.5
Health and safety 
committee!
64.5 57.7 39.8
Team briefing N/a 56.4 89.4
Quality circle N/a 37.0 47.7
Surveys N/a 23.3 54.4
Management chain N/a 68.8 68.6
Newsletters N/a 59.6 63.6
Suggestion schemes N/a 37.3 28.6
Cascade meetings N/a 46.6 38.8
Collective grievance 
procedures*
90.3 96.0 63.4
Individual grievance 
procedures
88.2 94.3 94.6
Paid by results (non- 
managerial staff)
96.3 84.8 N/a
Merit pay (non- 
managerial staff)
N/a 40.8 26.0
Share ownership/profit 
share schemes (non- 
managerial staff)
11.0 45.8 43.6
Made efforts to boost 
employee involvement 
(in last 3 years/5 years 
1998)
31.7 49.6 54.1
Appraisals N/a 30.3 83.2
Any collective voice 
mechanisms**
84.1 81.9 74.2
Any individual voice 
mechanisms***
11.0 95.1 98.2
The survey added workplaces with between 10 and 24 employees to the sample in 1998. These have been 
dropped for consistency, so all establishments have 25 or more employees.
N/a indicates that this question was not asked in a particular year.
* In all surveys two questions are asked: the existence of a procedure for dealing collectively with 
grievances relating to pay and conditions, and discipline and dismissal. Answer reflects the existence of 
one of these.
** Represents a hybrid of variables indicating either a collective voice forum such as a union or joint 
consultative committee or health and safety committee.
*** Represent a hybrid of variables indicating either forms of employee communication which are 
accessible to individuals or the existence of a share ownership or profit share scheme.
! in 1998 the question about the existence of health and safety committees changed significantly. 
Respondents were asked if they had any health and safety joint committees and then whether any that 
specifically dealt solely with these issues. In previous years they were asked directly about the existence 
of a dedicated health and safety committee.
The table shows the unweighted percentages of all establishments, in both private and 
public sectors, falling in to each of the voice categories.
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Table 6. The Incidence Of Voice Mechanisms Over Time In The Retail And
Hotel/Restaurant Sectors: Surveys 1980/90/98
Mechanisms Retail Hotels/restaurants
1980 1990 1998 1980 1990 1998
Union recognition 63.6 43.8 37.0 23.0 14.8 11.8
JCC or similar 38.6 36.9 44.7 36.1 37.7 23.6
Health and safety committee 34.1 42.5 39.8 37.7 21.3 17.3
Team briefing n/a 71.9 92.2 n/a 55.0 89.0
Quality circle n/a 40.0 43.2 n/a 35.0 32.3
Surveys n/a 13.8 56.6 n/a 16.7 50.5
Management chain n/a 68.1 72.7 n/a 56.7 51.2
Newsletters n/a 69.4 63.7 n/a 46.7 44.9
Suggestion schemes n/a 34.4 39.4 n/a 30.0 28.4
Cascade meetings n/a 45.6 36.3 n/a 33.3 42.5
Collective grievance 
procedures*
95.5 98.1 59.0 70.5 85.3 42.4
Individual grievance procedures 93.2 96.9 95.0 65.6 85.3 88.2
Paid by results 81.8 83.75 n/a 90.2 86.9 N/a
Merit pay N/a 40.0 34.5 N/a 34.4 17.3
Share ownership schemes 25.0 78.6 74.5 11.5 64.4 52.8
Made efforts to boost employee 
involvement (in last 3 years/5 
years 1998)
31.8 55.6 61.8 37.7 41.0 48.0
Appraisals N/a 71.8 92.2 N/a 48.0 83.5
Any collective voice 
mechanisms**
75.0 73.1 69.3 47.5 45.9 39.4
Any individual voice 
mechanisms***
25.0 95.8 98.1 11.5 90.6 96.9
Information in 1980 & 1990 is available at the 1968 SIC (two digit) order level, but 1998 data were only 
made available at the one digit level. The survey added workplaces with between 10 and 24 employees to 
the sample in 1998, these have been dropped for consistency so all establishments have 25 or more 
employees.
N/a indicates that this question was not asked in a particular year.
* In all surveys two questions are asked: the existence of a procedure for dealing collectively with 
grievances relating to pay and conditions, and discipline and dismissal. The answer reflects the existence 
of one of these.
** Represents a hybrid of variables indicating either a collective voice forum such as a union or joint 
consultative committee or health and safety committee.
*** Represent a hybrid of variables indicating either forms of employee communication which are 
accessible to individuals or the existence of a profit share/share ownership scheme.
The table shows the unweighted percentage of workplaces with each category of voice 
mechanism in the selected industries.
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Table 7. The Incidence Of Voice Mechanisms Over Time In The Food
Manufacturing And Leisure Sectors: Surveys 1980/90/98
Mechanisms Food manufacturing Leisure
1980 1990 1998 1980 1990 1998
Union recognition 84.8 80.6 55.2 39.6 80.9 48.7
JCC or similar 69.6 58.3 49.8 39.5 48.9 39.6
Health and safety committee 88.0 80.6 59.9 31.6 53.2 24.3
Team briefing N/a 62.5 81.9 n/a 57.5 88.3
Quality circle N/a 34.7 59.2 n/a 36.2 28.3
Surveys N/a 23.6 50.9 n/a 12.8 40.0
Management chain N/a 75.0 64.2 n/a 59.6 59.5
Newsletters N/a 61.1 54.9 n/a 46.8 48.7
Suggestion schemes N/a 22.2 18.7 n/a 36.2 22.5
Cascade meetings N/a 45.8 29.4 n/a 42.6 45.1
Collective grievance 
procedures*
97.8 98.6 63.2 79.0 97.9 50.5
Individual grievance procedures 98.9 97.2 93.6 84.2 95.7 90.1
Paid by results 94.6 77.8 n/a 100 91.5 N/a
Merit pay N/a 50.0 25.8 N/a 19.2 18.9
Share ownership schemes 28.3 68.6 61.2 0 55.0 30.6
Made efforts to boost employee 
involvement (in last 3 years)
39.6 43.1 57.5 23.7 42.6 45.1
Appraisals N/a 26.9 74.9 N/a 29.7 73.9
Any collective voice 
mechanisms**
95.7 87.5 80.3 73.7 97.9 65.8
Any individual voice 
mechanisms***
28.3 95.8 97.7 0 100 97.3
Information in 1980 & 1990 is available at the 1968 SIC (two digit) order level, but currently only at the 
one digit level for 1998 data. The survey added workplaces with between 10 and 24 employees to the 
sample in 1998, these have been dropped for consistency, so all establishments have 25 or more 
employees.
N/a indicates that this question was not asked in a particular year.
* In all surveys two questions are asked: the existence of a procedure for dealing collectively with 
grievances relating to pay and conditions, and discipline and dismissal. Answer reflects the existence of 
one of these.
** Represents a hybrid of variables indicating either a collective voice forum such as a union, joint 
consultative committee or health and safety committee.
*** Represent a hybrid of variables indicating either forms of employee communication which are 
accessible to individuals or the existence of a profit share or share ownership scheme.
The table shows the unweighted percentage of workplaces with each category of voice 
mechanism in the selected industries.
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Table 8. Incidence Of Voice Measures By Site
Firm Number 
of sites
News
letter
Bonus
Scheme
Team
briefing
Appraisal Cascade
meeting
Union
members
here
Union
recog’n
Hotels 7 4(57) 6(86) 7(100) 7 (100) 3(43) - 1(14)
Retail 5 1(20) 1(20) 5 (100) 5 (100) 0(0) - 4(80)
Leisure 11 2(27) 8(75) 11
(100)
11 (100) 1(9) 4(36) -
Quick
Service
Restaurant
26 5(18) 21 (81) 9(35) 26 (100) 24 (92) 0 -
Food
Manu­
facturer
3 2(67) 0(0) 2(67) 2(67) 2(67) 2(67)
Cells contain the actual number of sites using particular voice mechanisms, the percentage of sites with 
each mechanism is given in parentheses
Table 9. Mean Value Of Overall Job Satisfaction, By The Presence Of Voice 
Mechanisms
Mechanism Yes No T-test value
Union recognition 2.42 2.50 1.00
Union members 2.45 2.40 -.41
Team briefings 2.42 2.54 1.45
Cascade meetings 2.53 2.38 -2.47**
Bonus 2.38 2.54 2.65***
Appraisals n/a n/a n/a
Newsletter 2.52 2.40 -1.77*
* indicates a significant correlation at the 10% confidence level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1%
level. The second food manufacturing site was the only plant not to employ appraisals, and as employees 
did not complete satisfaction questionnaires then we cannot say anything about the interaction of this 
voice mechanism with overall job satisfaction.
Recall that lower values imply higher satisfaction. Therefore we can conclude that use of newsletters and 
meetings of all staff are associated with lower satisfaction than when not used. However, the use of a 
bonus system is related to a higher level of overall satisfaction.
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Table 10. Cell Proportions For Strength Of Agreement With The Statement ‘All In All I Am Satisfied With The Job’ By Voice Mechanism
Mechanism present Union recognition Union members Team briefings Cascade meetings Bonus Appraisals* Newsletter
Strength of 
response
Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y Y N
Strong agreement 22.3 16.2 28.8 12.4 17.0 18.4 15.3 18.2 18.4 15.0 17.2 20.5 16.9
Weak agreement 32.2 36.3 18.2 39.7 34.9 34.7 41.4 31.4 37.5 30.3 34.9 26.9 41.3
Neutral 30.8 33.3 35.4 32.5 33.2 29.0 28.9 34.8 32.6 33.0 32.7 40.5 30.5
Weak disagreement 10.6 8.9 15.2 12.7 12.0 10.0 9.3 13.1 8.5 17.3 11.8 7.0 9.6
Strong disagreement 4.1 5.2 2.5 2.7 2.9 7.9 5.3 2.6 3.0 4.4 3.5 5.1 2.7
Column totals** 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Total no. of obs 292 369 198 733 1402 190 551 1041 1007 585 1592 528 989
* All subject to appraisals except for the second food manufacturing site, on which there is no information. ** column totals may be slightly out due to rounding of percentages. 
Hotel and retail managers were asked about recognition, other managers about the presence of union members.
Table 11. Correlation Coefficients Between Voice Mechanisms And Satisfaction And Separation Probabilities Of Workers
Level of 
satisfaction
Newsletter Bonus Scheme Team briefings Appraisals! Cascade meetings Union members 
here
Union recognition
Very or quite -0.093*** 0.102*** -0.009 0 0.067*** -0.042 0.019
satisfied with job# (0.000) (0.000) (0.736) (0.007) (0.199) (0.632)
Separations# 10.139*** -0.035 -0.013 0 1.123*** -0.432***
(0.000) (0.210) (0.648) (0.000) (0.000)
!all who register as very or quite satisfied with the job are subject to appraisal so this variable is dropped. #satisfaction analysis uses all five companies, whereas separation 
analysis just uses data on retail and hotels.
* indicates a significant correlation at the 10% confidence level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
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Table 12. Marginal Coefficients From Probit Estimates On Job Satisfaction
Variable Marginal effects Ordered probit
Union recognition or presence of -0.073 -0.164
members (0.082) (0.192)
Newsletter 0.002 -0.089
(0.041) (0.121)
Bonus schemes 0.019 -0.121
(0.063) (0.160)
Team briefings -0.148** 0.284**
(0.053) (0.134)
Cascade 0.058 -0.112
(0.069) (0.134)
Hotel chain 0.190* -0.314
(0.093) (0.326)
Quick service restaurant 0.163* -0.567*
(0.088) (0.292)
Food retailer 0.371*** -0.813***
(0.066) (0.242)
Leisure firm 0.393*** -0.756**
(0.062) (0.300)
Female -0.007 -0.106
(0.037) (0.082)
Age -0.027* 0.077***
(0.015) (0.027)
Age2 0.036** -0.109***
(0.018) (0.033)
Ethnic minority 0.042 0.054
(0.066) (0.148)
Married/co-hab 0.008 -0.043
(0.039) (0.075)
One child 0.068 -0.266**
(0.049) (0.105)
Two or more children 0.064 -0.158
(0.057) (0.123)
CSEs 0.022 -0.351
(0.097) (0.229)
A levels -0.063 0.102
(0.057) (0.141)
Degree -0.167* 0.338*
(0.093) (0.186)
Vocational qualifications 0.055 -0.284***
(0.055) (0.095)
No qualifications -0.070 -0.048
(0.051) (0.117)
Much more than other local wages -0.105 0.478***
(0.092) (0.169)
A little more than other local wages -0.114** 0.468***
(0.053) (0.136)
A little less than other local wages 0.125** -0.186
(0.056) (0.143)
A lot less than other local wages -0.016 -0.110
(0.060) (0.142)
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Table 12. Marginal Coefficients From Probit Estimates On Job Satisfaction, cont.
Voice mechanisms Marginal effects Ordered probit
West Midlands -0.125**
(0.058)
0.094
(0.130)
North West -0.021
(0.083)
-0.142
(0.162)
South East -0.289***
(0.067)
0.352**
(0.158)
South West 0.020
(0.081)
-0.471***
(0.171)
Tenure 0.014 x 10’2 
(0.048) x 10'2
0.016 x 10'2 
(0.108) x 10'2
Sample size 909 909
Log likelihood -516.420 -1151.432
Pseudo R2 13.60% 6.92%
Predicted probability (at means) 0.665 N/a
The default categories are the food manufacturer, GCSE qualifications, Yorkshire and Humberside, 
paying about the same as other local jobs. The variable appraisal is dropped due to lack of variation 
across the sample. +/- indicates the sign of the estimated coefficient. Statistically significant results are 
reported at the 1% ***, 5% ** and 10% * significance levels.
The first column presents marginal effects from a probit regression using a dummy 
indicating positive levels of satisfaction, clustered by site. The second column presents 
coefficients from an ordered probit regression on a five point satisfaction variable.
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Table 13. The Marginal Effects Of An Ordered Probit Regression On Employee Satisfaction, Using A Benchmark Employee
Level of 
agreement with 
statement ‘all in 
all I am 
satisfied with 
this job’
Default
individual*
(John)
Representative
individual
(Angie)
Representative 
individual with 
some form of 
collective voice
Representative 
individual 
cascade meetings
Representative 
individual with 
team briefings
Representative 
individual with a 
bonus system
Representative 
individual with 
newsletters
Strongly agree 6.0 8.0 10.7 9.8 4.5 9.9 9.4
Agree somewhat 30.6 34.4 38.2 37.0 27.1 37.2 36.5
Indifference 37.6 36.4 34.4 35.1 38.0 35.0 35.4
Disagree
somewhat
15.1 13.0 10.8 11.5 10.7 11.4 11.8
Disagree
strongly
10.7 8.2 6.0 6.6 13.4 6.5 6.9
*The default individual, referred to in column 1, has the characteristics which form the default categories in the ordered probit estimation: they earn around the average 
local wage, are based in Yorkshire & Humberside, are educated to O level standard and work for the Food Manufacturer. They are attributed the mean age, value of age 
squared and length of tenure for the sample.
Column 2 adjusts the initial specification to make the benchmark individual more representative. The individual is now a cohabiting female. 
Columns 3-7 add in each of the voice mechanisms in turn.
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Table 14. Marginal Coefficients From Probit Estimates On Job Separations
All turnover Voluntary turnover
Variable Marginal effects Marginal effects
Union recognition 0.033 0.095***
(0.098) (0.024)
Newsletter -0.064** -0.044*
(0.028) (0.026)
Bonus schemes -0.108** -0.062*
(0.050) (0.040)
Regular team briefings 0.061*** 0.049***
(0.016) (0.015)
Cascade -0.020 -0.008
(0.022) (0.014)
Food retailer -0.268*** -0.264***
(0.092) (0.046)
Female 0.059 0.049*
(0.034) (0.024)
Age -0.047*** -0.026***
(0.010) (0.009)
Age squared (/100) 0.054*** 0.027**
(0.012) (0.011)
Ethnic minority -0.020 -0.006
(0.066) (0.059)
Cohabiting -0.064* -0.039
(0.030) (0.026)
One child 0.063 0.012
(0.063) (0.045)
More than one child 0.072 0.030
(0.075) (0.057)
No qualifications -0.024 0.003
(0.049) (0.041)
CSEs 0.049 0.068
(0.076) (0.060)
A levels 0.033 0.042
(0.079) (0.058)
Degree 0.169*** 0.150***
(0.067) (0.062)
Vocational qualifications -0.093** -0.047
(0.037) (0.039)
Relative wage rate 0.440*** 0.444***
(0.088) (0.102)
Unemployment in travel to work -0.009 -0.001
area 1997ql (0.012) (0.008)
Tenure -0.018*** x 10'1 -0.017*** x 10'1
(0.006) x 10'] (0.005) x 10'1
Unskilled or trainee position 0.131* 0.117*
(0.085) (0.072)
Semi-skilled position with some 0.001 -0.003
responsibility (0.056) (0.033)
Skilled or supervisory -0.032 -0.036
(0.052) (0.040)
Junior management or professional -0.137** -0.110**
(0.044) (0.035)
Full time (30 or more hours per 0.136** 0.039
week) (0.064) (0.065)
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Table 14. Marginal Coefficients From Probit Estimates On Separations, cont.
Number of obs 660 660
Log likelihood -273.704 -241.580
Pseudo R2 24.17% 25.91%
Predicted probability (at means) 0.160 0.108
The default categories are the hotel chain, GCSEs, semi-skilled occupations.
The variable appraisal is dropped due to lack of variation across the sample.
+/- indicates the sign of the estimated coefficient. Statistically significant results are reported at the 1% 
***, 5% ** and 10% * significance levels.
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Chapter 3. Absenteeism
1. Introduction
Absenteeism is a major workplace issue for the UK. Time off during the 
working week imposes costs on the employing organisation, individuals, and economy 
as a whole. In 2001 an average of 7.1 days were lost per employee, varying from 8.8 
days for manual workers to 5.5 for non-manuals (CBI Issues Statement 2002). CBI 
estimates of the costs to the whole economy in sick pay and replacement staff were 
£11.8 billion in 2001, or £476 per employee (CBI Issues Statement 2002), rising from 
£10.5 billion, or £438 per worker in 1999 (CBI News Release 2000). CBI data are 
derived from annual surveys of organisations employing around 6 per cent of the UK’s 
workforce, and show that larger firms and the public sector were worst affected. 
Historically the trend has fluctuated. Rose (1985) found increased absenteeism during 
the 1960s and 1970s, which was attributed to a declining work ethic. At this point the 
trend levelled off, before beginning to fall during the 1990s.
Absence is a labour supply issue, and so much of the economics literature on 
absenteeism incorporates a hedonic model, see for example Allen (1981a, 1981b, 1983) 
or Vistnes (1997). This model argues that it is possible to construct for each worker a 
series of indifference curves representing preferences across wages and absenteeism 
policy. Those with a high leisure preference will prefer workplaces which accommodate 
absence. Organisations will also develop a wage profile reflecting the ease with which 
they can accommodate absenteeism, which is related to the ease of capital and 
alternative labour substitutability. The equilibrium is reached at the tangency of the 
individual’s indifference and the organisation’s isoprofit function. The assumptions 
behind the model, particularly the idea that all workers have perfect mobility and can 
move to an organisation offering their preferred trade off of wage and absence 
tolerance, are unrealistic.
In the absence of a hedonic equilibrium, the costs are sizeable. The employer 
faces both direct and indirect costs. The direct costs derive from the lost production of 
the absent worker, disruption problems due to organising cover, the costs of monitoring 
and sometimes counselling absentees, and sick pay where the level offered exceeds the
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statutory minimum. Indirectly, the work patterns and productivity of attending staff may 
be disrupted, specifically where team work is important. Employees too face indirect 
and direct costs. Direct costs are obviously any lost wages and benefits, whilst indirect 
costs may be the decrease in the likelihood that they are promoted, or the greater 
likelihood that they will be laid off in bad economic times or sacked for unreliability. 
Absence may, of course, have some positive aspects. Absenteeism may be good as it 
allows for recovery from illness, preventing the spread of infection amongst other staff. 
It may also act as a safety valve for stressed or dissatisfied staff -  preventing the need 
for more permanent exit. Steers and Rhodes (1978) argue that absence theoretically 
lowers accidents and enables higher quality output. Indirectly it may lead to greater 
satisfaction amongst those attending work. The need to anticipate absences may enable 
co-workers to be trained in a variety of tasks so that they are able to offer cover, or they 
may be offered over-time working to cover the uncompleted tasks.
Absenteeism is of interest as it represents a point on the voice-exit continuum 
open to disgruntled workers. Hirschman (1970) identified two opposing reactions which 
were open to consumers faced with a decline in service or the quality of a product. 
These consumers could choose to exercise voice in the hope that the service or the 
quality of the product would be restored. Alternatively they could exit and find a 
substitute. Hirschman argued that the decision would reflect loyalty, with loyal 
consumers trying the voice option first. However, when applying this model to the 
labour market it is possible to assume that loyalty as a qualification might be superseded 
by access to a voice mechanism. So employees with limited formal voice options might 
exercise their voice through absenteeism. Employee exit might also be limited to 
absenteeism if labour market conditions were particularly difficult, or the employees 
faced difficulties in finding comparable alternative jobs due to their low levels of skill 
and constrained geographical mobility.
The aim of this chapter is to fully explore the longitudinal picture of 
absenteeism in one food manufacturing plant in North London in the mid 1990s. A 
particularly rich data set is available for this plant, comprising two and a half years’ 
payroll data and personnel details which record absence information. This plant was 
typified by low tenure, high absenteeism and poor economic performance until it was 
taken over by a national food manufacturer in 1992. The new owners subsequently
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sought to improve every aspect of performance, and following a strengthening of their 
position in the product market, the company introduced a significant sequence of 
changes in working conditions and pay from April 1995. In addition, satisfaction 
surveys for a small sub-set of the relevant workers were distributed in Autumn 1996; 
these are mapped in to payroll data. This paper will investigate whether absenteeism can 
be construed as a form of voice or a form of (partial) exit.
Table 1 presents industry level absence information from the 1990 Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS), and its follow up Workplace Employee Relations 
Survey of 1998. Respondents are asked for the percentage of staff taking time off sick 
over the last twelve months. Comparing the first two rows, manufacturing and non­
manufacturing, the percentage of staff absent appears to have fallen between the 
surveys, continuing the downward trend identified by Rose (1985). There is wide 
variation across industries and within the same industry. Looking first at manufacturing, 
between 4 and 6 per cent of staff were off in the year prior to the 1990 survey, falling to 
2-4 per cent in the 1998 survey, Aggregating up across all other industries, the modal 
categories were more than 4-6 per cent in 1990 and 2-4 per cent of staff in 1998. 
Comparison across the 12 main industrial classes shows that utilities and construction 
have particularly low rates of absence, whilst it appears highest for health and social 
work.
At the factory chosen for this case study, hereafter 2Bun Factory”, 53 per cent of 
staff took time off between July 1995 and June 1996. The WIRS survey data does not 
give absolute levels of absenteeism, just banded values, which prevents us from 
observing the maximum level of absenteeism. However, even these comparisons 
suggest that Bun Factory has extremely high levels of absenteeism. According to the 
hedonic model of absence, the match between employers and employees with wage- 
absence preferences has been made, with Bun Factory representing a plant at the low 
wage-high tolerance of absence end of the continuum. Whilst this might imply that the 
findings of this case study are not widely transferable, the longitudinal analysis of the 
change in absenteeism in light of changes to pay and conditions may have more general 
applicability. Such a data set also affords the chance to examine whether absence is 
being used as voice, to draw attention to poor pay and conditions, or as exit by these 
employees.
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The lay out of the paper is as follows: firstly, we discuss the methodological 
problems inherent in previous studies of absenteeism, and outline the various definitions 
which will be employed here. The literature review is divided in to a number of sub­
sections. Firstly, the impact of demographics, and job characteristics on patterns of 
absenteeism is analysed. The use of lagged absenteeism is then discussed, along with an 
examination of the impact of internal organisational pressures and external labour 
market factors on absenteeism. Information is available on the job satisfaction levels of 
a small subset of workers, so next the paper discusses the relationship between 
satisfaction and absenteeism. This organisation instituted a number of improvements to 
working conditions and pay over the period under study. If absenteeism is used to 
express dissatisfaction, as an informal voice channel, improvements to pay and 
conditions would be likely to lower the rate on non-attendance. The effect of these 
workplace changes on time off is explored, with a focus on variation by skill group. 
Finally, some of the literature on absenteeism posits that absenteeism represents a 
(weak) manifestation of exit. The final sub-section examines whether the determinants 
of absenteeism are the same as those which lead workers to quit. The data and 
modelling techniques are discussed in sections 4 and 5. Results are discussed in the 6th 
section, with conclusions offered in section 7.
2. What Is Meant By “Absenteeism”?
Studies of absenteeism are less numerous than those of other employment 
phenomena such as job satisfaction or labour turnover, and those that do exist are 
fraught by definitional issues which make many of the results incomparable (Hackett: 
1989). The practitioner literature offers a series of precise and conceptually clear 
definitions (ACAS: 1996, IDS: 1998).
The commonest measures are the overall rate of absence -  the total number of 
days lost due divided by the total number of working days available; the frequency -  
spells of absence divided through by total employees, and the incidence -  employees off 
one or more times divided through by total employees. These measures can be taken 
over different time periods - monthly, quarterly or annually and are generally 
multiplied out so that they can be expressed as percentages. More subtle than this,
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reflecting the greater disruption caused by multiple short spells off work is the 
disruption index (IDS: 1998). This figure is a multiple of squared spells off in a given 
year times days lost.
Eg: 1 spell of 14 days = l 2x 1 x 14 = 14 
or 14 spells of 1 days = 142 x 14 x 1 = 2744
Source: IDS March 1998, page 4.
Academics employ different definitions and further criteria. In their attempt to 
define a coherent conceptual framework for this subject, Mowday, Porter and Steers 
(1982) identified four measures: medical absences -  three days plus or spells coved by a 
medical certificate; frequency -  number of spells; attitudinal absence -  one day spells; 
and severity or rate -  total days. They argue that each is a distinct measure, as there is 
little statistical correlation between the different measures.
The concern with the length of each spell, and the desire to treat differently 
spells of a certain length, relates to the recognition that the motivation to take time off 
will vary. A common argument is that absence can be broken down in to “voluntary” 
and “involuntary” time off. Vistnes (1997) took the position that involuntary absence 
would be determined predominantly by state of health, which is often not visible. 
Whilst the submission of a medical certificate indicates that a spell of absence was 
involuntary, often this degree of information is not available. Researchers need to find a 
way of distinguishing between the two types of absence, and longer spells are likely to 
indicate health problems, an involuntary cause of absence. In choosing their definition 
of voluntary absences, Deery et al (1999) selected periods of one or two days where the 
worker did not obtain a medical certificate. Mowday et al (1982) used a three day cut­
off to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary absences. In a theoretical 
discussion of absenteeism, Steers and Rhodes (1978) argue employee absence will 
depend upon both the motivation and ability to come to work, reflecting a greater range 
of pressures than purely medical. Motivation, they argue, reflects satisfaction (voluntary 
absence) and family constraints and pressures reflecting the state of the wider job 
market (involuntary absence). Whilst Fichman (1984) argued that absenteeism theory 
was poorly defined, he rejected the idea that job satisfaction need be linked to
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absenteeism. He felt that voluntary absence might be seen as a rational choice, part of 
an adjustment to changes in the psychological contract (wage-effort), or it might reflect 
habit. Within the data set used here it is possible to distinguish between absences 
covered by a medical note and those that were either self or uncertified. The latter two 
categories will be treated as voluntary absence.
Mowday et al (1982, p.80) offer a further refinement of the concept of voluntary 
absenteeism. “Attitudinal absence” refers to absences of just one day, which represents 
quite clear voluntary absence and may indicate a lack of commitment to the 
organisation. Alternatively it may offer an immediate alternative to permanent exit 
following dissatisfaction. This concept corresponds to the concept of the “disruption 
index” (IDS: 1998), as many shorter spells will generate more problems than a smaller 
number of long absences. This paper looks at attitudinal absences, as a subset of all 
voluntary time off.
The lack of consistency in defining absenteeism extends to the choice of 
measure to be used. Some studies choose to look at the number of days off in a given 
period - severity, whilst others choose the number of separate spells - frequency. In their 
case study, Edwards and Whitston (1993) examined spells, days lost and the duration of 
spells. Chaudhury and Ng (1992) estimated absence using both total days off (voluntary 
time off) and long spells (involuntary) which they classified as those of more than five 
days’ duration. Hackett (1989) takes precisely the opposite approach, and finds that 
frequency is better explained than duration. Mowday et al (1982) also found absence 
frequency the most robust measure, by virtue of results in test-retest situations. Whilst 
there is no consensus on whether it is better to use total days or total spells, the measure 
chosen has implications for the modelling technique, as will be pursued in the 
methodology section. This study will attempt to identify which offers the more robust 
results: spells or total days.
The length of period under examination also varies widely. As Mowday et al 
(1982) point out, absenteeism will be influenced by seasonal and cyclical pressures, so 
the longer the period under study the more robust the results are likely to be. Studies 
such as that of Barmby and Treble (1991), take a short period of two weeks’ 
information, reflecting constraints in access to data. This may go some way to explain
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their inability to find significant influences. Both Edwards and Whitston (1993) and 
Chaudhury and Ng (1992) explore data for a one year period. Obviously access to a 
year’s data offers the chance to look for seasonal influences. In this data set we have a 
period of two and a half years and choose to focus on July 1995 - June 1996, with 
reference to information on the previous year to construct lags.
The source of the information can also influence the quality of the data. Barmby 
and Treble (1991) use self-reported absence data. Where the respondent seeks to make a 
good impression this may be subject to attribution bias -  with the individual seeking to 
justify their absence from work in ways different to the actual causes. The longer the 
period between the time off and the collection period the more likely the individual is to 
suffer from recall bias. As a consequence the results of Barmby and Treble are 
inconclusive. To avoid these problems Hackett et al (1989) asked their respondents to 
complete a daily sheet recording their intentions about attendance and their actual 
attendance during their study. The use of employers’ data in this study obviously solves 
the recall issue, but is still open to some problems with regard to the recording of the 
justification for the absence. There may be some causes which the employee cannot 
disclose as they may prove unacceptable to the employer. In this study we have access 
to the employer’s attendance records, which record whether the absence was 
uncertified, self-certified or medically certified.
The data set used in this paper is particularly rich, and enables us to surmount 
most of the problems encountered in previous research. Following a detailed description 
of the data available in section 4, we will use a one year unbalanced panel to explore the 
pattern of voluntary absence, using information on the probability of absence, total 
spells and total days off and “attitudinal” absences.
3. Themes and Hypotheses
a) Absenteeism And Demographic, Job Or Workgroup Characteristics
Much of the previous work on absence has examined the impact of individual or 
work group characteristics on the probability of taking time off. Gender, education level 
and age are often shown to be related to the probability of taking time off (Steers and 
Rhodes: 1978). Workplace and job characteristics may also play a role. Flexibility in 
selecting hours, total hours worked, and position in the hierarchy may be linked to
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taking sick leave. Wage rates are influential too. The hedonic model is often used by 
researchers taking an economic approach to the issue of absenteeism, for example 
Allen: 1981, Vistnes: 1997. According to this model, across the labour market workers 
seek out firms offering their desired bundle of wages and absenteeism tolerance. This 
may not be a reasonable assumption for workers whose skills are so limited that they 
have few job choices, or those who are geographically immobile. Within our sample 
such a trade off and pairing of firms with particular isoprofit functions and workers with 
tangential indifference curves would already have been made. Therefore it is possible to 
concentrate on an analysis of the demographic and job characteristics which may affect 
absenteeism.
Female labour market participation rates are lower than those of men, and their 
choice of employment is often driven by the need to combine work and care for 
children. Most studies examining the impact of gender have found that women are more 
likely to take time off sick, though this may be driven by a number of factors: their 
lower labour market commitment (Mastekaasen & Olsen: 1998, Chaudhury & Ng: 
1992); their need to care for other family members (Allen: 1983); or poorer health 
(Vistnes: 1997). Vistnes (1997) argues that the pattern of absenteeism varies so much 
by gender that separate equations should be run. In her study of involuntary absence in 
the US during the 1980s, the coefficients on a number of variables were significantly 
different by sex. Women were significantly more likely to be off and to take longer to 
recover than men. The results were driven by poorer health and the need to care for their 
young children. Men with young children in child care conformed more to the absence 
pattern of mothers of young children than the standard pattern for men. Mastekaasen 
and Olsen (1998) find similar results in their study of gender differences in the 
Norwegian public sector, though they cited a slightly narrower motivation. They used 
panel data to control for occupational and workplace crowding. Women were more 
likely to be off and to obtain medical certificates, though differences disappeared when 
looking at longer spells off work. They claim that this reflects the importance women 
attach to childcare. Edwards and Whitston (1993) found that women of child bearing 
age were more likely to take time off in the pharmaceutical factory they studied, which 
led the employer to advocate avoiding their employment. Whilst most studies 
concentrate on gender differences, and find that women’s absenteeism is higher than
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men’s, Delgado and Kniesner (1997) look at marital status. They find that married men 
take more time off than single.
In a series of papers looking at absenteeism in industrial contexts Allen (1981a, 
1981b, 1983) employed the hedonic model. Whilst this model suggests that an 
equilibrium can be reached, with those workers who prefer high absence and low wages 
matching themselves to organisations offering a low wage-high tolerance of absence, he 
finds several factors which are associated with higher absenteeism. Absence is linked to 
inflexibility in scheduling and accident rates. Access to flexibility with regard to work 
scheduling is often argued to inhibit absence, as workers are better able to deal with 
other commitments (Allen: 1983). In his earlier study of the US paper industry, Allen 
(1981) found that workers in large plants were more likely to take time off as they were 
more constrained by predetermined work schedules, suggesting that size is related to 
inflexibility. Chaudhury and Ng (1992) investigated modelling techniques for predicting 
absenteeism using Canadian industry data. Whilst they too predicted that long hours 
would be correlated with absence, their results show that it is inflexibility in scheduling 
which is positively associated with time off.
Education and skill are likely to be highly correlated and will indicate the 
individual’s position in the organisation’s hierarchy. Chaudhury and Ng (1992) suggest 
that those with higher levels of education will face fewer hazards and have greater 
scope for using their initiative, leading to lower absenteeism. In practice they find that 
lower rates were only observed for long-term absences, which are presumably health 
related. Allen (1983) compares the rates of blue- and white-collar industrial workers. 
Blue-collar workers take more time off, but he cautions that this may reflect the greater 
flexibility that white-collar workers enjoy and the scope that they have for concealing 
their attendance behaviour. Indeed, Delgado and Kniesner (1997) found that more 
highly skilled labour has a higher absence rate. However, as Delgado and Kniesner 
point out, grade will also be correlated with hourly wage. If higher wages cause 
employees to take more time off then the income effect is said to dominate. The cost of 
leisure is the wage foregone, so where they view the cost of an hour’s leisure as too 
expensive the substitution effect is dominant. Therefore the grade variable can be used 
to explore whether the income or substitution effect dominates in this sample.
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Steers and Rhodes (1978) and Mowday et al (1982) both emphasise that 
attendance at work is driven by desire to attend and ability to attend. Distance from 
home to work can be classed as a factor affecting ability to attend. Those living further 
away will have to spend more time and may encounter more trouble reaching their 
destination than those living close to the plant. Delgado and Kniesner (1997) test this 
empirically using a sample of London transport workers, and find that distance has a 
significant, negative impact on attendance.
Age effects on absenteeism are indeterminate. Chaudhury and Ng (1992) argue 
that older workers are more likely to be ill, and hence need time off, but have stronger 
commitment due to financial constraints. These effects appeared to cancel each other 
out, and no empirical effect was measured. However, Allen (1983), using US industry 
level data, found that young workers were more likely to be off than their older 
colleagues. The London bus driver sample showed age to be negatively associated with 
absenteeism (Delgado and Kniesner: 1997).
As unions represent a form of voice mechanism they may have an impact on 
absenteeism (Allen: 1984). Unionisation may lead to an increase in absenteeism as 
personnel policies prevent arbitrary sackings, or, it may fall if the union can solve minor 
problems. For instance they may reduce the need to work unpleasant or inconvenient 
shifts, or provide a premium for working shifts which compensates for this. Allen finds 
that absence in unionised plants is 34-40 per cent higher than for non-union labour. 
However, he suggests that it may be strength of the union rather than unionism per se 
which matters. The presence of a union may lead to higher expectations which only a 
strong union can deliver on. Addison and Belfield (2001) cover the relationship 
between absence and both union and non-union forms of voice. Whilst collective, 
representative forms of voice are positively linked with absence in 1998 WERS data, 
employee involvement (El) was negatively correlated with time off. When employee 
involvement was disaggregated into constituent policies, such as team briefings or 
suggestion schemes the relationship disappeared, suggesting that El is more than the 
sum of its parts.
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Hypotheses for sub-section a: Demographic, Job Or Workgroup Characteristics
Many demographic and workplace features have been shown in previous work 
to have indeterminate effects. However, there are some hypotheses which can be made 
with confidence. It is to be anticipated that women will show a higher rate of 
absenteeism than men, and those with further to travel will be off more often than those 
living close to the plant. In this sample grade represents skill level, and is acting as a 
proxy for education and wages -  as wages are non-contingent. In line with most studies 
it is anticipated that the less educated and less skilled will take more time off work. 
Whilst hours data is not available, shift pattern is. Those on day shifts are less likely to 
have flexibility to conduct their non-work affairs. Those on nights will face similar 
problems and will have to adjust their social and personal lives to fit their work 
schedules. Therefore it is anticipated that these groups will take more time off. When 
restricting the sample to voluntary absences it is likely that younger workers will take 
more time off. This plant remained non-union until 1999, and only introduced a formal 
communication mechanism, team briefings, in November 1995. Whilst it is not possible 
to test union impact, it is possible that the introduction of team briefings may lower 
absence.
b) Absenteeism And Lagged Absenteeism, External And Internal Pressures
Both Delgado and Kniesner (1997) and Avery and Holtz (1984) argue that 
absenteeism is a dynamic process, so models must accommodate the individual’s 
reaction to changing circumstances. Delgado and Kniesner use data from London 
Transport to test a dynamic model of voluntary absence -  proxied as spells of less than 
eight days off work. They find that independent variables affect results more than the 
modelling technique, and find a range of significant demographics. Lagged absence 
spells, from last year and the one prior to that, were significant (positive) explanatory 
variables at the 1 per cent level, with time off last year having the greater effect.
Steers and Rhodes (1978) mention the role of “pressures” in determining 
attendance. Unemployment, reflecting the ability to get an alternative job, was a 
significant pressure. Markham (1985), and Markham and McKee (1991), pursue this 
issue in much greater detail. Markham (1985) finds an inverse relationship between 
national unemployment and national absenteeism, a pattern which was replicated at a
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local level. Markham and McKee (1991) use a data from a sample of US textile plants 
between January 1978 and July 1983 to look at causes in deviations from the average 
plant level of absenteeism. They sought to investigate the effect of external and internal 
pressures, namely changes in unemployment rates and changes in the size of the 
workforce, on attendance behaviour. They tested a range of values for external and 
internal pressures, to determine whether behaviour is moderated by contemporaneous 
plant size and unemployment rates, lagged or anticipatory rates. Both internal and 
external pressures cause employees to restrict their absenteeism. Contemporaneous 
changes in the levels of plant employment and anticipatory changes to local 
unemployment, of one month, and their interaction term, have the most significant 
impact on absenteeism, indicating a degree of economic awareness on the part of the 
employees. The major drawback of this study is the unrepresentative nature of the 
sample. Only plants which declined monotonically in size were included. It may be the 
case that workers in such environments are much more sensitive to these types of 
pressures than workers in general.
Hypotheses for sub-section b: Absenteeism And Lagged Absenteeism, External 
And Internal Pressures
Lower employment within the plant may lead to insecurity, so workers will tend 
to reduce time off to avoid early redundancy. Lower employment across their local 
labour market will reduce opportunities making their current job more attractive and 
hence lowering absenteeism. Lagged absenteeism is likely to be positively correlated 
with current absenteeism -  both because of attitudinal reasons and as an indicator of 
poor health. This paper will not focus on the impact of poor health on attendance, 
therefore the empirical work will focus on the effect of lagged voluntary time off on 
current voluntary absenteeism.
c) Absenteeism And Job Satisfaction
Hirschman (1970) argues that when faced with an unsatisfactory environment an 
individual may react in one of two ways: they may use their voice in an attempt to 
improve their situation; or they may choose to exit from this position. Using this 
approach, employee absenteeism can be interpreted in one of two ways. Absence may 
be used by a dissatisfied employee as a (moderated) form of exit. Alternatively, in the 
absence of any institutionalised voice mechanisms such as trade unions or works
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councils, or where these are perceived as having little power and independence, absence 
may be operating as a muted form of voice. By breaking their side of the wage-effort 
bargain, absent workers may signal to the employer that they are unhappy with their 
terms of employment and/or working conditions (Allen: 1984). Therefore, a negative 
relationship between satisfaction and time off may offer support for either the absence 
as exit or absence as voice hypothesis.
Most of the literature examining the relationship between job satisfaction and 
absenteeism predicts a negative relationship, see for example Chaudhury and Ng 
(1992). However, Steers and Rhodes’ (1978) summary of extant empirical work found 
little evidence of a link between satisfaction and absence, and the relationship 
deteriorated further when individual level data were used. They hypothesised that 
attendance at work will reflect motivation and the ability to get to work, with 
motivation closely related to job satisfaction. They called for a more sophisticated 
model that disaggregated job satisfaction in to facets which reflect the content of the job 
and those which represent the work context. In their review variables related to job 
content, such as the degree of challenge in the job, appear to affect absenteeism more 
than those related to the context, such as workgroup size and relations with supervisors; 
with the reverse true for the relationship between facets of satisfaction and labour 
turnover.
The Steers and Rhodes model has been extensively used in the study of 
absenteeism. Mowday, Porter and Steers (1982) discuss four studies which attempted to 
test the model devised by Steers and Rhodes with varying results. The first of these, 
Hammer et al (1980), finds that satisfaction and other attitudinal factors were more 
closely correlated with absenteeism than demographic and job characteristics. However, 
the results of this study are dubious as job satisfaction and absence were positively 
correlated. Terborg et al (1981) found no link between ability to attend work and 
absence, but job satisfaction and commitment were related (inversely) to absenteeism. 
Frechette (1981) argues that pressure to attend was the significant factor in explaining 
absence, but identified commitment as a pressure to attend. In contrast, Watson’s (1981) 
limited test found no significant factors. A later literature review, by Rosse and Miller 
(1984), also examined the robustness of the Steers and Rhodes model. Their summary 
of extant literature found that overall job satisfaction was generally negatively
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associated with absenteeism, with a significant relationship between work content and 
absenteeism. Relations between supervisors or co-workers and absenteeism do not have 
significance, whilst satisfaction with pay or promotion is linked to labour turnover but 
not absence.
Price (1998) uses employee data for a large private hospital in the mid-western 
US to explore the causes of absence. Adapting the Steers and Rhodes model, Price 
divides influences into those which are exogenous, such as alternative jobs, repetition in 
the job, kinship responsibilities and social support, and those which are endogenous, 
such as job satisfaction, job involvement and organisational commitment. Kinship 
responsibilities, organisational permissiveness, pay, and supervisory support are 
significantly related to absence. Job involvement, job satisfaction and organisational 
commitment do not mediate exogenous determinants. Fichman (1984) rejects the Steers 
and Rhodes model on the basis that job satisfaction and absence need not be related. He 
argues that absence may be avoidance behaviour, it may be a rational choice in the face 
of change in the wage-effort bargain, may be a habit or reflect outside pressures. 
However, he is unable to offer empirical support for his arguments.
Hackett (1989) examines the conflicting results of three meta-analyses on the 
link between absenteeism and job satisfaction. The relationships between satisfaction 
and absence were weaker than predicted by the models used, due to the range of 
external pressures on individuals to attend. Hackett divided studies in to those that used 
overall satisfaction, reflecting aspects of the job, whereas those using work satisfaction 
focused on intrinsic tasks. This corresponds to the Steers and Rhodes (1978) concepts of 
job context and content. The strongest associations between work satisfaction and 
absenteeism are discovered when using absence frequency, and this relationship was 
found to be stronger where respondents were younger, and had shorter tenure. The 
relation was weaker with a higher proportion of women in the sample -  presumably as 
they are less attached to the labour market. The strongest links between duration of 
absence and satisfaction were found when employing data on overall satisfaction.
Although the Steers and Rhodes (1978) model underplays the importance of job 
context variables, satisfaction with the work environment may reflect a positive 
industrial relations climate. Deery et al (1999) find that absenteeism is negatively
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correlated with individual commitment and the industrial relations climate. However, 
Edwards & Whitston (1993) found that high group cohesiveness and trust in capital did 
not lower absenteeism in the two plants which they studied.
Hypotheses for sub-section c: Absenteeism And Job Satisfaction
In the light of these studies, it is expected that there will be a significantly 
negative, if weak, relationship between job satisfaction and absence. This will vary 
according to the facet of satisfaction used: content or contextual aspects. For example, 
those who are challenged by the nature of their job are less likely to be off. Whilst ease 
of transport, good relationships and contentment with this employer may seem 
theoretically influential factors, these contextual factors are less likely to be 
(significantly) negatively related to absenteeism. A negative relationship could imply 
that absence is used as exit, or as voice; a definitive answer to this may arise from 
subsequent analysis of absenteeism against a backdrop of better pay and conditions.
d) Absenteeism And Changes To Working Conditions And Pay
Following from the work of Hirschman (1970) and Allen (1984), absence may 
be used to indicate to the employer that all is not well in the workplace, particularly in 
the absence of other voice mechanisms. Edwards and Whitston’s (1993) longitudinal 
study of absenteeism in a pharmaceutical factory and warehouse examines absenteeism 
during a period when the industrial relations climate deteriorated. Greater product 
market competition led to mandatory redundancies amongst the predominantly semi­
skilled workforce, which changed the climate at work. Senior management endeavoured 
to change from their previously “sophisticated” and pluralist approach, adopting a more 
cost-centred strategy and unitarist style. This included introducing a target of 7-8 per 
cent absenteeism, with return to work interviews used as a means to deter voluntary 
absence. To change management style methods such as team briefings, cascades, and 
meetings with customers were used. The changes proved unpopular and line managers 
viewed the absenteeism target in particular as unnecessary. As a result of the changes 39 
per cent of those remaining considered leaving and absenteeism increased. This reflects 
the anxiety survivors experience after radical organisational change (Littler et al: 2003). 
Deery et al (1999) examine how the relationship between trade union and employers in 
Australia impacted upon attendance patterns. Although their focus is on union effects, 
they hypothesise that changes to working conditions/practices may have beneficial
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effects on absence, moderated by demographics and external market conditions. A 
better industrial relations climate was associated with higher attendance, but changes 
were more successful where unions were involved in the planning of change.
Training may be a means to improve employee attendance. Katz et al (1983) 
look at the impact of quality of working life (QWL) programmes in General Motors 
Plants on economic and industrial relations indicators, including employee absence. 
Those programmes listed as impacting on QWL included: projects involving 
employees’ families out of hours; community projects; plant environment 
improvements; off-site problem solving groups and union meetings; drug and alcohol 
abuse programmes; quality boosting schemes; information sharing; two-way 
communications schemes; Christmas lunches; and training and up-skilling supervisors. 
They do not disaggregate the effects of these different schemes. Absenteeism moved 
sharply in line with changes in the economic cycle, but rose much more slowly where 
strong efforts to improve QWL were observed. Such workplace changes may have an 
immediate, direct effect: if the workplace becomes more tolerable this may lead to 
higher individual morale, possibly lowering absenteeism and turnover in the medium 
term. Katz et al (1983) argue that introducing QWL programmes can have an additional 
less direct effect: alleviating conflict and helping to enshrine trust, thus working in 
opposition to Fox’s (1974) high conflict-low trust dynamic. Interestingly, whilst higher 
absenteeism was linked to lower productivity it was also related (just insignificantly) to 
higher quality of output, which emphasises that absenteeism may perform a useful 
function. These results come with some caveats. Longitudinal data were used for this 
study, but the QWL attitude survey was not administered at the same time, or as often, 
as the other quality and efficiency data was collected. The measure of absenteeism, 
contractual hours taken off, is also less sophisticated than most employed, conflating 
voluntary and involuntary absences.
Krueger and Rouse (1998) take a much narrower focus, looking at the impact of 
adult education provision for low skilled workers, during working hours, on a number 
of indicators including absenteeism. Their study covers two plants in New Jersey. Their 
measure is the fraction of hours missed per week as a function of hours spent in adult 
education. They find a small beneficial effect. However, there are three particular 
problems with this study. The training takes place during working hours, so it is not
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possible to investigate what impact out of hours education would have. Classes are not 
held at crucial times for absenteeism, such as Christmas and the holiday season, so it is 
not possible to see if training can offset seasonal fluctuations in absence rates. The 
study also covers a short time period so it gives information on the current impact of 
education. The (unspecified) lagged effect on absenteeism was negligible.
Any improvements in basic pay may be subject to two conflicting influences. 
The income effect predicts that a higher hourly wage, by raising income, will lead to 
higher rates of absenteeism (Allen: 1983). The substitution effect predicts that higher 
hourly wages make the cost of leisure, the alternative use of time, more expensive and 
therefore less leisure will be desired. These opposing effects will be mediated by any 
introduction of contingent pay. Any withdrawal of pay as “punishment” for absence is 
likely to lead to higher attendance. A performance related component is likely to lead to 
better performance across a range of indicators (Cooke: 1992). Employee voice may 
also be manifested through employee ownership of the organisation (Bonin: 1993). 
Rhodes and Steers (1980) and Hammer et al (1981) found absenteeism began to fall 
when employee share ownership was introduced. Brown, D. (1998) investigates 
longitudinal survival rates at the plant used in this paper. Labour turnover did fall as 
terms and conditions improved, but grade-related wage increases in May 1996, had the 
greatest downward effect. This study is flawed in that it failed to consider local 
unemployment as an external pressure and concentrated on the impact of change on 
entrants rather than the stock of employees.
Wilson and Peel (1991) use data on a sample of blue collar workers in UK 
engineering plants during the 1980s to look at the effects of financial participation 
schemes, and the interaction effects of these with trade unions and works councils. The 
extant literature showed that unions were associated with higher absences and lower 
quits, whilst financial participation was linked to lower quits, and ambiguously related 
to absence. The authors hypothesised that absenteeism and labour turnover would be 
influenced by labour market, organisational and individual factors, but they focused 
purely on organisational factors. In order to identify if it was union presence or union 
influence which was important, they generated a principal components variable 
representing an index of union position and strength. They find that absenteeism was 
8.5 per cent lower in the presence of profit share, 13 per cent lower with share
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ownership, and bonuses had a very small negative impact on absenteeism. Quits also 
fell, though by less. Representative forms of participation were also negatively related 
to absence. Unionised plants were linked to 6  per cent lower absence, and those with 
works council 12 per c e n t. The authors use a panel to look at longitudinal effects but as 
the sample was limited to firms with profit share and/or share ownership causality is not 
determined. Brown et al (1999) conduct a similar analysis to Wilson and Peel, but use 
French panel data. They choose to focus on white-collar workers, as these are under 
represented in empirical work and may experience greater flexibility with respect to 
their work schedules, possibly necessitating less time off. They hypothesise that profit 
sharing and share ownership may cut absenteeism because leisure becomes less 
attractive -  a substitution effect. Therefore the employer gains directly through higher 
attendance and indirectly by saving on the monitoring and control aspects associated 
with absenteeism. Absenteeism and wage are negatively correlated. Share ownership 
cuts absenteeism by 14 per c e n t, and profit share by 7 per c e n t. A combination of the 
two cuts absence by 11 per cent . Whilst linking pay to performance in some way is 
likely to lower absenteeism it is not addressed in this paper as Bun Factory does not use 
any form of contingent pay.
Hypotheses for sub-section d: Workplace Change
Improvements to the working environment, in general, may lead to lower 
absenteeism, with those which are suggested by or negotiated with employees 
beforehand being the most likely to have an impact. Such a relationship would imply 
that absence was being used by employees as a voice mechanism to indicate their 
unhappiness, given a lack of other mechanisms. The impact of grade-related wage 
increases is ambiguous due to the opposing forces of income and substitution effects, 
however, given the relatively low level of wages offered at this plant the substitution 
effect seems more likely. Training should bring benefits to both employer and 
employee. By enhancing the employee’s potential it may be possible to expand their 
range of tasks and make the job more challenging. Training supervisors should boost 
workplace efficiency and may also improve the industrial relations climate.
e) Absenteeism As A Predictor Of Quitting -  Or Common Roots Theory
Rosse and Miller (1984) outline two distinct theoretical approaches to the 
relationship between absence and labour turnover. The first posits that both are forms of
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withdrawal, with absenteeism potentially spilling over into turnover. The second views 
them as independent forms of behaviour. There are nuances to each of these approaches. 
The simplest withdrawal model is that of random spillover. Lateness, absenteeism and 
turnover all represent forms of withdrawal, and are driven by similar factors. Whilst an 
individual may engage in one particular form of withdrawal they may also engage in 
either or both of the others. A more complex version of this theory, progression, 
hypothesises that an individual will graduate from lateness to absence to turnover. This 
progression is driven by a worsening of working conditions, or by an awareness that the 
individual does not fit within their organisation. The empirical work on these two 
versions of the theory is so inconclusive that it is not possible to distinguish between 
them.
A further variant of withdrawal theory is that of alternate forms. Individuals may 
have a preference for a particular form of withdrawal but they may be constrained in 
their use of it, leading to greater use of another form. Allen (1984) argues that absence 
will be used, by dissatisfied employees, as a substitute for turnover where the local job 
market is slack. These constraints may be external, as in the state of the labour market, 
or may reflect the value system of the individual. So, if they perceive turnover as 
unacceptable they will manifest withdrawal through lateness or absence. This version is 
not supported by empirical research. A lack of labour market opportunity, as a result of 
limited skills rather than poor external options, would also prevent progression through 
forms of withdrawal. Alternatively, workers may choose to withdraw, to some degree, 
to avoid an unpleasant or dangerous work environment. This has not been fully 
explored empirically. In this chapter withdrawal may be interpreted as an indirect voice 
mechanism -  indicating to the employer that something is wrong. A more direct 
application of voice would require disgruntled employees to attempt to change their 
working conditions, with withdrawal following a lack of success.
Alternatively, the independent forms model, propounded by Porter and Steers 
(1973), Steers and Rhodes (1978), Mowday et al (1982), identifies absenteeism and 
turnover as distinct. This follows from either their different causes or their different 
consequences. Porter and Steers (1973) argue that absenteeism is not the same as 
turnover because the negative consequences faced by labour are less serious for absence 
than for turnover; absence is more likely to be spontaneous; and absence may be a
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substitute for turnover, especially where there a few alternative labour market 
opportunities. Mobley (1982) identifies several reasons why absence and turnover are 
not related forms of behaviour. Absence may be caused by positive feelings rather than 
a desire to avoid work; it may be involuntary in the face of non-work demands; and it is 
spontaneous. Turnover and absence will not have the same roots if one is a constrained 
option or if one leads to different consequences than the other. They will follow 
different patterns if the job allows for discretionary time off, if sick leave can be cashed 
in at the time of quitting. He also states that absence may be a safety valve which 
prevents the need for quitting -  though this is akin to the substitutability variant of 
withdrawal theory. By way of support for this position, Steers and Rhodes report that 
only six of the 2 2  studies they looked at found a significant overlap in explanatory 
variables for absenteeism and turnover (1978).
In response, Rosse and Miller (1984) argue that a weak relationship between 
absence and turnover is to be expected because the relationship is complex and yet is 
modelled too simply. Mobley (1982) himself takes an inconclusive position. He states 
that there may be a conceptual but not an empirical link between the two phenomena if 
the individual uses absence as a safety valve to avoid quitting or if quitting is desired 
but constrained. Alternatively there will be an empirical relationship between the two if 
absence is to allow job search, the consequences of both forms of work avoidance are 
similar and both behaviours are unconstrained, and where dissatisfied staff prefer 
absence to turnover despite the availability of jobs. Given the consistent but weak 
relationship found by most research, Rosse and Miller find the independent forms 
approach is inconsistent with evidence. They conclude that the two phenomena have 
common roots, particularly in satisfaction. Wilson and Peel (1991) attempt to test the 
common roots hypothesis using their UK engineering sample. The right hand side 
variables are common to both models, though the absenteeism model is less well 
specified than that for turnover. Therefore they use Zellner’s seemingly unrelated least 
squares estimator. The common explanatory variables explain 73 per cent of the 
variation in permanent and temporary withdrawal, indicating that there is a common 
link between absence and quits.
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Hypotheses for sub-section e: Absenteeism As A Predictor Of Quitting -  Or 
Common Roots Theory
If absenteeism and turnover have common roots, as indicated in the literature 
discussed, then they will be correlated. The spillover model is the best supported of the 
approaches discussed. Therefore there should be a sizeable overlap in significant 
explanatory variables for absence and turnover. The progression version of the spillover 
model would be supported by a positive relationship between absence in periodt-i and 
turnover in periodt.
4. Data
This case study looks at the issue of absenteeism in a medium size food 
manufacturing plant, Bun Factory, in the outer London area. The data used are from the 
payroll information bank and personnel files for the period January 1994 to August 16 
1996, though the focus will be on July 1995-June 1996, with data for the previous year 
used as explanatory variables. Observations are available for 1,445 individuals, with 
each absence spell counting as a separate observation. This provides a data set with 
5,055 entries. Historically, Bun Factory performed badly in the product market and 
experienced high absenteeism and labour turnover. The plant has relied upon an 
ethnically diverse workforce, predominantly non-native English speakers, including 
many seeking refugee status. Personnel literature identifies a range of problems faced 
by new staff: the language barrier; low skills; and transportation issues. For this reason 
it issues a temporary four-week contract to all starters. It was taken over by a national 
food manufacturer in 1992, and immediate changes were made to improve its product 
market performance. Following an improvement in its market position, changes to 
working conditions and wages were introduced between April 1995 and May 1996. 
These working practice changes included training, the provision of an all day canteen, 
and the introduction of team meetings. As appendix B1 indicates, this was the first time 
a formal voice mechanism had been introduced in this plant. The impact of these 
different changes will be examined in the results section.
It is possible to derive the tenure and absence history of employees from this 
sample. Another strength of this data set is that it affords the chance to review payroll 
records which are most likely to accurately record absences -  generally data sets rely
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upon individuals’ self-reporting. Table 2 presents the monthly statistics on employment 
levels, quits and absenteeism -  in terms of spells and frequency of absence. The table 
shows that employment levels have fluctuated at around 300 staff. However, absence 
figures, which are very high, fluctuate much more erratically. The highest number of 
spells starting in a given month is 248, in March 1995, and the lowest 28 in April 1996. 
The highest frequency was 74.5 per cent, recorded in April 1995, and highest incidence 
was 43.3 per cent in December 1995. Figures for frequency and incidence also drop off 
sharply from March 1996. The number of quits shows a less discernible pattern, and is 
probably related to the local unemployment rates, a relationship which will be pursued 
in the results section.
Although the data set does not record the exact reason for taking time off, it is 
possible to identify which absences were signed off medically, which were self-certified 
and which remained unexplained. Therefore it is possible to construct a range of 
absenteeism markers which are reported in table 3, and depicted in figure 1 for 1995-96. 
The simplest variable is a dummy, offslot, which indicates whether an employee was 
off between July 1995 and June 1996, hereafter referred to as “year two”. Its precursor 
is offold, which reflects the same information for the earlier year, hereafter “year one”. 
The dummy fell in value between year one and year two, from 56 per cent to 53.4 per 
cent. An important distinction is made according to whether the time off was voluntary, 
within the employee’s control, or involuntary, due to ill health or perhaps to a family 
crisis. Taking any voluntary absence over the period is recorded in the dummy 
“volslot”, and involuntary, presumably medically related time off is captured with 
“invoslot”. The variable invoslot takes a much lower value than volslot: 4.6 per cent as 
compared to 48.8 per cent for year two. Mowday et al (1982) introduced the concept of 
attitudinal absence, one day periods of time off, to capture most clearly voluntary time 
off. This is represented by the variables “attslot” and “attold”. In year one 26.5 per cent 
of absences fitted in to this category, rising to 27.9 per cent in year two. This data set 
enables us to identify individual spells of time off, “oblsot”, and to calculate the total 
number of days off per year, “newskives”. The variable representing total days off is 
constant over the two year period, at 2 2  days, with the highest value for year two being 
157 and the lowest 0. Obslot is also constant at four spells, over the two years, with a 
highest value of 28 and lowest of 0. Our variables show that the majority of absence is 
voluntary, and our analysis will concentrate on manifestations of voluntary time off.
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Table 4 presents correlations between the various absenteeism measures. All 
correlations are significant, most at the 1 per cent level of confidence. The strongest 
positive relationships, unsurprisingly, are between time off period two and voluntary 
time off period two, and time off period one and voluntary time off period one. 
Attitudinal absence is also strongly correlated with time off and especially voluntary 
time off, reinforcing the argument that this type of absenteeism allows employees to 
escape the stress of work (Mowday et al: 1982). Involuntary absenteeism measures are 
negatively correlated with other variables, and small in size, reflecting the small 
proportion of absence that is due to sickness.
The data indicate the gender, ethnicity, job category, shift pattern, home postal 
code and pay grade of each employee. Sample means are presented in table 5. The 
workforce is predominantly male, 90 per cent, and is almost entirely comprised of 
ethnic minorities. In line with the relatively young age, the mean is 32 years, most 
workers are single. The factory operates a shift system based around a 45 hour basic 
working week, with compulsory overtime. Day, afternoon, night, morning and rotating 
shifts patterns are available, though the commonest by far are days and nights. The plant 
does not use contingent pay schemes; wages are grade-related, though a 2 0  per cent 
shift premium was payable for night work. The majority of staff fall in to the unskilled 
category, 67 per cent, with around 15 per cent being classified as trainees. Whilst wage 
increases across the other skill groups were uniform at around 2.5 per cent in 1995 and 
3 per cent in 1996, these two groups received different increases. In May 1995 both 
received a rise of about 5.5 per cent, yet in May 1996 whilst unskilled won 6.5 per cent 
trainees only received 1 per cent. The plant manager viewed the wages offered as a little 
worse than those on offer within the local labour market in 1996, see appendix B l. 
Labour turnover at the plant is also high, and information on the timing of departures, 
and their cause, is available.
A job satisfaction survey was put to employees in October 1996, and this can be 
mapped on to payroll data for those still employed at that point. This survey collected 
details about domestic arrangements: presence of partner and number of children, 
whether their partner worked. It also collected details on the education, their previous 
activity before taking this job, and the number of employers they had had over the past 
three/five years. The questions on job satisfaction related to specific aspects of their job:
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material conditions; relationships at work; and the developmental aspects of the 
position. More than 50 questionnaires were returned which matched the payroll data, 
providing a data set of 229 observations. This data can be used to explore the 
relationship between satisfaction and absenteeism. The sample means of this sub-set are 
presented in appendix B 8 .
5. Modelling Issues
a) Absenteeism And Demographic, Job Or Workplace Characteristics
Whilst the choice of modelling technique for looking at the probability of 
absence is straightforward, either a probit or logit model may be used, assumptions 
about normal distributions may not apply when using a count variable on the left hand 
side. This data set has information on the total days taken off and the number of spells, 
both of which represent count variables. As table 3 indicated, the variance of both these 
variables is as great or greater than the mean. Mastekaasen & Olsen (1998) and 
Chaudhury and Ng (1992) tested a variety of modelling techniques: OLS; poisson; rank 
based regression; and negative binomial for use with count measures of absenteeism. 
The negative binomial model is suitable for use with a non-negative, truncated variable 
such as number of absence spells or total days off as it makes no assumptions about the 
distribution of the error term and is less vulnerable to extreme values than OLS. Whilst 
the OLS was theoretically a less obvious choice, both papers suggest that it is more 
interpretable and offers robust results. Therefore, this chapter will discuss OLS models 
in the text with negative binomial regression results presented in appendix B5.
The chapter will focus on voluntary absenteeism, having first sought evidence of 
difference in the variables explaining voluntary and involuntary absence, and the 
robustness of the models used. Whilst running separate equations by gender may be the 
ideal approach (Vistnes: 1997), it requires a large data set, with a fairly even 
distribution of observations between the two sexes. Results of a log likelihood (Chow) 
test to estimate the difference in coefficients by sex are presented in appendix B21. As 
this data set has a low proportion of women, around 1 0  per cent, merging information 
on both sexes is preferable.
99
b) Absenteeism And Lagged Absenteeism, External And Internal Pressures
Avery and Hotz (1984) advocate the use of event history techniques to model 
absenteeism. This requires that lagged absenteeism be used as an explanatory variable. 
Markham and McKee (1991) adopt a similar method for identifying the impact of 
external and internal pressures, represented by changes in local unemployment and 
plant employment levels. They experimented with different length lags, and determined 
that the highest level of explanatory power was gained when using contemporaneous 
changes in plant size, one month anticipatory changes to unemployment and their 
interaction term. External pressure on employees to avoid taking voluntary time off is 
proxied here by the monthly travel-to-work area unemployment rate, and the internal 
pressure by employment numbers at Bun Factory. The correlation between absence 
spells and local unemployment for this sample is -0.17, which is insignificant, that 
between absence spells and plant size is 0.13, which is significant at the 1 per cent level. 
The results section of this paper will introduce absenteeism indicators for the previous 
year as an explanatory variable. Various measures of plant size and local unemployment 
at the time of the absence event, and their interaction terms, will also be tested.
c) Absenteeism And Job Satisfaction
If one hypothesised that satisfaction explained to some extent absenteeism, then 
absenteeism would represent the dependent variable, and satisfaction an explanatory 
variable. Having both the dependent and this key independent variable for the same 
period would be preferable. Alternatively, as Markham and McKee (1991) illustrate, 
workers often anticipate future changes when considering their behaviour, so having 
satisfaction data preceding payroll information need not be a problem. The payroll and 
personnel data represent a slightly different calendar period than the satisfaction data. 
The satisfaction data refer to Autumn 1996, after the changes to wages and workplace 
conditions have been introduced. Whilst Katz et al (1983) employ non- 
contemporaneous data in their study of General Motors’ QWL programmes, this is not 
strictly reconcilable, so parametric techniques will not be employed here. Limiting the 
use made of the satisfaction data avoids the problem of endogeneity which would arise 
if satisfaction were a function of absenteeism. Therefore the paper will report on 
patterns of satisfaction. As responses are recorded for contentment with 12 aspects of 
the job, variation by job context as opposed to job content will be explored. Correlations 
between job satisfaction and absence will be calculated.
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d) Absenteeism And Changes To Working Conditions And Pay
The time span available, two and a half years, covers a number of workplace 
changes at Bun Factory. The general effect of these changes might be expected to be an 
improvement in industrial relations climate and morale. Within that period a series of 
discrete changes were made, and information on the nature and date of each is also 
available. Wages vary by grade, as do some of the improvements to conditions, so an 
analysis of difference in differences is employed. This enables variation by grade in the 
response to each of the changed working conditions and wages to be identified 
(Wooldridge: 2003). This requires looking for the difference in difference estimator 8 1 , 
where:
8 1  = (absencetw-absencetxyz) -  (absence t-iw -  absence t-ixyz).
w represents the grade in question, whilst xyz are the remaining staff categories, t is the 
month after the change, whilst t.i is the month before the change. It is also possible to 
determine the overall impact of the series of changes introduced between April 1995 
and May 1996, by grade. However these results were insignificant, due to the very 
small sample size, and are not reported.
e) Absenteeism As A Predictor Of Quitting -  Or Common Roots Theory
A simple way of identifying a link between absence and labour turnover is to 
investigate whether each is determined by the same explanatory variables. As each can 
be modelled by a probit equation we will estimate each phenomenon in a probit model 
with the same right hand side variables. If correlation coefficients confirm a relationship 
between the two variables this suggests it is necessary to examine the possibility of 
endogeneity between absence and labour turnover. The preferred solution to 
endogeneity is to find an instrumental variable. If one accepts the progression model of 
withdrawal, then absenteeism in year one may explain turnover in year two (Rosse and 
Miller: 1984). Therefore, lagged absenteeism will be employed as an explanatory 
variable in a labour turnover equation, thus circumventing the endogeneity problem.
6. Results
a) Absenteeism And Demographics, Job Or Workplace Characteristics
Table 6  present the marginal coefficients from probit estimates of the 
probabilities of taking time off for any reasons, of taking one or more one-day periods,
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and of taking voluntary time off, using a model in the form of equation 1. Probit 
coefficients are shown in appendix B3, and involuntary absence is examined in full in 
appendix B4.
Prob (time off) = aX + bY + e Equation 1
where X is a vector of individual characteristics, Y of workplace characteristics and e 
represents the error term.
Column one reports coefficients explaining the probability of taking time off 
between July 1995 and June 1996 for any reason. Few explanatory variables reach 
significance. Those in the white or other ethnic category are almost 20 percentage 
points less likely to have time off than the default Asian origin group. Those who are 
widowed, divorced or separated are more likely to take time off, as are the unskilled. 
The unskilled result, which is highly significant, may be explained by the less 
challenging nature of the work they perform compared to higher skill groups. In 
contrast, trainees spend the first four weeks of their employment on a temporary 
contract which will act as a disincentive to take time off. The lack of significance for 
better paid semi-skilled and highly skilled employees suggests negligible income and 
substitution effects. This will be examined again in the context of wage changes. The 
result for those promoted this year is surprising. This group is 35 percentage points 
more likely to be off than those who are not promoted; their absence perhaps reflecting 
their relative security at Bun Factory. Tenure is a strong influence on absence in this 
and all the subsequent estimations. An additional 100 days’ tenure reduces the 
probability of taking time off by 2 percentage points. Presumably this reflects a 
compositional effect, with those who find the job unacceptable or unsatisfactory 
choosing to leave with shorter tenure. The only remaining significant influence is shift 
patterns. Those on morning, afternoon or rotating shifts are less likely to take time off, 
though this coefficient is significant only at the 5 per cent level. This probably reflects 
the greater ability to juggle conflicting responsibilities which comes with working these 
shifts as opposed to straight night or days.
Column two reports coefficients from the estimation of the probability of 
attitudinal absence, a subset of voluntary absenteeism. Mowday et al (1982) hypothesise
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that one-day periods of absence can be used as a very good proxy for voluntary time off 
-  and may indicate that employees need to escape from stress at work. This model is 
slightly less robust than the previous one, and only four coefficients achieve 
significance. The white or other ethnic category and married employees are less likely 
to be off than the default, whilst those who are promoted this year are 24 points more 
likely to take a one-day period. Tenure has a reduced effect on absence here: each 
additional 1 0 0  days’ tenure reduces the probability of a one-day spell by one percentage 
point.
The final column contrasts the results of the full voluntary absence models. The 
results for voluntary absence are almost the same as those for aggregated time off. To 
explore more clearly the effects of these variables we employ benchmark employees, 
table 7. The table starts by identifying the predicted probability that an individual in the 
default category would be off during the individual period July 1995 to June 1996. This 
individual is a single male, of Asian origin aged 36-45, who is a semi-skilled day 
worker living two to five miles from the plant with average employment tenure. 
Characteristics are changed in turn until the default becomes an unskilled married 
woman aged more than 45 years of afro-caribbean origin, who lives very close to the 
plant, has longer tenure and works nights.
The table shows the predicted probability, first if all characteristics are assumed 
to affect the chance of time off significantly, and later concentrates upon those which 
table 6  indicated were statistically influential. The first row indicates that changing sex 
is important and lowers the probability from 0.52 to 0.5, whilst aging the default 
individual adds more than 6  percentage points to the likelihood. The change in ethnicity 
is negligible, but changing marital status from single to married sees the likelihood fall 
more than 3 percentage points. Reclassifying this individual as unskilled has a very 
striking effect, with the probability of absence rising almost 1 0  percentage points to 
0.61. Changing shift and address have small impacts, particularly when compared to the 
tenure effect. Increasing tenure from the mean of 494 days to 794 days cuts 7 
percentage points off the probability of absence, giving a final figure of 0.54. The 
bottom row concentrates on those variables which are statistically significant in table 6 . 
From a baseline probability of 0.52, reclassifying by skill increases the likelihood of
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time off to 0.62. The only other significant independent variable is tenure which cuts the 
probability from 0.62 to 0.54.
This method of depicting the influence of independent variables highlights the 
significance of skill group and tenure, and other significant variables included ethnicity 
and promotion. This model had better diagnostics than that for undifferentiated absence, 
in contrast, the model for involuntary time off achieves a low level of robustness, see 
the log likelihood in appendix B4, and few coefficients are significant. This reinforces 
how important it is to have information on health if modelling involuntary absence. 
Therefore the rest of paper will report only voluntary absences.
The data set offers the opportunity to investigate absenteeism in detail: 
information on the number of days off; number of spells; and number of attitudinal 
absences from July 1995 to June 1996 is available. The negative binomial regression is 
the most theoretically applicable modelling technique, as discussed above. However, 
the results of this technique are generally no more robust than OLS techniques, and are 
less easy to interpret. For this reason table 8  presents OLS models, estimated following 
Equation 2, with the results from negative binomial models shown in appendix B5.
OLS (count of time off) = aX + bY + e Equation 2
Column one presents estimates for total days off. The mean number of days off, 
volnewsk, between July 1995 and June 1996 was nine. Married workers take one day 
more than their single peers and those falling in to the “other marital” status category 
have significantly more than this: 2 1 , though there is no obvious theoretical reason for 
this. Employee grade is influential. The unskilled take an additional two days, the 
highly skilled five days fewer, and trainees four days fewer than the default. The greater 
number of days taken by unskilled workers is likely to reflect the repetitive nature of the 
work and their relative job security. Those promoted during this year are also likely to 
feel secure in their positions. They take an additional four days off per year, a result 
which is very highly significant. Contrary to the majority of findings, women in this 
sample take fewer days off, four less than the average. As these estimations use 
voluntary absences, we have excluded time off for health reasons. This is the primary 
cause of women’s greater absence according to Vistnes (1997). Ethnicity is strongly
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significant. Compared to the default group, workers of Asian origin, Afro-Caribbean 
employees take an extra two days off whilst white/other employees take four fewer.
Delgado and Kniesner (1997) find that distance between work and home is 
positively related to time off, yet workers in this sample living more than five miles 
from work take one fewer day off. Those working nights take more time off, an extra 
three days, and those on morning, afternoon or rotating shifts take four days fewer than 
day shift workers. This reinforces the argument that flexibility is important to workers 
(Allen: 1981, 1983). Allen (1983) also predicts that young workers will take more time 
off, though this only applies to voluntary time off (Chaudhury and Ng: 1992). Those 
aged 46 or older take one day less per year, a result which just misses significance. 
Prime aged workers of 26-35 years take an extra day off, a result which may reflect 
family responsibilities. Tenure has a significant influence on total days off. Each 
additional one hundred days of service reduces the total number of absences by one 
third of a day.
The results for spells of absenteeism are somewhat different in terms of 
coefficient size and significance, column 2 of table 8 . The default number of spells, 
volnewob, over the period was three. Two explanatory variables are significant in this 
model but not the previous one: those aged 46 or older are likely to have one fewer 
spell; and those living very near by have an additional half of one spell. The results for 
distance from work are counterintuitive as the company does not provide transport for 
those living further away, appendix B l, so it is not obvious why this result arises. 
Although the spells model achieves a higher R2 , analysis will concentrate on total days 
taken off as this gives a clearer idea of the magnitude of absenteeism.
The estimation of the number of attitudinal absence spells, countatt, sees a large 
number of significant coefficients. The mean number of attitudinal absences, spells of 
just one day, is two per individual for the period July 1995 until June 1996. Ethnicity is 
an influential factor, as is gender and shift pattern. Marital status is also significant: 
divorced and widowed workers take four spells; whilst married employees will take just 
under the mean. Skill groups affect the number of one-day spells of absenteeism. The 
highest skill group are the most significantly different to the default group, taking just 
one attitudinal spell per year, trainees take around one half of a spell less than the mean
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and the unskilled take an additional one quarter. Obviously trainees will be deterred 
from taking unnecessary time off by their temporary contractual status. The unskilled 
have job security but, as mentioned before, presumably not much scope to be 
challenged in their role. The coefficients on distance between home and work continue 
to show unexpected signs. Those within two miles of the Bun Factory take half of an 
additional one-day spell, and those living more than five miles away take slightly less 
than the average of two, though the latter is not significant. Contrary to the theoretical 
prediction that young workers will be less reliable, those aged under 25 are less likely to 
take attitudinal spells, taking one and three quarters as opposed to the mean of two.
We hypothesised that women, those on day or night shifts, younger workers, the 
lowest skilled employees and those living far from the plant would have a greater 
likelihood of taking time off. These hypotheses were largely proven to be incorrect. 
Across the probit equations three variables retain a significant influence: those classed 
as white/other are repeatedly less likely to take time off; employee tenure reduces the 
likelihood of time off by a small but reasonably consistent amount; those who were 
promoted in the previous year are considerably more likely to be off. Whilst the tenure 
result is intuitive, those who dislike this work will hunt for other opportunities, the 
promotion result is startling. Those who are promoted seem to exploit their position in 
the company in order to miss work. A much wider range of influences recur in the count 
equations. Whites, women, trainees, the highly skilled and those on more flexible shifts 
were shown to take significantly less time off in all three models. Those promoted, 
workers of afro-caribbean descent, divorced or separated workers, the unskilled and 
night workers were likely to take more time off than the average in all of the models. 
Tenure was also a significant influence, though it changed sign from positive to 
negative in the final (attitudinal absence) model. Here the result for women is most 
surprising, extant literature shows women to have a much higher rate of absence, for a 
variety of reasons (Vistnes: 1997, Masktekaasen and Olsen: 1998, Chaudhury and Ng: 
1992). For clarity the rest of the paper will focus on just two manifestations of absence: 
on the probability of voluntary absence, and total voluntary days off.
b) Absenteeism And Lagged Absenteeism, External And Internal Pressures
Table 9 presents selected marginal coefficients from a probit model examining 
the influence of total days voluntary absence in year one, plant employment levels and
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local unemployment on the probability of taking time off in year two. The full results 
can be found in appendix B 6 , whilst probit coefficients are reported in appendix B7.
Prob (voluntary time offt) = aX + bY + cZ + dTt.i + e Equation 3
where X is a vector of individual characteristics, Y of workplace characteristics, Z 
represents internal and external pressures, Tt-i represents voluntary days off in the 
previous year, and e represents the error term.
Following Markham and McKee (1991), variations of the model are constructed 
using one-month lagged, current, and one month anticipatory values of both plant size 
and local unemployment for the month in which absence occurs. This provides nine 
potential variations of the equation. Falling plant employment and rising local 
unemployment would theoretically reduce job opportunities and lead to lower labour 
turnover. Conversely, rising employment levels and falling local unemployment, by 
increasing employees’ prospects, should lead to higher levels of absenteeism. Whereas 
the unemployment coefficient is of varying size and significance across the different 
models, it is more consistent in those variations using next month’s employment level at 
Bun Factory. In versions 7-9, the unemployment coefficients are all sizeably positive, 
and Bun Factory employment levels are consistently related to a greater probability of 
taking voluntary time off.
The most successful model in terms of diagnostics, version 7, combines 
anticipatory employment with last month’s local unemployment rate. Unemployment is 
positively related to the probability of absence, a one-unit change in last month’s 
unemployment increases the probability of voluntary absence by 257 percentage points, 
which is counterintuitive but may reflect the fact that unemployment was relatively 
stable over the course of the sample. Each one-unit change in next month’s employment 
at Bun Factory changes the probability of taking time off very slightly, which suggests 
that employees are sensitive to their firm’s labour demand and so feel more confident 
that there will be no repercussions if they take time off. The interaction terms between 
local unemployment and plant employment are generally negative, small but significant. 
In version 7 the combination of anticipatory employment and lagged unemployment is
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marginally negatively related to the chance of voluntary time off. Introducing the 
number of voluntary days off in year one as an explanatory variable is consistently 
weakly, but significantly negatively related to time off in year two. The average number 
of days missed in year one for voluntary reasons is 11. Each additional day taken off 
last year lowers the chance of absence in year two by less than one hundredth of a 
percentage point. Across all nine possible versions of the model tenure has a 
consistently small but significantly negative coefficient. Each additional 100 days of 
service lowers the probability that time off is chosen by around 1.5 percentage points.
As table 9 shows, introducing internal and external pressures and lagged absence 
massively increases the explanatory power of the probit model. Both the log likelihood 
and pseudo R2  are greatly enhanced. However, few demographic and workplace 
explanatory variables retain significance, see appendix B6 . We hypothesised that local 
unemployment would be negatively related to absence and plant employment positively 
so. Contrary to expectations, unemployment and plant employment are both positively 
related to absence in most models. The failure of absenteeism to reflect local 
unemployment levels shows a lack of rationality on the part of employees. This is 
surely due to the stable rate of unemployment over the year. Whilst the unemployment 
result is surprising, employees are taking some signals about the state of labour demand 
and hence their job security from plant employment levels. Lagged absence is 
consistently negatively related to contemporaneous absence, though the coefficient is 
small. Whilst focusing on voluntary absence eliminates the effect of continuing poor 
health, the correlation of absence over time is not surprising.
c) Aspects Of Job Satisfaction
A subset of employees completed questionnaires during Autumn 1996, which 
asked both a range of demographic and job satisfaction questions. Sample means for 
this sub-set are presented in appendix B 8 . The mean responses to questions about 
satisfaction with various aspects of the job are presented in table 10. The aspects of job 
satisfaction are grouped in to those representing job context and those reflecting job 
content. Those questions reflecting job content ask about promotional prospects, the 
degree of interest and challenge provided by the work, intent to stay and fatigue levels. 
Context variables are those related to transportation, relationships and hours. Pay and 
overall satisfaction fall outside the two groupings. Overall, employees are least happy
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with their pay, and most happy with relationships with their co-workers. There is no 
clear indication that respondents were happier with context than content, or vice versa.
If absence is perceived to be a vehicle for employee voice, then satisfaction and 
absence will be negatively correlated. Table 11 shows correlations between aspects of 
satisfaction and a range of variables representing absenteeism. Again we focus on the 
probability of voluntary absence and the total number of days off, a comprehensive 
analysis is reported in appendix B9. In column 1 the reported correlation coefficients 
indicate whether there is a relationship between a dummy indicating whether the 
respondent was off work for non-medical reasons during the sample window (volslot) 
and satisfaction aspects. Three correlation coefficients achieve significance, though they 
are not all in the direction hypothesised. Unsurprisingly those who report being tired are 
more likely to take time off, and those reporting good relations with peers are less likely 
to do so. This suggests that peer pressure may work in the employer’s favour to reduce 
absenteeism, as argued by Garrahan and Stewart (1992). Those expecting promotion 
have more to lose by taking unnecessary time off. However, those reporting that they 
saw their promotion prospects as good were more likely to be off. This corresponds to 
the earlier probit equations, which saw that those who were promoted during year two 
were more likely to take time off. Perhaps these workers are confident that their jobs are 
secure even if they choose to miss work, implying that the firm accepts high levels of 
absenteeism from otherwise “good” workers. Such an interpretation is consistent with a 
hedonic model of the labour market, in which Bun Factory is a low wage-high absence 
employer.
Columns 2 and 3 look at the relationship between satisfaction aspects and the 
total number of days off this year and last, respectively. A greater number of 
coefficients reach significance than using the probability absence variable. Total days 
off is negatively related to two job content variables: a desire to remain in this job and 
an interest in food manufacturing. Two context variables have a similarly common 
negative relationship: the ease of getting to work and a positive view of the employer. 
In complete contradiction of the result in column one, total days off is positively related 
to good relationships with peers. This suggests that concern for peers does not reduce 
absence. It is possible that good relations allow workers to generate their own norms 
about what constitutes acceptable absence. The positive correlation between time off
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and promotion prospects also disappears. Those who view their job as challenging are 
significantly more likely to be off. This suggests that a taxing or stimulating job is not 
always a positive. The main differences when using last year’s total days off relate to 
content aspects of work. There is no relationship between lagged days off and an 
interest in the business. Promotion prospects and tiredness are negatively related to 
lagged days off, whilst being unrelated to current days off. These inconsistencies 
suggest that satisfaction is not constant over time. Overall job satisfaction and lagged 
days off are also significantly negatively related, which might be capturing the 
unhappiness of employees unable to find a more satisfactory alternative job.
A negative relationship between satisfaction and absence is consistent with the 
idea that employees take time off to indicate that they are unhappy -  implying that 
absence is a voice mechanism. Overall both job content and job context variables are 
related to absenteeism, although the coefficients are inconsistent across the three 
absenteeism variables. For example, whilst good relations with colleagues is linked to 
more days off both in the current and previous year, good relations between peers is 
linked to a lower probability of absence. That relationships between total days off this 
year and last, and satisfaction are also inconsistent suggests that satisfaction is an 
unstable construct which is not closely related to absenteeism. This makes the work of 
an employer hoping to reduce absenteeism that much harder.
d) Workplace Change
Following a strengthening of their position in the product market, the company 
introduced a sequence of changes in working conditions and pay, outlined in table 1 2 . 
From April 1995 attempts were made to change the company culture. Basic food 
hygiene training was introduced for all workers and the company also initiated training 
for their line leaders. This change was closely followed by the annual May pay round. 
Trainees and unskilled workers benefited the most. At around 5.5 per cent their pay 
rises were worth one and a half times the rate of inflation whereas their colleagues took 
a real wage cut, receiving increases worth only two thirds of the inflation rate of the 
time. The uneven nature of these increases reflected attempts to reduce the much higher 
turnover rates exhibited by trainees and the unskilled.
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In November 1995 the company moved to further improve working conditions. 
Again the company made progressive moves to change its culture, introducing team 
briefings. Prior to this introduction of team briefings, Bun Factory had used no voice 
mechanisms. Deery et al (1999) find that incorporating employee voice is important 
when introducing change and increases the benefits that may be derived from it. 
Therefore, this move might be expected to improve morale and possibly to elicit 
productivity enhancing suggestions. Union recognition was not introduced until 1999. 
On a more substantive note new canteen facilities were introduced, incorporating for the 
first time 24 hour vending facilities to cater for shift workers. The 1996 May pay round 
saw different groups of workers, this time including skilled staff, benefiting at the 
expense of trainees. Whereas semi-skilled, skilled, engineers and section leaders all 
gained wage rises comfortably in excess of inflation, then 2 . 2  per cent, trainees only 
gained an increase of 1 per cent. However, the biggest winners were the unskilled who 
again saw a significant increase, this time 6.5 per cent.
The sum of these changes had a significant impact upon labour turnover: new 
starters had a 60 per cent chance of leaving in their first three months in 1994, falling to 
10 per cent in 1996 and 20 per cent in 1997 by which time all the HR changes were in 
place (Brown: 1998). The biggest impact on turnover rates was derived from wage 
increases. Table 13a looks at the impact of changes on absenteeism by employee grade 
over the period March 1995 until May 1995, using a technique called “difference in 
difference”. This relies upon estimations of the following model:
A (time off) = Po + SoTime + piGrade + 8i(Time*Grade) + e Equation 4
where time takes a value of one in the second period, and is 0  otherwise; and the 
penultimate expression shows the extra effect by grade in the second period. This 
enables us to isolate any changes in absence following the introduction of training 
programmes in April 1995. The first row of the table shows that there is a significant 
fall in absenteeism across the period, for all but unskilled workers. The coefficients on 
grade are significantly negative for three skill groups; trainees, semiskilled and the 
highest skill group, indicating falls in absence of between 6  and 7 percentage points. 
However, the coefficient on the unskilled indicates that they saw an increased 
probability of voluntary absence, of 8  percentage points. If the effect of the time trend,
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grade effect and the interaction of the two is combined the two highest skill groups react 
to changed working conditions by lowering absence by around 8  percentage points; the 
effect for the unskilled is neutral, and trainees’ tendency to be absent rises by 43 
percentage points.
Table 13b looks at the change between April and June 1995, capturing the effect 
of differential pay rises in May, benefiting trainees and the unskilled far more than other 
workers. Again there appears to be a downward trend in absence of between four and 
five percentage points for all but the unskilled. Grade and interaction effects are 
insignificant. Previous work found that the pay rises were successful in reducing labour 
turnover (Brown: 1998), yet these results suggest that differential pay rises are not a 
strategy that lowers absenteeism. Table 13c looks at changes in absenteeism between 
October and December of 1995. In November the first voice mechanism was 
introduced, team briefings, and the canteen began to offer 24-hour cover. This time the 
downward time trend in absence is only apparent for unskilled workers. Reactions by 
grade vary: absenteeism amongst trainees and the unskilled is unchanged, whilst that for 
the two higher skill groups falls by around 3 percentage points, perhaps in response to 
the opportunity to use a formal voice mechanism. The May 1996 pay increases 
benefited the unskilled, with trainees in particular falling behind inflation. However, 
table 13d shows that no trend in absenteeism is discernible. Trainees and the semi­
skilled react by dropping their absenteeism slightly, by around 2  percentage points but 
again the unskilled, benefiting from a higher percentage rise, do not change their 
behaviour.
The tables show a general downward trend over time, which could reflect a 
better industrial relations climate as a result of the combined measures, but little 
reaction to discrete workplace changes from employees. This is not consistent with the 
idea that absence was being used as a form of voice, but purely as muted or partial exit. 
The investigation in to the effects of these changes on labour turnover found significant 
improvements after these changes, particularly following wage rises (Brown: 1998). 
When looking at absenteeism, wages rises had less impact than other forms of 
workplace change, with the first round of changes, including training and job security 
being the most influential. Different grades exhibited different reactions to the changes,
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though it is clear that the two more highly skilled groups were more responsive than 
other groups.
e) Absenteeism As A Predictor Of Quitting -  Or Common Roots Theory
Table 14 presents correlations between labour turnover, defined by a dummy 
variable, and our two main measures of absenteeism; a broader analysis is reported in 
appendix B l l .  Columns one and two use current labour turnover and absenteeism, 
whilst columns three and four use absenteeism measures from the previous year, year 
one. Correlations between current absence and labour turnover would be consistent with 
the spillover exit model (+) or the alternate forms model (-), whilst a positive 
relationship between current turnover and lagged absence would be supportive of the 
progression model (Rosse and Miller: 1984, Allen: 1984). A lack of significant 
correlation coefficients would be consistent with the independent forms explanation of 
exit (Mowday et al: 1982).
Restricting the use of information on turnover to those who can be shown to 
have left voluntarily makes a difference; voluntary quits are negatively related to the 
probability of voluntary absence whilst all turnover is not. This is consistent with the 
alternate forms model of exit. However, this is undermined by the positive correlation 
between total days off and voluntary turnover which is more in line with a spillover 
explanation. Columns three and four repeat the previous investigations using 
absenteeism data from the previous year, resulting in fewer significant relationships. 
The probability of time off last year is negatively related to undifferentiated labour 
turnover, a result which is only compatible with the independent behaviour 
interpretation of absence.
To clarify the relationship between absence and turnover we next look to see 
whether the same factors are significant independent variables in absenteeism and 
turnover equations. This requires that we reuse the previous model of absenteeism, 
replacing absence with turnover on the left hand side:
Prob (leaving) = aX + bY + e Equation 5
113
where X is a vector of individual characteristics, Y of workplace characteristics and e 
represents the error term. The marginal coefficients from the regression are presented in 
table 15, with probit results given in appendix B 1 2 .
Column 1 of table 15 reports the results using the probability of turnover for any 
reason. Following Wilson and Peel (1991), if absenteeism and turnover have common 
roots then we expect to find common explanatory variables. However, when comparing 
the coefficients on variables in the undifferentiated labour turnover equation with those 
on undifferentiated absence (table 6 , column 1 ) we find few variables are significant in 
both. Unskilled workers are significantly more likely to be off and to leave, presumably 
reflecting the lack of stimulation in their work. Tenure in both models has a dampening 
effect, though it is greater in the absenteeism model. This is likely to reflect a sample 
selection effect, with the more dissatisfied leaving quickly.
Column two limits the definition of turnover to those departures generated by 
employees and adds in internal and external pressures, as represented by log of plant 
employment next month and last month’s local unemployment rate:
Prob (leaving) = aX + bY + cZ + e Equation 6
where X is a vector of individual characteristics, Y of workplace characteristics, Z 
represents internal and external pressures, and e represents the error term. The most 
comparable results are to be found in model 7 of table 9, which uses the same external 
and internal pressures to explain voluntary absenteeism. Appendix B13 reports the 
marginal coefficients from this equation using all variants of unemployment and plant 
employment.
Current or future plant employment has a significantly positive relationship with 
absence in all variations of equation 3, as reported in table 9, though the coefficients 
varied in size. In the absenteeism model this was interpreted as indicating employee 
confidence in a buoyant state of labour demand at the plant. In this model the 
coefficient is negative, but small and insignificant. In the absenteeism models local 
unemployment is most often positively related to quits, though more strongly than plant 
employment. Whilst this may appear irrational, with a slack labour market deterring
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risk, it could reflect the relative stability of the unemployment rate at that time and the 
greater importance attached by employees to their plant’s labour demand. In the 
turnover model, last month’s unemployment rate has a small (insignificant) negative 
relationship with turnover.
Few demographic or workplace variables showed up in the extended 
absenteeism models, however, associations prove more significant in the turnover 
equations. Replicating the earlier analysis of benchmark employees in table 7, we alter 
employee characteristics to find the effect of various demographics and workplace 
variables on the predicted probability of quitting, table 16. The predicted probability of 
quitting for our standard default individual is 0.21. Changing the sex and age of our 
individual, to become an older woman, has no significant impact on the probability of 
quitting. The next change is ethnic grouping, and moving from Asian to Afro-Caribbean 
descent lowers the likelihood of leaving to 0.13. Altering marital status is important, 
raising the probability by 10 percentage points. Married women have traditionally been 
less attached to the labour market, but this data set is male dominated. It may be that the 
result is due to the presence of a working partner, bolstering their financial position or 
that it is driven by the need for better wages to support families than on offer at Bun 
Factory. Changing the skill level from semi to unskilled further adds to the likelihood, 
which is now 0.30. Working nights instead of days lowers the probability by 8 
percentage points, which is probably linked to the shift premium. Distance from work, 
indicating convenience, is again an important factor: reducing the travel to work 
distance lowers our probability to 0.14. Distance had no impact upon absenteeism 
decisions, which strengthens the impression that employees weigh up different factors 
when considering absence and resignation. Tenure had a consistently small negative 
relationship with absence, and this effect holds in the turnover model. Moving from 
mean tenure to an employment of 794 days sees the probability of quitting drop to a 
mere 0.03.
Both the spillover and progression models of exit are based upon the argument 
that absence and exit have common roots. So far our data are inconsistent with common 
roots. Looking at the progression model in particular, this argues that employees using 
absence as a weak form of exit in period one are likely to quit, the strongest
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manifestation of exit, in the following period (Rosse and Miller: 1984). To investigate 
this the model represented by equation 7 is estimated:
Prob (voluntary quitst) = aX + bY + cZ + dTt.i + e Equation 7
where X is a vector of individual characteristics, Y of workplace characteristics, Z 
represents internal and external pressures, Tt-i represents total voluntary days off in the 
previous year, and e represents the error term. The results are presented in the final 
column of table 15, the corresponding probit coefficients are shown in appendix B12.
Previous examination in this chapter has shown that different demographic and 
workplace variables play significant roles in the various absence and labour turnover 
models. This is more consistent with the independent forms approach to exit than the 
progression model (Mowday et al: 1982). Looking directly at the coefficients on the 
lagged absenteeism variable presents evidence to the contrary. The coefficient on 
lagged total days indicates that there is a small positive effect, which supports the 
progression argument that workers’ dissatisfaction will manifest itself in stronger forms 
of exit over time. The predicted probability of absence is 0.21, rising to 0.3 if total 
lagged days off is twice the mean value, at 22 days. The impact of external and internal 
pressures, and their interaction, on voluntary labour turnover are again wholly 
insignificant, with the other explanatory variables yielding very similar coefficients to 
those discussed above.
This section of the chapter has looked for evidence to support various 
explanations of a relationship between absence and quitting. The spillover model argues 
that the desire to “withdraw” one’s labour will manifest itself in both absence and 
quitting, alternate forms suggest behaviour is constrained, so only the easiest or 
unconstrained manifestation will be visible, whilst progression posits an escalation over 
time from absence to quitting (Rosse and Miller: 1984). Aside from these explanations 
comes the argument that absence and quitting are totally different forms of behaviour 
with difference causes and consequences (Mowday et al: 1982). A negative relationship 
between absenteeism and contemporaneous turnover in our data would be consistent 
with the alternative forms hypothesis, a positive one suggests the spillover interpretation 
is correct, whilst a positive relationship between lagged absence and quitting would
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suggest the progression model was more realistic. Correlations between 
contemporaneous absenteeism and voluntary turnover dummies are inconsistent: the 
correlation with the probability of absence dummy suggesting alternative forms and the 
count variable indicating the spillover model. Relationships between lagged 
absenteeism variables and turnover in year two were also inconsistent, and indicated no 
relationship between the two phenomena. Variation in the coefficients on demographic 
and workplace variables across the absence and turnover models is inconsistent with 
common roots, but when lagged absenteeism is entered as an explanatory variable in a 
quit model the results contradict this impression. We have weak support for the 
argument that quitting is a progression from absenteeism for some employees.
7. Conclusions
This chapter uses case study data from Bun Factory, a food manufacturer in the 
greater London area in the mid-1990s. Several years’ personnel data and payroll 
information were made available, and these were mapped in to staff satisfaction 
questionnaires for a sub-set of all staff. Absenteeism at Bun Factory was very high: the 
probability of being off between 1995 and 1996 is almost 50 per cent; the average total 
number of days off was nine. Comparison with WIRS data shows that Bun Factory had 
a significant problem with absence relative to other industries, a problem that they 
began to address after their takeover by a large national food company. This data set 
offers the opportunity to test the stylised facts of absence on an atypical workforce: 
workers here earn relatively low levels of pay and employment of ethnic minorities is 
very high. Our interest in voluntary absence arises from the recognition that may 
operate as a manifestation of exit or an informal voice mechanism. Dissatisfied 
consumers are faced with two choices when they experience a decline in service from a 
supplier of a service or product they enjoy: voice or exit. This approach is transferable 
to the labour market, where it can be applied to the relationship between an employee 
and their employing organisation. Absenteeism represents a means of temporarily 
exiting from an unsatisfactory, tiring or dangerous work situation. Bun Factory had no 
formalised voice mechanism until the introduction of team briefings in late 1995. Trade 
union recognition, a more established vehicle for meaningful two-way communication 
was not agreed until 1999. For this reason absenteeism patterns are of interest as 
absence might also be playing a voice role. Various features of absenteeism at the plant
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were investigated, along with the possibility that absence was used in either an exit or a 
voice capacity.
Comparing previous work on absenteeism is complicated because of the range 
of definitions employed. The richness of the data enabled us to look at the results across 
many definitions of absenteeism, though the main reporting is of the probability of 
voluntary absence across the year and the total number of days taken off voluntarily. 
Certain demographic and job-related factors were consistently related to absence: those 
promoted were much more likely to take time off; the unskilled, whites and those on 
flexible shifts were less likely to be off. Women took significantly fewer days off than 
men, as did those living more than five miles from the plant. Whilst absenteeism was 
sensitive to plant labour demand, the local rate of unemployment was positively related 
to time off which indicates that employees attach more importance to job security than 
the availability of other jobs. These findings counter many of the stylised facts of 
absenteeism.
Employees at Bun Factory were remarkably satisfied with most aspects of their 
job, with relationships being viewed particularly favourably. Correlations between 
forms of satisfaction and absence were generally negative, which suggests that absence 
might have been used as a voice mechanism. However, the satisfaction questionnaires 
were distributed after the end date of the payroll and personnel samples. Reaching a 
conclusion on the relationship between absence and voice would have been easier with 
an earlier distribution of satisfaction questionnaires to employees. The takeover of Bun 
Factory by a national company was followed by a series of improvements to pay and 
working conditions aimed at improving performance and lowering quits and absence. 
However, longitudinal analysis shows that whilst absence at Bun Factory seemed to 
decline over time, it had not fallen significantly in response to the discrete workplace 
changes such as pay rises or training. This undermines the absence as voice hypothesis, 
although the decline could be in response to a better climate emanating from the 
combined package of changes.
Absence and quitting may be entirely separate phenomena but a body of work 
exists which identifies a number of models relating absence and quitting: absence may 
be a form of exit which is open to employees whose options are constrained, alternate
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forms; the desire to withdraw may manifest itself through both quitting and absence, 
spillover; absence in one period may lead to quitting in the next, progression. Our 
correlation evidence was contradictory. However regression analysis suggests Bun 
Factory’s employees progress from voluntary absence to voluntary turnover.
We have highlighted the importance of testing stylised facts on new data sets. 
The chapter challenges many of the stylised facts of absenteeism, notably in finding 
women more reliable and those who are promoted less so, reflecting the combination of 
the demographic pattern of employees and the working conditions on offer. The 
reaction of different grades of employees to the discrete improvements in conditions 
showed limited variation, and the results were inconsistent with the idea that absence 
was used as a form of voice. The analysis tested various models of the relationship 
between absence and quitting and found evidence to support the hypothesis that absence 
is used as a precursor to quitting.
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Endnotes
i. Separating data by gender does seem to suggest that the coefficients are significantly 
different: however, the female sample is rather small (less than 10 per cent of the total).
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Figure 1. Absenteeism data for Bun Factory, July 1995-June 1996
All absenteeism  data
Probability off at all 
0 53
voluntary involuntary
■ ■■ ■
any length attitudinal voluntary involuntary
9 days 4 days 2 times 0 .49 0.05
voluntary
3 spells
involuntary 
0.3 spells
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Table 1. Absence Rates By Industry, WIRS Data
Main activity 
(Sic 1992)
Less than 
2%
2%
<4%
4%
<6%
6%
<8%
8% or more Total
Manufacturing 13.5 39.4 29.9 8.8 8.4 100.00
(10.0) (15.2) (36.7) (30.4) (17.7) (100.00)
All non­ 23.0 36.4 21.8 7.6 11.2 100.00
manufacturing (6.4) (15.6) (38.5) (14.7) (24.8) (100.00)
Electricity, 20.83 62.5 12.5 1.4 2.8 100.00
gas, water (0.0) (0.0) (44.4) (22.2) (33.3) (100.00)
Construction 36.6 35.5 14.0 7.5 6.5 100.00
(0.0) (33.3) (66.7) (0.0) (0.0) (100.00)
Wholesale & 20.8 37.2 20.1 13.0 8.9 100.00
retail (8.0) (12.0) (44.0) (24.0) (12.0) (100.00)
Hotels & 37.4 23.1 16.5 7.7 15.4 100.00
restaurants (25.0) (50.0) (0.0) (0.0) (25.0) (100.00)
Transport & 15.9 28.0 29.9 10.3 15.9 100.00
telecoms (11.1) (11.1) (50.0) (5.6) (22.2) (100.00)
Finance 17.7 50.6 21.5 0.00 10.1 100.00
(0.0) (20.0) (40.0) (20.0) (20.0) (100.00)
Other business 33.7 28.5 18.6 5.2 14.0 100.00
services (16.7) (16.7) (33.3) (16.7) (16.7) (100.00)
Public admin 7.6 39.6 29.9 13.2 9.7 100.00
(7.7) (15.4) (30.8) (15.4) (30.8) (100.00)
Education 24.9 37.8 18.1 8.8 10.4 100.00
(0.0) (50.0) (25.0) (12.5) (12.5) (100.00)
Health & 11.9 22.8 35.2 9.9 20.3 100.00
social work (0.0) (0.0) (30.0) (10.0) (60.0) (100.00)
Other services 25.8 34.8 23.6 6.7 9.0 100.00
(0.0) (12.5) (37.5) (12.5) (37.5) (100.00)
Total 20.8 35.5 23.8 8.7 11.3 1785
(3.7) (15.4) (37.8) (21.3) (21.8) 100.00
(188)
(00.00)
Source: The definition of absence used is “the percentage of staff off sick over the last 12 months”. 
Respondents are not asked about total days’ sick leave.
WERS 1998 data are presented with WIRS 1990 percentages in brackets. As the 1990 survey gave the 
option to state absence for the last week, month, quarter or year, cells contain fewer observations for that 
year.
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Table 2. Absenteeism Statistics For “Bun Factory”
Month & year Total
employees
Total spells 
off starting 
this month
Frequency
(%)
Incidence Quits Month & year Total
employees
Total spells 
off starting 
this month
Frequency
(%)
Incidence Quits
July 1994 311 127 40.8 29.6 29 July 1995 328 196 59.8 37.2 16
August 1994 312 133 42.6 29.8 22 August 1995 319 125 39.2 27.6 31
September 1994 311 154 49.5 33.1 19 September 1995 306 141 46.1 30.7 28
October 1994 313 171 54.6 31.9 38 October 1995 316 194 61.4 38.9 21
November 1994 324 175 54.0 35.8 50 November 1995 366 181 49.5 32.2 20
December 1994 308 165 53.6 32.8 39 December 1995 330 223 67.6 43.3 40
January 1995 318 223 70.1 42.8 17 January 1996 297 174 58.6 36.4 46
February 1995 311 183 58.8 38.3 33 February 1996 289 140 48.4 32.9 22
March 1995 333 248 74.5 42.9 21 March 1996 297 132 44.4 32.3 18
April 1995 334 187 56.0 35.9 15 April 1996 317 28 8.8 8.2 16
May 1995 331 155 47.0 29.6 16 May 1996 324 55 17.0 15.4 22
June 1995 324 202 62.3 38.3 28 June 1996 312 66 21.2 18.3 23
The monthly frequency is calculated as follows: total spells of absence * 100
total employees.
The monthly incidence is calculated as follows: total number of employees with one or more spells * 100
total employees
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Table 3. Absenteeism Variables
Variable (n) Definition Mean (sd) Variable (n) Definition Mean (sd)
Offslot
(3082)
Took any time off
Julyl995-June
1996
53.4%
(0.01)
Offold
(3806)
Took any time off
Julyl994-June
1995
55.7%
(0.01)
Newskives
(3802)
Total days off 
Julyl995-June 
1996
22 days 
(22 days)
Oldskives
(3806)
Total days off 
Julyl994-June 
1995
22 days 
(22 days)
Obslot
(3082)
Number of spells 
July 1995- 
Junel996
4(5) Obsold
(3086)
Number of spells 
July 1994- 
Junel995
4(5)
Invoslot
(3082)
Took medically 
certified time off 
July 1995- 
Junel996
4.6%
(0 .00)
Involold
(3804)
Took medically 
certified time off 
July 1994- 
Junel995
5.9%
(0.00)
Volslot
(3082)
Took self or 
uncertified time 
off Julyl995-June 
1996
48.8%
(0.01)
Volold
(3804)
Took self or 
uncertified time 
off Julyl994-June 
1995
49.8%
(0.01)
Attslot
(3082)
Took any single 
days off July1995- 
June 1996
27.9%
(0.01)
Attold
(3806)
Took any single 
days off July1994- 
June 1995
26.5%
(0 .01)
Countatt
(5055)
Number of 
attitudinal 
absences July 
1995-June 1996
2(3) Cattold
(5055)
Number of 
attitudinal 
absences July 
1994-June 1995
2(3)
Volnewsk
(5055)
Total voluntary 
days off July 1995- 
June 1996
9 days 
(14 days)
Vololdsk
(2118)
Total voluntary 
days off July 1994- 
June 1995
11 days 
(14 days)
Volnewob
(5055)
Number of 
voluntary spells 
July 1995- 
Junel996
3(5) Vololdob
(5055)
Number of 
voluntary spells 
July 1994- 
Junel995
4(4)
Invnewsk
(5055)
Total involuntary 
days off Julyl995- 
June 1996
4 days 
(13 days)
Involdsk
(5055)
Total involuntary 
days off July 1994- 
June 1995
5 days 
(13 days)
Invnewob
(5055)
Number of 
involuntary spells 
July 1995- 
Junel996
0.3(0.7) Involdob
(5055)
Number of 
involuntary spells 
July 1994- 
Junel995
0.5(1)
NB: Standard errors must be calculated as confidence intervals for dummy variables
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Table 4. Correlation Matrix For Absenteeism Variables
Variable Offslot Volslot Invoslot Offold Volold Involold Attslot Attold Volnewo Volnewsk Vololdob
Offslot
Volslot 0.911***
Invoslot 0.206*** -0.215***
Offold -0.834*** -0.755*** -0.201***
Volold -0.754*** -0.683*** -0.182*** 0.889***
Involold -0.214*** -0.193*** -0.052** 0.223*** -0.249***
Attslot 0.581*** 0.623*** -0.103*** -0.491*** -0.444*** -0.126***
Attold -0.572*** -0.477*** -0.127*** 0.536*** 0.577*** -0.095*** -0.310***
Volnewob 0.302*** 0.314*** -0.029 -0.317*** -0.270*** -0.097*** 0.194*** -0.127***
volnewsk 0.241*** 0.250*** -0.022 -0.266*** -0.224*** 0.085*** 0.034* -0.112*** 0.888***
Vololdob -0.304*** -0.293*** -0.024 0.347*** 0.359*** -0.031* -0.218*** 0.199*** 0.138*** 0.017***
Vololdsk -0.247*** -0.246*** -0.002 0.339*** 0.344*** -0.116 -0.196*** 0.135** 0.024* 0.065*** 0.836***
*** indicates significance at the 1% level of confidence, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level.
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Table 5. Sample Means & Summary Statistics
Variable Variable
Gender 90.1% male Wage rate May 1994 - 
trainee
£3.00 per hour
Distance from home to 
work (miles)
4.44(3.74) Wage rate May 1994 -  
unskilled
£3.34
Marital status - single 53.9% Wage rate May 1994 -  
semi-skilled
£4.22
Marital status -  married 42.5% Wage rate May 1994 -  
skilled
£4.67
Marital status -  other 
(divorced, separated, 
widowed)
3.6% Wage rate May 1994 -  
team leader
£5.11
Ethnic status -  affo- 
Caribbean
57.1% Wage rate May 1994 -  
engineer
£6.56
Ethnic status -  Asian 40.5% Wage rate May 1995 -  
trainee
£3.16 per hour
Ethnic status -  white & 
other
2.4% Wage rate May 1995 -  
unskilled
£3.52
Tenure (days) 494 (532) Wage rate May 1995 -  
semi-skilled
£4.32
Age (years) 32 (7.7) Wage rate May 1995- 
skilled
£4.78
Promoted 1/7/95- 
30/6/96
9.8% Wage rate May 1995 -  
team leader
£5.23
Grade -  trainee 15.4% Wage rate May 1995 -  
engineer
£6.72
Grade -  unskilled 66.9% Wage rate May 1996 - 
trainee
£3.19 per hour
Grade -  semi-skilled 11% Wage rate May 1996 -  
unskilled
£3.75
Grade -  high (skilled, 
team leaders, engineers)
6.2% Wage rate May 1996 -  
semi-skilled
£4.45
Night shifts 54% Wage rate May 1996 -  
skilled
£4.92
Day shifts 44% Wage rate May 1996 -  
team leader
£5.39
Other shifts 2% Wage rate May 1996 -  
engineer
£6.92
Local unemployment 
rate
10% (0.60) Bun Factory 
employment
311 (28)
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
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Table 6. Marginal Coefficients For Probit Estimates Of The Probability Of Time 
Off July 1995 -  June 1996
Model Any time off Attitudinal absence Voluntary absences 
only
Variable Coefficient (sd) Coefficient (sd) Coefficient (sd)
Afro-Caribbean -0.031 0.015 -0.018
(0.024) (0.022) (0.025)
White or other ethnic -0.178** -0.126* -0.228***
group (0.078) (0.057) (0.072)
Married -0.021 -0.046** -0.032
(0.024) (0.021) (0.024)
Other marital status - 0.107** -0.016 0.096*
divorced, widowed or (0.052) (0.048) (0.055)
not stated.
Women -0.012 -0.028 -0.018
(0.034) (0.030) (0.034)
Trainee 0.065 -0.015 0.059
(0.040) (0.037) (0.042)
Unskilled 0.112*** 0.031 0.099***
(0.032) (0.028) (0.032)
High Skilled -  skilled, -0.012 -0.024 0.036
line leaders, or engineers. (0.053) (0.047) (0.054)
Aged < 26 years -0.038 -0.044 -0.030
(0.037) (0.031) (0.037)
Aged 26-35 years 0.036 0.015 0.040
(0.028) (0.025) (0.028)
Aged 46 years and older 0.060 0.060 0.066
(0.043) (0.043) (0.045)
Promoted this year 0.354*** 0.236*** 0.347***
(0.019) (0.027) (0.022)
Lives less than 2 miles -0.034 0.008 -0.027
away (0.025) (0.022) (0.025)
Lives more than 5 miles -0.019 -0.017 -0.011
away (0.026) (0.023) (0.026)
Tenure -0.019 x 10"2*** -0.012 xlO'2*** -0.024 x 10’2***
(0.003) x 10"2 (0.003) x 10’2 (0.003) x 10"2
Night shifts 0.023 -0.021 0.027
(0 .022) (0.019) (0.022)
Other shifts -  afternoons, -0.151** -0.084 -0.158**
mornings or rotating (0.072) (0.055) (0.070)
No of obs 2780 2780 2780
Log likelihood -1730.4181 -1580.9828 -1736.6012
Pseudo R2 9.4% 5.3% 9.9%
Predicted probability 0.570 0.278 0.517
The table presents robust marginal coefficients from a probit estimation. *** indicates significance at the 
1% level of confidence, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level.
The default category is semi-skilled ethnically Asian men, who are single, aged 36-45 years, living 2-5 
miles from the plant and working days.
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Table 7. Benchmark Effects For Estimates Of Probability Of Taking Voluntary Time Off Between July 1995 And June 1996
Benchmark
type
Benchmark type Benchmark type Benchmark type Benchmark type Benchmark type Benchmark type Benchmark
type
Benchmark type Benchmark
type
Character­
istics
Male
Aged 36-45
Semi-skilled
Living 2-5 miles
away
Day shifts
Single
Asian origin
Mean tenure (494
days)
Female
Aged 36-45
Semi-skilled
Living 2-5 miles
away
Day shifts
Single
Asian origin
Mean tenure (494
days)
Female 
Aged 45+
Semi-skilled 
Living 2-5 miles 
away 
Day shifts 
Single 
Asian origin 
Mean tenure 
(494 days)
Female 
Aged 45+
Semi-skilled 
Living 2-5 miles 
away 
Day shifts 
Single
Afro-caribbean
origin
Mean tenure (494 
days)
Female 
Aged 45+
Semi-skilled
Living 2-5 miles
away
Day shifts
Married
Afro-caribbean
origin
Mean tenure 
(494 days)
Female 
Aged 45+ 
Unskilled
Living 2-5 miles
away
Day shifts
Married
Afro-caribbean
origin
Mean tenure 
(494 days)
Female 
Aged 45+ 
Unskilled 
Living 2-5 
miles away 
Night shifts 
Married 
Afro- 
caribbean 
origin
Mean tenure 
(494 days)
Female 
Aged 45+ 
Unskilled 
Living <=2 
miles away 
Night shifts 
Married 
Afro-caribbean 
origin
Mean tenure 
(494 days)
Female 
Aged 45+ 
Unskilled 
Living <=2 
miles away 
Night shifts 
Married 
Afro- 
caribbean 
origin
Tenure of 
(794 days)
Predicted 
probability 
of being off 
using all 
changes
0.517 0.498 0.564 0.546 0.514 0.612 0.639 0.613 0.541
Predicted 
probability 
of being off 
using only 
significant 
coefficients
0.517 0.517 0.517 0.517 0.517 0.616 0.616 0.616 0.544
This table starts with benchmark individual from previous regressions, and changes characteristics until person becomes an unskilled married female worker, aged 45 plus, of afro-caribbean 
origin, living close to the plant and working nights. The coefficients used are from table 6.
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Table 8. OLS Estimates Of Voluntary Absences: Total Days, Spells And One-Day 
Periods Between July 1995 -  June 1996
Model Total days off Spells off Number of attitudinal 
absences
Variables Coefficient (sd) Coefficient (sd) Coefficient (sd)
Afro-Caribbean 1.891*** 0.888*** 0.643***
(0.510) (0.165) (0.102)
White or other ethnic -3.629*** -1.145*** -0.379*
group (0.781) (0.230) (0.203)
Married 1.554*** 0.130 -0.158*
(0.509) (0.153) (0.091)
Other marital status - 12.282*** 5.009*** 2.307***
divorced, widowed or not (2.088) (0.823) (0.442)
stated.
Women -4.296*** -1.960*** -1.013***
(0.755) (0.235) (0.145)
Trainee -3.773*** -1.343*** -0.643***
(0.764) (0.263) (0.160)
Unskilled 1.943*** 0.427* 0.248*
(0.644) (0.227) (0.137)
High Skilled -  skilled, -5.076*** -1.716*** -1.060***
line leaders, or engineers. (0.762) (0.297) (0.178)
Aged < 26 years 0.523 -0.294 -0.247*
(0.709) (0.226) (0.134)
Aged 26-35 years 0.986* -0.008 -0.012
(0.589) (0.197) (0.113)
Aged 46 years and older -1.056 -0.758** -0.211
(1.111) (0.364) (0.227)
Promoted this year 4.026*** 2.153*** 1.655***
(0.546) (0.164) (0.115)
Lives less than 2 miles -0.708 0.561*** 0.590***
away (0.542) (0.181) (0.106)
Lives more than 5 miles -1.396** -0.243 -0.109
away (0.542) (0.157) (0.097)
Tenure 0.038 x 101*** 0.019X10'1*** -0.012 x 101***
(0.005) x 10_1 0.002 x 101 (0.001) x 10‘2
Night shifts 3.138*** 1 017*** 0.482***
(0.471) (0.152) (0.091)
Other shifts -  afternoons, -4.177*** -1.150*** -0.477***
mornings or rotating (0.667) (0.268) (0.183)
No of obs 4217 4217 4217
Constant 4 527*** 1.619*** 0.704***
(1.082) (0.357) (0.215)
R2 8.56% 13.32% 13.27%
The table presents robust coefficients from an OLS estimation. *** indicates significance at the 1% level 
of confidence, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level.
The default category is semi-skilled ethnically Asian men, who are single, aged 36-45 years, living 2-5 
miles from the plant and working the day shift.
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Table 9. Marginal Probit Coefficients Indicating The Pressures On Absenteeism: Size Of Plant, Local Unemployment And Previous Year’s 
Absenteeism
Pressures Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 4 Version 5 Version 6 Version 7 Version 8 Version 9
Previous month’s 
plant employment
0.055***
(0.007)
-0.026
(0.030)
-0.085**
(0.038)
- - - - - -
This month’s plant 
employment
- - - 0.091***
(0.008)
0.045***
(0.006)
0.020
(0.018)
- - -
Next month’s plant 
employment
- - - - - - 0.132***
(0.018)
0.071***
(0.007)
0.064***
(0.006)
Last month’s local 
unemployment rate
0.614***
(0.206)
- - 1.710***
(0.202)
- - 2.575***
(0.525)
- -
This month’s local 
unemployment rate
- -1.921*
(1.002)
- - 0.539***
(0.166)
- - 1.248***
(0.191)
-
Next month’s local 
unemployment rate
- - -4.024***
(1.242)
- - -0.412
(0.581)
- - 1.099***
(0.179)
Interaction term -0.006***
(0.001)
0.003
(0.003)
0.009**
(0.004)
-0.010***
(0.001)
-0.005***
(0.176)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.013***
(0.002)
-0.008***
(0.001)
-0.007***
(0.001)
Total voluntary days 
off last year
-0.008***
(0.001)
-0.009***
(0.001)
-0.009***
(0.001)
-0.008***
(0.001)
-0.008***
(0.001)
-0.009***
(0.001)
-0.009***
(0.001)
-0.009***
(0 .001)
-0.007***
(0.001)
Diagnostics
Number of 
observations
2629 2629 2629 2654 2654 2654 2602 2602 2602
Log likelihood -933.1299 -1081.0193 -1056.7855 -928.6131 -1061.3532 -1062.0943 -885.497 -991.4804 -964.8335
Pseudo R2 48.56% 40.41% 41.75% 49.35% 42.11 42.07 50.79% 44.89% 46.38%
Predicted probability 0.527 0.504 0.465 0.510 0.530 0.515 0.457 0.518 0.530
This table examines the relationships between different measures of internal and external pressures and the probability of absence.
Unemployment information is from the National Office of Statistics, and refers to the North London travel-to-work area. Unemployment and plant employment data refer to the month in which 
the absence occurs. The table shows robust, marginal coefficients from a probit regression. Full results, with coefficients for other variables, appear in appendix B6. Probit coefficients are 
shown in appendix B7. *** indicates significance at the 1% level of confidence, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level.
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Table 10. Satisfaction Levels
Job content variables Mean (standard 
deviation)
Job context variables Mean (standard 
deviation)
I find the job 
challenging.
2.51(1.15) The hours suit me. 3.25(1.38)
I feel like I could stay 
in the job forever.
3.20(1.37) I get along well with my 
supervisor.
2.00(1.22)
My promotion prospects 
are good.
3.23(1.21) I get on well with the 
other workers.
1.73(0.87)
I am interested in this 
type of business.
2.67(1.36) This company is a good 
employer.
2.77(1.34)
When I get home from 
this job I am tired.
2.40(1.44) Getting to work is not a 
problem.
2.54(1.57)
Content and context variables
The pay is good. 3.77(1.24) All in all, I am satisfied 
with the job.
2.92(1.30)
The questionnaire put a range of statements to the employees, and asked them to respond on a scale of 1- 
5, with 1 indicating strong agreement and 5 strong disagreement. Therefore a high score indicates a 
negative feeling about a particular facet of the job.
131
Table 11. Correlations Between Satisfaction And Absenteeism Variables
Facet of satisfaction Probability of voluntary 
absence
Total number of days 
off
Total number of days 
off last year
Job content
I feel like I could stay in the 
job forever.
-0.015 -0.375*** -0.241***
I find the job challenging. 0.081 0.231*** 0.098
I am interested in this type of 
business.
-0.073 -0.185*** -0.114
My promotion prospects are 
good.
0.135* 0.001 -0.170**
When I get home from this 
job I am tired.
0.157** 0.070 -0.278***
Job context
I get along well with my 
supervisor.
-0.095 -0.016 -0.056
Getting to work is not a 
problem.
0.048 -0.326*** -0.170**
The hours suit me. 0.028 -0.019 0.095
I get on well with the other 
workers.
-0.130* 0.176** 0.128*
This company is a good 
employer.
0.050 -0.390*** -0.198***
Job content and context 
variables
The pay is good. 0.022 0.036 0.085
All in all, I am satisfied with 
the job.
0.089 -0.065 i o £ * *
Respondents are asked to show their agreement with these statements on a scale of 1, for agree strongly, 
to 5, for disagree strongly. The time period for all absence variables is 1st July 1995 until 30th June 1996. 
Satisfaction questionnaires were returned during Autumn 1996.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level of confidence, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level.
Appendix B9 reports correlation coefficients for all absenteeism variables.
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Table 12. Changes Affecting Workers At The Food Manufacturing Plant
Groups
affected
April 1995 May 1995 November 1995 May 1996
All workers Basic food hygiene 
training introduced
Plant stability 
guaranteed by 
company 
rationalisation
Pay rises Change of culture, 
embracing team 
briefings
New canteen with 
24 vending 
facilities
Sick pay introduced
Annual leave 
accrued from start 
date
Annual leave 
increased from 15 to 
17 days
Pay rises
Specific groups of workers
Trainees 5.3% pay rise 1% pay rise
Unskilled 5.4% 6.5%
Semi-skilled 2.4% 3%
Skilled 2.4% 2.9%
Line leaders training initiated 2.3% 3.1%
Engineers 2.4% 3%
Skilled employees, line leaders and engineers are combined in to a highly skilled grade, this ensures the 
cell size is big enough to avoid problems in estimation.
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Table 13a. Difference In Difference Equation For March To May 1995
March -  May 
1995
Trainees Unskilled Semi-skilled High skilled
Time dummy -0.060*** 0.001 -0.062*** -0.061***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Grade -0.069*** 0.077*** -0.068*** -0.058***
(0.011) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Interaction 0.560 -0.078*** 0.052*** 0.042**
(0.355) (0.023) (0.017) (0.018)
Constant 0.069*** 0.014** 0.077*** 0.077***
(0.011) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013)
No of obs 466 466 466 466
R2 13.59% 13.75% 13.87% 13.89%
These tables look at the difference in absenteeism rates by grade following significant changes to pay and 
conditions. Generated using voluntary absences: see appendix BIO for tables using all absences. *** 
indicates significance at the 1% level of confidence, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level.
Table 13b. Difference In Difference Equation For April To June 1995
April -  June 
1995
Trainees Unskilled Semi-skilled High skilled
Time dummy -0.042*** -0.040 -0.049*** -0.047**
(0.016) (0.025) (0.018) (0.018)
Grade 0.261 0.037 -0.052 -0.038
(0.274) (0.029) (0.034) (0.032)
Interaction -0.292 -0.007 0.028 0.013
(0.274) (0.032) (0.036) (0.035)
Constant 0.073*** 0.049** 0.082*** 0.081***
(0.013) (0.024) (0.015) (0.015)
No of obs 522 522 522 522
R2 18.32% 18.36% 18.38% 18.39%
See notes for table 13a.
Table 13c. Difference In Difference Equation For October To December 1995
October -  
December 1995
Trainees Unskilled Semi-skilled High skilled
Time dummy 0.001
(0.013)
-0.017**
(0.015)
0.004
(0.016)
0.001
(0.015)
Grade 0.152
(0.103)
0.028
(0.018)
-0.031*
(0.017)
-0.036**
(0.014)
Interaction of -0.047 0.028 -0.029 -0.010
grade & time (0.121) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021)
Constant 0.045***
(0.008)
0.035***
(0.013)
0.056***
(0.010)
0.057***
(0 .010)
No of obs 538 538 538 538
R2 15.49% 15.55% 15.61% 15.64%
See notes for table 13 a.
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Table 13d. Difference In Difference Equation For April To June 1996
April -  June 
1996
Trainees Unskilled Semi-skilled High skilled
Time dummy -0.006
(0.009)
-0.002
(0.012)
-0.001
(0.011)
0.002
(0.010)
Grade -0.019***
(0.006)
0.012
(0.011)
-0.016**
(0.008)
0.009
(0.025)
Interaction 0.042
(0.036)
- 0.000
(0.018)
-0.003
(0.012)
-0.027
(0.027)
Constant 0.019**
(0.006)
0.010
(0.009)
0.020***
(0.007)
0.016**
(0.005)
No of obs 562 562 562 562
R1 10.70% 10.70% 10.70% 10.70%
See notes for table 13a.
135
Table 14. Correlations Between Measures Of Absenteeism And Labour Turnover
Absenteeism 
variable 
M y 1995- 
Junel996
Labour
turnover
(1/7/95-
30/6/96)
Voluntary
labour
turnover
1/7/95-
30/6/96)
Absenteeism 
variable 
July 1994- 
Junel995
Labour
turnover
(1/7/95-
30/6/96)
Voluntary
labour
turnover
1/7/95-
30/6/96)
Voluntary time 
off
“volslot”
0.004 -0.082*** Voluntary time 
off
“volold”
-0.121*** -0.032
Voluntary total 
days off
“volnewsk”
0.452*** 0.122*** Voluntary total 
days off
“vololdsk”
0.015 0.015
*** indicates significance at the 1% level of confidence, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. 
Voluntary labour turnover defined as termination not due to misconduct, sackings, end of temporary or 
seasonal contracts, redundancy, retirement, bad time keeping, ill health or a transfer to staff.
A more extensive analysis of correlations between absenteeism and labour turnover is 
reported in appendix B l l .
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Table 15. Marginal Coefficients From Probit Estimates Of The Probability Of Leaving 
July 1995 -  June 1996
Model Turnover Voluntary turnover Voluntary turnover
(1) (2) (1)
Variable Coefficient (sd) Coefficient (sd) Coefficient (sd)
Afro-Caribbean -0.038 -0.080*** -0.093***
(0.026) (0.021) (0.021)
White or other ethnic group 0.174* -0.178*** -0.199***
(0.086) (0.024) (0.015)
Married 0.089*** 0.106*** 0.108***
(0.025) (0.020) (0.020)
Other marital status -  divorced, 
widowed or not stated.
0.017
(0.058)
Dropped Dropped
Women 0.014 0.015 0.025
(0.038) (0.031) (0.032)
Trainee 0.172*** 0.070* 0.077*
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Unskilled 0.233*** 0.070** 0.055**
(0.033) (0.026) (0.026)
High Skilled -  skilled, line 0.107* -0.146*** -0.140***
leaders, or engineers. (0.060) (0.033) (0.034)
Aged < 26 years -0.061 0.024 0.015
(0.037) (0.033) (0.033)
Aged 26-35 years 0.001 x 101 0.078*** 0.081***
(0.299) x 10'1 (0.025) (0.025)
Aged 46 years and older 0.044 0.035 0.056
(0.055) (0.050) (0.052)
Promoted this year -0.326*** -0 179*** -0.158***
(0.025) (0.017) (0.018)
Lives less than 2 miles away -0.008 -0.077*** -0.079***
(0.026) (0.019) (0.019)
Lives more than 5 miles away 0.017 0.034 0.033
(0.027) (0.022) (0.022)
Tenure -0.061 x 10' 2*** -0.037 x 10'2*** -0.038 x 10‘2***
(0.005) x 10"2 (0.004) x 10'2 (0.004) x 10’2
Night shifts -0.040* -0.083*** -0.104***
(0.022) (0.018) (0.019)
Other shifts -  afternoons, -0.075 0.001 0.004
mornings or rotating (0.092) (0.068) (0.066)
Next month’s plant employment N/a -0.008
(0.007)
-0.004
(0.007)
Last month’s local unemployment N/a -0.017 0.093
rate (0.196) (0.197)
Interaction term N/a 0.009 x 10 1 
(0.007) x 101
0.004 x 101 
(0.007) x 101
Lagged total voluntary days off N/a N/a 0.004***
(0.001)
No of obs 2788 2485 2485
Log livelihood -1572.3404 -1185.0843 -1173.0877
Pseudo R2 18.61% 16.28% 17.13
Predicted probability 0.489 0.207 0.205
The table presents robust marginal coefficients from a probit estimation. *** indicates significance at the 
1% level of confidence, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level.
The default category is semi-skilled ethnically Asian men, who are single, aged 36-45 years, living 2-5 
miles from the plant, and working days.
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Table 16. Benchmark Effects For Estimates Of Probability Of Voluntary Quits
Benchmark
type
Benchmark type Benchmark type Benchmark type Benchmark type Benchmark type Benchmark type Benchmark type Benchmark type Benchmark type
Charact­
eristics
Male
Aged 36-45 
Semi-skilled 
Living 2-5 
miles away 
Day shifts 
Single 
Asian origin 
Mean tenure 
(494 days)
Female
Aged 36-45 
Semi-skilled 
Living 2-5 
miles away 
Day shifts 
Single 
Asian origin 
Mean tenure 
(494 days)
Female 
Aged 45+
Semi-skilled 
Living 2-5 
miles away 
Day shifts 
Single 
Asian origin 
Mean tenure 
(494 days)
Female 
Aged 45+
Semi-skilled 
Living 2-5 
miles away 
Day shifts 
Single
Afro-caribbean
origin
Mean tenure 
(494 days)
Female 
Aged 45+ 
Semi-skilled 
Living 2-5 
miles away 
Day shifts 
Married 
Afro-caribbean 
origin
Mean tenure 
(494 days)
Female 
Aged 45+ 
Unskilled
Living 2-5 
miles away 
Day shifts 
Married 
Afro-caribbean 
origin
Mean tenure 
(494 days)
Female 
Aged 45+ 
Unskilled 
Living 2-5 
miles away 
Night shifts 
Married 
Afro-caribbean 
origin
Mean tenure 
(494 days)
Female 
Aged 45+ 
Unskilled 
Living <=2 
miles away 
Night shifts 
Married 
Afro-caribbean 
origin
Mean tenure 
(494 days)
Female 
Aged 45+ 
Unskilled 
Living <=2 
miles away 
Night shifts 
Married 
Afro-caribbean 
origin
Tenure (794 
days)
Predicted 
probability of 
being off 
using only 
significant 
coefficients
0.207 0.207 0.207 0.127 0.233 0.303 0.220 0.143 0.032
This table starts with a benchmark individual from previous regressions, and changes characteristics until person becomes an unskilled married female worker, aged 45 plus, of afro-caribbean 
origin, living close to the plant and working nights. The coefficients used are those reported in column 2 of table 15.
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Chapter 4: Voice and Workplace Change
1. Introduction
British industrial relations has been subject to a range of strong pressures over the last 
twenty five years. Whilst during the 1980s there was debate between proponents of the idea 
that things had changed radically (Bassett: 1986), and others argued that change should not 
be overstated (Maclnnes: 1987), by the end of the 1990s Gallie et al pronounced that 
industrial relations had undergone a “transformation” (1998: p i). This change was driven 
by increased global competition (Beatson: 1995a), government legislation (Freeman and 
Pelletier: 1990), technical advances (Gallie et al: 1998) and the development of human 
resource management. The degree of change can be measured in terms of altered workplace 
institutions, or the relative power of the two major parties: employers and workers. Trade 
unions are obviously central to a discussion of industrial relations. Trade unions have been 
affected by a range of secular influences, and cyclical pressures, which have reduced their 
influence and changed workplace industrial relations across much of the developed world. 
The 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey revealed that the proportion of British 
establishments employing union members had dropped from 73 per cent in 1980 to 54 per 
cent. Whilst some firms established non-union councils to fill the representation gap (Terry: 
1999), a sizeable proportion of employees have no access to a form of collective voice.
Power is a contested concept (Lukes: 1974, Kirkbride: 1992) but it is relevant to our 
consideration of employee influence over workplace change. Lukes (1974) devised a three 
dimensional model of power which underpins the analysis of this chapter. The one­
dimensional view defines power as the ability of parties to “win” issues and influence 
decisions. The two dimensional definition states that power does not merely relate to who 
wins an issue but dictates which issues are deemed suitable for negotiation, thereby 
reducing the opportunities for employees and trade unions to exercise voice. If management 
control the agenda, it is harder for unions to legitimise dissent and hence mobilise their 
members, which is vital if they are to utilise their collective power (Tilly: 1978, Kelly: 
1997). In an age of union decline, the majority of employees have non-union representation 
or no representation at all. Mobilisation of these employees will be extremely difficult. The
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three dimensional view of power articulated by Lukes (1974) recognises that one party may 
have the ability to manipulate the other through ideological control. Whilst employers may 
historically have desired the ability to wield ideological control, their ability to introduce 
this may have been impaired by the counterbalancing power of trade unions. A move 
towards a more unitarist environment may enable management to bypass trade union voice 
for more direct communication forms, or to withdraw formalised voice. An analysis of 
Lukes’ third dimension of power is left for future work. In Lukes’ model, dimensions are 
not sequential, they do not need to be pursued in a certain order; but power as indicated by 
the second dimension is greater than that of the first dimension.
In this chapter we argue that the pressures on organisations led to an increase in 
workplace change over the period 1979 to 2000. Any fall in the ability of employees to 
influence decision about workplace change implies a reduction in power. We use the ability 
to influence the introduction of workplace change as a proxy for Lukes’ second dimension 
of power, so we argue that the ability of management to introduce change without 
discussing it during the annual settlement reflects a change in the “terrain of bargaining” 
(Terry: 1989 p 110) and a reduction in employee influence. Changes to working practices 
are associated with effort intensification (Bennett and Smith-Gavine: 1988). An inability to 
get compensatory remuneration for workplace change is an irrefutable fall in employee 
power as represented by Lukes’ first dimension. Our hypotheses are that there will be fairly 
consistent levels of workplace change, in view of the pressures on organisations to 
maximise performance and that change will be compensated for with greater than average 
increases in remuneration. However, the ability to link change to the annual settlement and 
gain the associated remuneration will be greatest where union recognition remains.
This chapter focuses on changes to working practices introduced as part of the annual 
pay round, and on the ability of employees to extract a wage increase or improvement in 
their conditions of employment at the time change is introduced using the CBI Pay 
Databank Survey for the period 1979-2000. The Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys 
(WIRS) are used to look at the context of change and the ability of collectively organised 
employees to exercise voice over such issues across the wider economy. Between 1980 and
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1998 managerial respondents gave information about the range of issues they negotiated 
over with trade union representatives. This information is discussed in section 2. Section 3 
looks at the literature on workplace change, and develops some hypotheses for testing. The 
data and methodological issues arising from the CBI dataset are addressed in section 4. The 
next section looks at the pattern and determinants of workplace change, before examining 
whether improved remuneration and conditions of employment are correlated with 
workplace change, section 5. Section 6 offers conclusions on the pattern and consequences 
of changes to working practices.
2. The Context For Negotiated Change: Workplace Industrial Relations 
Surveys
This chapter charts the introduction of workplace change, and examines whether 
change is accompanied by compensatory remuneration. We can set the context for this by 
examining the pattern of negotiation over various workplace changes using the range of 
Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys (WIRS). In 1980, 1984, 1990 and 1998 
managerial respondents were asked to indicate whether they negotiated over issues such as 
staffing, working conditions, recruitment and capital investment with trade union 
representatives. Whilst our CBI sample is not restricted to sites which engage in trade union 
bargaining, this information is still relevant. Trade unions are likely to exert greater 
influence over workplace change than non-union company councils (Terry: 1999), and even 
more than unrepresented employees. The proportion of managerial respondents indicating 
that union representatives had a meaningful voice in such changes are shown in Table 1.
It is clear that the right to negotiate has fallen over time. Comparison is made less 
than straightforward by changes to the questions over time, yet this indicates that union 
influence was perceived to have fallen by the surveyors. Between 1980 and 1990 the 
picture of influence is varied. More respondents claimed to negotiate over the length of the 
working week, physical conditions, redeployment, redundancy and staffing levels in 1990 
than in the earlier study. Figures on capital investment and recruitment were roughly 
constant, whilst negotiation over changes to boost productivity fell by around one third. On 
most issues the responses are very similar for manual and non-manual workers. Between
141
1990 and 1998 however, things change quite severely. Respondents claimed to negotiate 
over physical conditions, recruitment and staffing levels in very few cases. Pensions were 
widely negotiated over, but as part of an overall dialogue about remuneration. This survey 
no longer covered capital investment decisions or redeployment by 1998. The fact that the 
question changed, with options for agreement becoming less strategic by 1998, may 
indicate a fall in the coverage of voice. This is important because as Brown et al (2000) 
argue, examining the shift from employee rights negotiated through collective bargaining to 
those enshrined in legislation, “collective procedures are the custodians of individual 
rights” (2000: 627). Without a collective agreement on issues such as staffing, 
redeployment and working conditions, individual employees may be faced with regular 
demands for change and have no ability to influence the introduction of change to obtain 
compensatory remuneration.
It is possible to extend the period covered by WIRS backwards, to the 1960s. 
Brown et al (2000) report information from an earlier survey, that of the 1968 Royal 
Commission, which can be used to allow analysis from the mid 1960s, albeit for a smaller 
sample of the economy. The 1966 Royal Commission Survey, used a sample of 319 
managerial respondents, across manufacturing sites of 150 employees and construction 
sites of 50 staff or more, making the survey much less representative than the later WIRS 
series. Using those questions which are strictly comparable with those in Table 1: 
redeployment was subject to agreement in 62 per cent of cases; new jobs and new machines 
in more than 60 per cent of cases: and the manning of machines in 47 per cent. Compared 
with the information presented in Table 1, these indicate a stronger influence on specific 
issues than in 1980, although as the range of issues is narrower than covered by the 1980’s 
WIRS it is not clear if the overall sphere of influence was greater or not. Respondents were 
asked to indicate if they discussed and settled these issues with shop stewards -  where they 
were present, which again makes the results slightly different those from WIRS. This 
extension of the period is important though, as it allows us to consider the 1990s as a time 
of particularly low levels of union influence, rather than to see the 1980s as a time of 
particularly strong union influence.
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An earlier paper by Brown et al (1998: iii) identified the phenomenon of “partial 
derecognition”, whereby trade unions see the range of issues over which they have 
negotiation rights shrink. Overall, the picture from WIRS is one of a reduced sphere of 
influence, of this “partial derecognition” where union representatives remain, particularly 
since 1990. It is likely that non-union company councils and unrepresented workers will 
have even less influence over change.
3. Themes & Hypotheses
a) Patterns of Workplace Change
According to Lukes’ (1974) model, the ability to negotiate over or influence the 
introduction of change corresponds to power as measured by his second dimension. Over 
the 1980s competitive pressures increased, and so we anticipate an increasing proportion of 
settlements will include consideration of workplace change. If the proportion of settlements 
covering workplace change has risen we can assume that employees have lost little or none 
of their power to influence the contents of the annual settlement. If our literature suggest 
that plenty of workplace change is occurring but the data show that employees no longer 
discuss this with their employer, this will indicate a fall in employee power. We look first 
for evidence of the amount of workplace change over this period and specific pressures 
leading to more change, before looking at the type of workers and industries most likely to 
be affected.
Between 1979 and 2000 there was a great deal of structural change in industry (Gallie 
et al: 1998) and an intensification of economic competitiveness Beatson (1995a). Evidence 
on whether there was an increase in the rate of workplace change though is mixed. Pollert 
(1991) cautions that to see 1979 as a watershed in terms of flexibility ignores the tradition 
of continual change in industrial relations, and Bosworth (1983) too stresses that technical 
change was common in the UK throughout the post-1945 period. However, Beatson 
(1995a) claims that there has been a significant increase in measures to boost flexible 
working arrangements since the end of the 1970s. Beatson (1995b) argues that the rise in
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UK workplace change reflects a response to the increase in international competitiveness, 
new production processes, changes in the supply and demand for labour, and changes in 
government policies. Marsden and Thompson (1990), using secondary qualitative sources 
and some interviews, examine the rise in flexibility improving deals in the early 1980s. 
Efforts to boost productivity saw two periods of intense change: 1980 to 1982; and 1984 to 
1987. WIRS data illustrates the continuing pattern of workplace change in the UK over 
recent years: 65 per cent of managerial respondents employing 25 or more staff in 1998 
claimed their establishment had undergone a lot of change over the last five years. 
However, between 1979 and 1990 Dunn and Wright (1994) found little evidence of formal 
change on brownfield sites. This suggests that change may be occurring informally, outside 
annual settlements, which will impact on our ability to capture all incidences of change 
with the CBI dataset.
Eiger (1991) argues that employers behave pragmatically, using secular and cyclical 
pressures to instigate workplace changes. The recession of the early 1980s and the 
government’s attitude towards organised labour made it relatively easy to engineer 
piecemeal change, which is likely to arouse more limited resistance than a fundamental 
change in working practices, and during the first half of the 1980's most flexibility 
measures were introduced at a time of crisis (Eiger: 1991). Firms are unlikely to use an 
economic downturn as an excuse for radical change if they were not sure of imposing their 
wishes (Kelly: 1985, Batstone and Gourlay: 1986). Thus firms proceeded with the 
introduction of new working practices in much the same way as the government moved its 
anti-union legislative programme. Marsden and Thompson (1990) claimed that the 
introduction of change was smoother at the end rather than during the early 1980s because 
of the widespread recognition of intense and constant competition. The smoother 
introduction of change could reflect the fact that management exploited competitive 
pressures to justify change, or that employees recognised the need to constantly improve 
performance through new practices. Change has certainly been cyclically induced, but the 
continuing decline in union membership may have added a secular element to the pattern of 
change. Kelly (1990) argues that by all three of Lukes’ (1974) definitions of power, union 
strength declined over the early and mid 1980s, and union density and recognition have
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continued to fall since then. Viewing power struggles as zero sum engagements implies that 
this fall was accompanied by the strengthening of employers’ hands which may lead to 
greater workplace change outside the annual settlement. In line with this idea, Brown et al 
(1998) introduce the concept of partial derecognition, referring to instances where 
recognised unions have seen the scope of their voice curtailed. Such a position represents a 
change in the terrain of bargaining (Terry: 1989), and a decline in their bargaining power 
over a full range of issues may be accompanied by less influence over those issues which 
remain on the joint bargaining agenda. Whilst non-union representatives may be offered a 
chance to negotiate over change (Neathey and Arrowsmith: 2001), their role tends to be one 
of consultation rather than strong influence, and is diminished in tough economic climates 
(Terry: 1999).
Although it appears that workplace change has become more common over the period, 
there is likely to have had been uneven incidence across industries and types of employee. 
Whilst Batstone and Gourlay’s (1986) study finds that two thirds of all shop stewards had 
been involved in the changing of working practices, this average varied from 80 per cent of 
shop stewards in chemicals to 44 per cent in finance. The pattern of industrial relations 
conflicts during the 1980s and 1990s also affected sectors unevenly, notably involving 
paper and publishing sector and transport and communications (Batstone and Gourlay: 
1986). Beatson (1995a) suggests that increasingly competitive markets made measures to 
boost manufacturing efficiency crucial following the onset of the 1980s’ recession likely; 
so change would have been concentrated in the manufacturing sector and/or in the 
industrialised North and Midlands in the earlier years of the sample. Marsden and 
Thompson (1990) find that most change related to demarcation and deployment, and was 
centred on manual workers in non-car engineering. These groups of workers often saw lots 
of changes to their working methods following a flexibility agreement. Batstone and 
Gourlay (1986) stressed that certain processes and groups of workers would be more likely 
to experience change than others, particularly manual workers. They claimed that finance 
and telecoms saw the greatest repeated use of technical change, whereas print, food and 
drink, engineering, and chemicals had generally only been affected once. The second 
recession of the period, during the early 1990s, had a more even geographical impact, so
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service sector firms, in banking and insurance for instance, are likely to have introduced 
changes during the 1990s. Skill biased technical change is a pervasive phenomenon across 
most industrialised nations (Machin: 2001), and the associated fall in demand for unskilled 
workers over the last eighteen years, may have been mirrored by unskilled manual 
workers’ disproportionate experience of workplace change.
Evidence for the other specific types of change on which this paper focuses, shift 
working, flexible hours and removal of restrictive practices, is hard to find. The abolition of 
restrictive practices is likely to be concentrated in particular areas, reflecting the demise of 
previously strong trade unions, as in printing. Daniel (1987) found that around 20 per cent 
of large unionised plants had seen steps taken to reduce “restrictive practices”. Cross (1988) 
found that 13 per cent of his sample of 450 manufacturing groups saw increased use of 
more flexible working practices from 1979 onwards. The introduction of shift working is 
likely to be limited to certain process and industries, perhaps recently communications and 
banking. It is likely that all industries and workers will have been affected to some extent 
by the introduction of new technology, however, smaller firms may find it harder to 
introduce technical change due to capital constraints. A report by ACAS (1988), focussing 
on large, private manufacturing companies, finds that task flexibility was more likely to 
have been imposed in larger firms. The idea that there should be some compensatory trade 
off for workplace change is explored in the next section.
Hypotheses For Sub-Section a -  Workplace Change
Given the pressures establishments were facing between 1979 and 2000, we expect a 
relatively high incidence of workplace change, with trade unions better able to maintain the 
right to negotiate over change as part of the annual settlement. If workplace change is 
cyclically driven the incidence is likely to be concentrated in the two periods corresponding 
to a weak economy, the early 1980s and early 1990s, and in regions with higher 
unemployment. We predict that it will have a greater effect upon manufacturing than 
services and manuals more than other employees. Lagged change, indicating a need for 
continued improvements in performance, is likely to be positively related to change.
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b) Intensification And Rewards For Change
According to Lukes’ (1974) model, the first dimension of employee power can be 
proxied by wages rises. In particular where workplace change affects a group of employees 
we assume that their effort levels have increased. This group must obtain compensatory 
remuneration, as represented by a greater than average wage increase or better working 
hours or holidays, in order to retain the same wage-effort trade off.
Whilst workers may not resent efficiency increasing change per se there is a wealth of 
evidence that shows workplace change has "involved an uneven increase in the scope of 
management prerogatives and, often, an intensification of work" (Eiger: 1991 p.49), see 
also Green (2001) and Brown et al (1998). Batstone and Gourlay (1986) revealed 60-80 
per cent of manual manufacturing respondents believed their effort levels had increased and 
more than a half of all groups stated that their effort had increased to very high, or 
reasonably high levels. Effort rose fastest where there was repeated change. Gallie and 
White (1993) revealed that new technology was correlated with a higher level of required 
skill. In turn greater skill was linked to higher levels of effort so, whilst some analysts 
might view technical change as having a benign or even beneficial impact upon employee 
effort, the resulting rise in required skills leads to effort intensification. As a background to 
these findings, Bennett and Smith-Gavine (1988) devised a percentage utilisation of labour 
index. They revealed a ceiling-breaking rise in productivity, as represented by this index, 
between 1982 and 1984, indicating effort intensification because there was no 
accompanying rise in capital investment.
More formally if workers are subjected to change which increases the demands upon 
their effort then they would expect to see compensatory wage rises. Equation 1 highlights 
the wage-effort trade off which employers and workers enter into:
Et = (piX + P2 Wt + et) Equation 1
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Effort, E, is determined by a vector of characteristics, X, which we assume to be 
unchanging, the wage, W, with p2>0 and an error term, e. Assuming that the employment 
relationship commences at time t, then in return for a given effort level, Et, the worker 
expects to receive wage, Wt. The introduction of workplace change at time t+1 alters this 
relationship. If workers have retained a degree of power then we expect that in line with the 
extra effort represented by Et+i, their wage will rise to Wt+i. The closer the elasticity to one 
the greater their power. So that
Wt+i = (diX + d2Et+i + ut+i) Equation 2
With d2>0
Workplace change may be resisted by employees, which could offer another 
justification for compensatory increases or shorter hours. Empirical evidence reveals that 
the pattern of worker resistance to changes in working practices varies widely, according to 
the type of change introduced and the skill group of the worker (Daniel: 1987, Batstone and 
Gourlay: 1986). New technology in particular is often viewed positively (Marsh: 1992, 
Marsden and Thompson: 1990), as it may enhance employees’ status (Daniel: 1987). WIRS 
3 indicates that manual stewards have greater influence in workplaces than non-manual 
union representatives, which may go some way to explaining why manual workers were 
less resistant to change than non-manuals.
As the evidence suggests workplace change increases the effort demands on workers, 
then their pay should rise in line with their effort. Siegrist (1998) uses medical data to 
illustrate the stress, and ill health, which results from an effort-reward imbalance. The 
forging of a link between workplace change and wage rises is not new, Daniel (1987) 
stressed the similarity between more recent flexibility deals and 1960s’ productivity 
bargaining. Following the example of the Esso plant at Fawsey, productivity bargaining 
was advocated by the Donovan commission in the late 1960s (Martin: 1992). Whilst 
common in the 1960s and 1970s, such bargaining fell out of use when increases were 
constrained by incomes policies, as it was discredited as a means of breaking statutory pay 
limits (Marsden and Thompson: 1990). Evidence on the ability of workers to influence
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change and benefit financially from it is mixed. Marsden and Thompson (1990) find that 
the introduction of workplace change was generally the result of an agreement offset by 
higher wages. However, Eiger (1991) and Terry (1989) suggest that whilst bargaining over 
flexibility measures to some extent resembles bargaining over productivity, cyclical 
pressures resulting in the ‘regaining of the managerial prerogative’, favour managers and 
make bargaining more adversarial. A tight labour market might encourage firms to engage 
in a trade-off with their workers, in order to maintain morale and facilitate a smooth 
transition, whilst during recession employers may be better able to resist workers’ claims. 
This is why a longitudinal study of this nature is so important.
It is recognised that unions have different degrees over influence over different 
workplace issues (Andrews and Simmons: 1995), which has led to the development of 
sequential bargaining models (Manning: 1987), a position supported by the WIRS data in 
table 1. Within sequential models, unions often find themselves in a reactive role regarding 
discussion of workplace change, wages are bargained over by both sides, and unions take 
no role in deciding employment levels, although employment levels are beyond the scrutiny 
of this paper. Frost (2001), focusing on the process of change in North American steel 
plants, finds an active local union involvement in change brings benefits to both employees 
and firms, but only where unions were involved from the initiation of consideration of 
change. Marsh (1992) argues that UK unions often have little role in negotiating workplace 
change, their place being to react once management have begun to plan the changes and to 
try and ensure that labour shares in the benefits (Price: 1988). However, Rose and Jones 
(1985) found substantial variation in the ability at plant level to resist management attempts 
to reorganise work and to bargain for non-pecuniary benefits in return for new technology 
and the introduction of other changes. Eiger (1991) found that workers in the South East 
and chemicals were more likely to extract recompense for change, whilst Batstone and 
Gourlay (1986) found that print workers were most often compensated for change. This 
suggests that we are more likely to capture employee influence in the form of a link 
between change and remuneration than between change and the settlement.
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Unions have traditionally bargained for improvements in non-wage remuneration, so the 
search for recompense for accepting change must be broader than an analysis of wage rises. 
For the US Kochan (1980) found that unions’ success in achieving wage premia was 
matched by a superior non-wage package, and Green et al (1985) found evidence of similar 
achievements in the UK. In relation to hours, improvements were noted between 1945 and 
1980, with little sign of a fall since then, but holiday improvements are visible over our 
period (Green: 2001). This success reflects the fact that “paid holidays have become an 
important part of the contested labour contract” (Green 1997, p.245). His analysis of the 
UK labour force survey finds holiday entitlement rose across the board during the 1980s, 
but that the union-nonunion gap increased, the holiday gap implying that non-union effort 
levels are higher, ceteris paribus. Whilst the introduction of the Working Time Directive in 
1998 might be thought to influence hours and holiday arrangements in our sample, Neathey 
and Arrow smith (2001) found that it has so far had a limited impact, particularly over 
holiday arrangements.
Hypotheses For Sub-Section b -  Intensification And Rewards For Change
The outcome of bargaining over wages represents power, as represented by the first of 
Lukes’ (1974) dimensions. The introduction of workplace change in the annual settlement 
will be accompanied by a compensatory wage increase, or improved hours and holidays 
unless there is as decline in employees’ power. Voice, in the form of union recognition, will 
be crucial in making sure that the disruption and greater effort associated with change are 
rewarded.
c) Continued Employment
We predict that change will be accompanied by better than average pay increases, or 
improved hours and holidays, but organisational crisis may limit the outcomes of 
bargaining. If employers face the prospect of shutdown then it might seem sensible for 
workers to accept efficiency-boosting workplace change without extra financial 
remuneration or improved conditions, the “reward” to these workers being their continued 
employment. In the US Jacobson et al. (1993) use individual level data to highlight wage
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falls for individuals who were victims of mass lay-offs during the early and mid-1980s. 
Those who were “separated” earn 9 per cent less then their colleagues and these shortfalls 
were visible as early as three years before their termination. The duration of these pay 
inequalities suggests that the firm felt able to identify the least productive of its workforce 
and to reject seniority as a criterion for discharge when economic conditions dictated 
layoffs. It also implies that it may not be too difficult to identify plants where change is 
introduced without “rewards” in order to combat poor performance. Whilst nominal wage 
freezes are unusual and cuts rare within the UK (Brown et al: 2004, IDS: 1990, 1991a, 
1991b, 1993) and notably in this dataset, it is possible that workers in endangered plants 
may receive a lower increase than employees within the same industry and region.
Lawrence and Lawrence (1985) argue that during the late 1960s and early 1970s real 
wages rose faster than they “should” have, given productivity and terms of trade changes. 
They suggested that in a declining industry labour acts to boost its share of income by 
taking some of that which would previously have accrued to capital. Capital is “held to 
ransom” because of its fixed and irreversible nature. By demanding higher than appropriate 
wage increases an industry-wide union acts to hasten the demise of plants in the industry 
concerned, and although workers’ wages eventually fall, by this time the plant is doomed to 
close. This paper contradicts that of Jacobsen et al, suggesting as it does that it may be 
relatively difficult to establish a link between wage increases and plant closure, with poor 
performers only becoming visible at the last minute.
The only comparable work for the UK is that of Blanchflower (1991). He claimed to 
find that labour was willing to forego its share of rents in the face of a demand shock, with 
wages a declining function of the probability of firm closure. Using data from individuals’ 
responses to British Social Attitude Surveys he suggested that workers who expect to be 
laid off get a lower wage, as do those who expect their plant to close. However, those 
expecting job cuts at their plants to leave them unaffected did not experience lower wages. 
Whilst these findings initially seem plausible, respondents report the probability of 
redundancy as constant over the cycle, indicating that they are not economically rational. 
Their responses may represent ex post rationalisation for their lay off. The lower wage
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effect for plant closure is only significant for non-union labour, indicating the importance 
again of voice in determining rewards.
Hypotheses For Sub-Section c -  Continued Employment
It is likely that firms facing crisis will want to introduce workplace change, with the 
exception of new technology which is costly (Eiger: 1991). Multiple changes may be 
needed to save the organisation, so an association between crisis, as exemplified by an 
employment shock, and multiple change is predicted. This change is unlikely to be 
accompanied by improved wages or changes in hours and holidays even in the presence of 
a trade union.
4. Data
This paper uses the CBI Pay Settlement Data Bank, a sample of firms drawn originally 
from the 1978 Census of Production. This survey was introduced in 1979 as a systematic 
monitoring of private sector wage settlements, including both CBI member and non­
members. The sample offers approximately 1500 observations each year, at the level of the 
settlement group within establishments, offering one of the longest continuous sources of 
disaggregated firm-level wage data available in Britain. The data cover around 1.5 million 
employees, around 8 per cent of the private sector labour force. One, two or three 
settlement groups for each establishment may be present in any one year, with the 
questionnaire requesting that where possible these be the two largest manual and the largest 
non-manual groups. The response rate to this survey is high, 65-70 per cent according to 
Gregory et al (1985), and care is taken to replace firms which exit with ones in the same 
industry and region. Although the survey now covers both manufacturing and services, 
unionised and non-union groups, service sector establishments were only included from 
1987 onwards and the sample remains dominated by manufacturing companies. However, 
because service sector groups are typically larger they employ a disproportionate number of 
workers in the sample.
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The data are arranged in pay years running from August till the following July, a 
phenomenon which indicates the tendency of firms to settle annual deals during the same 
month each year and reflect wider pay trends. Sample means for the entire period are 
presented in the first column of Table 2. The sample period encompasses two episodes of 
double-digit inflation, two recessions - one in a high inflation environment, the other 
associated with low inflation - and analysis suggests that the coefficients vary over time. In 
order to pursue discussion of whether workplace change and annual settlements are subject 
to cyclical pressures the overall 22 year period is divided into four unbalanced panels of 
five years. These correspond broadly to the economic downturns, 1979-1983 and 1991- 
1995, and the two upturns of 1987-1991 and 1996-2000.
In 1986 Batstone and Gourlay claimed that formal agreements at the pay bargaining 
level only covered a narrow range of other issues, because pay settlements were more 
centralised than agreements on conditions. However, Gregory et al (1986) analysed data 
from the CBI sample and found that the establishment level was the most common level for 
bargaining and decision making about pay and conditions by the early 1980s. The 
proportion of pay settlements dealt with at establishment level has increased due to the 
extent of decentralisation in industrial relations (WIRS: 1990). Thus this data set provides 
valuable insight into the processes and outcomes of plant-level bargaining. All groups in 
the data set have some element of site bargaining or decision making in the annual 
settlement.
The union identifier in the dataset is inconsistent over time so we use the variable 
“claim submitted” to identify which groups are in fact unionised. The overall rate of union 
recognition is over 80 per cent in the first years of the dataset reflecting the sample’s 
manufacturing basis, falling to around 35 per cent in the last years of the sample, having 
followed the same pattern of decline over the last twenty years as in the wider economy. A 
problem arises in respect of the occupational grouping identifier. From 1998 this question 
is withdrawn, so the information has to be inferred from previous years. This creates a 
problem with groups who enter in 1998, 1999 or 2000 for the first time. Those groups for 
whom occupational grouping cannot be inferred are classified as mixed, the default
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grouping in all regressions, so coefficients on manual and non-manual groups are biased 
downwards. This affects around 10 per cent of settlement groups in 1998 and 1999, rising 
to just under 20 per cent in 2000.
The measure of “workplace change” is a composite variable comprising one or more of 
the following: the introduction of new technology; flexible working time arrangements 
(from 1985); the end of “restrictive practices”; shift working or other productivity 
improvements (until 1998). Whilst the majority of the analysis will focus on this composite 
variable, the variable is disaggregated into its constituent parts in order to compare the 
incidence of the introduction of each form of change. It is also possible to isolate instances 
of multiple change, introduced as part of the same settlement. Therefore the paper contrasts 
the impact of single and multiple simultaneous changes to working practices in any given 
year. Each survey also asks the respondent whether settlement groups saw changes in their 
hours and holiday arrangements:
“Please indicate whether the settlement included [ 1 the following improvements in 
terms and conditions: a reduction in the length of the normal working week; an increase in 
the length of holidays”,
a positive answer to either would represent unambiguous improvement for employees.
The CBI dataset contains two wage measures. One option gives the percentage increase 
to average basic hourly/weekly rates of pay of the employees in the relevant settlement 
group. However, this wage variable is only available for the middle years of our period. We 
use the wage variable that has been used more frequently in academic study of the CBI 
settlement databank, which is the response to:
“Please indicate how much the settlement will increase the earnings of a typical 
employee in this group over the next 12 months. Please include the effect of bonus 
payments, merit awards etc, if made as part of the settlement”.
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Examining wage changes with employers’ settlement data brings the advantage that it 
avoids the recall and measurement bias associated with individual level data. However, 
settlement wage data show a much lower level of increase over the period 1979 to 2000 
than individual level wage series (Smith: 2000, Gregory et al 1985). This is largely due to 
the fact that individual level data will reflect changes in job, promotions and contingent 
elements of pay. Settlement data also show a much greater level of nominal rigidity (Brown 
et al: 2004) than individual data (Smith: 2000), but this again reflects the contingent 
element in the latter. It is appropriate to use settlement data for this analysis as we are 
examining what happens to a group of workers affected by the same workplace change. 
Also be looking at relative changes in wage levels we are controlling for unobserved 
characteristics. The wage increase variable employed is adjusted to reflect the real 
settlement wage increase, by deducting the percentage inflation rate in the month of the 
settlement from the nominal settlement increase.
In order to investigate whether firms which appear to be in crisis introduce more 
changes and change without associated wage rises, we construct some new variables. A 
dummy variable indicates whether the organisation subsequently drops out of the dataset 
permanently, which we take to imply that the firm goes out of business. An organisational 
level exit dummy is preferable to one for the settlement group, as it is possible for the 
organisation to merge previously distinct settlement groups which would erroneously imply 
problems for the firm. Additionally, a dummy is generated to show if there has been a fall 
in employment of at least 10 per cent between the previous year’s settlement and this 
year’s. To test the strength of the assumptions underlying these variables an additional 
variable interacting the two is created.
The choice of modelling technique for looking at the probability of workplace change is 
straightforward, either a probit or logit model may be used depending upon assumptions 
about the distribution of the continuous latent variable which is assumed to lie behind the 
observed binary dependent outcome variable. This chapter will report the marginal effects 
from probit estimations, a technique which is also appropriate for examining changes to 
hours and holidays, whilst wage increases can be modelled using ordinary least square
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techniques. Looking at the incidence of multiple change is less straight forward, and will 
require an ordered probit estimation. Coefficients from ordered probit estimations indicate 
which variables are significant and in what direction they are related to the dependent 
variable. However, unlike a probit regression where marginal coefficients can be used to 
identify the exact size of relationship between one explanatory and the dependent variable, 
ordered probits require the creation of benchmark or ideal types to ascertain the scale of 
significant relationships. Benchmark settlement groups are introduced in the results section, 
during the discussion of multiple workplace changes.
5. Results
a) Patterns Of Change
Tables 3 and 4 show the pattern of workplace change by region and industrial sector. 
Before making comparisons by region or sector, we can immediately see that the incidence 
of change was higher at the beginning of the period, with a highpoint in 1979 and 1980, and 
dropped off sharply from 1990. This pattern does not conform to one of cyclically 
determined change. Given the economic downturn of the early 1990s one would expect to 
witness more change from 1990 onwards than in the late 1980's. Table 3 reports the pattern 
of change by region, and lists regional unemployment rates. Scotland and the North are the 
regions most affected by changes to working practices, with East Anglia and Yorkshire the 
least likely to undergo change. Whilst these regions include those with the highest 
unemployment rates this relationship is not strong; the correlation between areas of high 
unemployment and high rates of workplace change is not significant. Table 4 covers 
manufacturing industries from 1979, and adds in service ones from 1987. As one might 
expect, given the intensification of international competition from 1979 onwards and the 
tradable nature of manufactured output, the degree of change within manufacturing has on 
the whole been greater than that in services. Following Batstone and Gourlay (1986) 
change was concentrated in paper and publishing with a concentration of change in 
transport and communications amongst service industries. This probably reflects the swift 
advance in communications technology. Textiles had the lowest incidence of change of 
manufacturing sectors, conceivably because it relies on intensive, low paid labour. A
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number of service industries, organisations in construction or leisure or miscellaneous 
categories, all saw much less change than in other categories; a result which may reflect the 
relatively low number of observations for these industries.
Whilst there is little sign of a cyclical pattern to the incidence of change, the decreasing 
occurrence over time is smoother within manufacturing. This decline may reflect either a 
shake-out of manufacturing inefficiencies meaning there are no changes left to make, or a 
severe alteration in the frontier of control between employers and employees, enabling the 
introduction of workplace change outside the annual settlement. Econometric analysis may 
shed more light on the explanation.
Econometric estimation on workplace change
The investigation of the determinants of workplace change is developed using 
regression analysis. The dependent variable for the regression is dichotomous, and 
therefore ordinary least squares estimation is unsuitable, producing biased standard errors. 
Instead we employ probit techniques to estimate equation 3:
Prob. A work practices = aX + bU + cWorkplace change^ Equation 3
+ dP + e
where X is a vector of settlement group characteristics, U represents a dummy for union 
recognition, lagged workplace change is also an explanatory variable, vector P adds a 
variety of dummy variables representing economic pressures on the employing 
organisation, and e represents the error term. Whilst the coefficients from a probit 
regression indicate which independent regressors are significant and in what direction, they 
do not provide the correct magnitude of each influence. Therefore we calculate the 
marginal coefficients which give the percentage point change in the predicted probability, 
relative to the sample mean, given the presence of each variable.
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Table 5 presents the marginal effects from the probit regression, with full probit 
results in appendix C l. The predicted probability of workplace change is 0.12 for 1979- 
2000, 0.22 for 1979-1983, 0.15 for 1987-1991, 0.07 for 1991-1995 and 0.04 for the last 
period. Union recognition is a crucial explanatory variable over all time periods. Looking at 
the sample as a whole, column 1, recognition is associated with a higher probability of 
workplace change, 0.20 as compared to the predicted mean of 12 per cent. This 
relationship is significantly positive across all periods. Occupational grouping is also 
important: workers in solely manual settlement groups have a 3 percentage points greater 
likelihood of undergoing change, whilst the probability for non-manual groups was 4 
percentage points smaller. Whilst the association is fairly consistent across the five year 
sub-samples for non-manuals, manual settlement groups only have a significantly greater 
likelihood of change between 1987 and 1991. Lagged workplace change is consistently 
positively associated with change, groups experiencing change last year had a far greater 
probability of change this year: 0.31 overall; declining over the 1990s. The paper industry 
has a significantly greater chance of workplace change than other industries: 0.20, though 
this association declines over time. Service industries are on the whole less likely to see 
change, as are certain regions: Yorkshire, South West and East Midlands.
Continued employment
We tried to capture the effect that organisational crisis would have on the probability of 
change by creating dummy variables to identify which groups had seen a significant drop 
in size or who subsequently left the data set. Of these variables only one reaches 
significance, the dummy indicating a drop in employment of at least 10 per cent. Although 
this is negligible in the first column, the whole period, it achieves significance during both 
economic downturns and the upturn of the 1990s. However the coefficients are 
inconsistent: in the first period an employment drop is correlated with a lower probability 
of change, 19 per cent compared to a mean probability of 22 per cent. Yet in both the later 
periods the relationship is positive, raising the probability by one and then two percentage 
points. The latter seems more intuitive, as any problems requiring sizeable cuts in 
employment might be ameliorated by workplace changes. During the period 1979-1983
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inefficiencies and uncompetitiveness may have been addressed by cutting jobs rather than 
introducing new methods or technology (Nolan and Walsh: 1995).
The only consistent trends evident from this table are the relationships between union 
recognition and lagged change with contemporaneous workplace change. Table 2 showed 
the incidence of workplace change declined monotonically, yet the relationship between 
recognition and change was greater at the end of the 1990s than at the end of the 1980s. 
This may indicate either that only organisations recognising unions need further changes, or 
that unions are better able to retain influence over the introduction of workplace change, 
and thus retain power as defined by the second dimension (Lukes: 1974). It seems unlikely 
that only unionised plants need workplace change, which makes the latter a more plausible 
explanation. The association between lagged and current change is also positive, though 
decreasing over the period. This could indicate either a lack of success arising from a first 
round of changes, or that by introducing an initial change, employers overcome resistance 
and find it easier to call for further changes as part of the next settlement. This issue will 
become clearer once we have examined the relationship between remuneration, 
organisational difficulties and change
Types o f  workplace change
Table 2 presented sample means, and indicates that the most common type of 
workplace change was the rather vague introduction of productivity enhancing change, 
followed by flexible working time arrangements, new technology, the removal of restrictive 
practices, with shift work as by far the least common option. Table 6 examines the 
introduction of each form of change, using probit regressions of similar form to equation 3. 
Marginal effects are reported in table 6 with the full probit results presented in appendix 
C2. The predicted probability of introducing other productivity agreements is greatest at 
0.06, shift working the lowest at 0.01, and other forms of change falling between these two. 
That productivity boosting measures is the commonest is not surprising: its vague nature 
will cover a multitude of actual changes. The low level of technical change is more 
surprising given the development of microchips and computers and their widespread use
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(Machin: 2001). This low incidence of shift introduction reflects the limited scope for their 
use in many industries and the abolition of restrictive practices is likely to be limited to 
settlement groups with formerly strong unions (Daniel: 1987). A range of explanatory 
variables are similarly related to each form of workplace change: unionisation; lagged 
change; occupational status and falling employment.
Trade union recognition is positively associated with each form of change: most 
strongly with other productivity agreements, and least strongly with shifts. Again this has 
two possible explanations: that change is more necessary in unionised groups; or that 
unions have greater influence over change and thus ensure that it is linked to the annual 
settlement. Lagged change is positively correlated with all forms of change, with the 
coefficients exceeding those on union recognition. In discussing table 5 we considered that 
the link between lagged and current change could indicate either that previous change was 
ineffectual, or that having overcome employee resistance managers wanted to further 
improve working methods and practices. If organisational crisis is associated with 
workplace change we would expect to see a positive relationship between employment falls 
in particular and all or most types of change. However, only flexible working and the 
abolition of restrictive practices are positively linked to employee cuts. New technology 
and productivity deals are negatively associated with firms who have cut labour. New 
technology may prove too expensive for firms in trouble who are forced to cut labour, but 
the vagueness of the category “productivity agreements” would seem to offer such firms a 
chance to improve their position. No forms of change are significantly related to 
disappearance from the dataset. We are still not able to reach a definitive conclusion on the 
relationship between earlier and current change, but as employment falls are not positively 
related to all forms of change, that fact that all five types are associated with lagged change 
seems more consistent with the idea that employers have broken any workforce resistance.
Occupation matters: non-manual groups have a slightly lower probability of all forms 
of change; manual settlement groups are significantly more likely to undergo flexible 
working and productivity agreements and to suffer the abolition of restrictive practices. We 
know that manual workers were most affected by the recession of the early 1980s (Nolan
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and Walsh: 1995) which would often leave those in employment facing workplace change, 
but non-manuals have undoubtedly been faced with new technology (Machin: 2001), so the 
negative non-manual result is less well explained. The WIRS data in table 1 identified the 
greater influence of manual shop stewards in change negotiations, so it may be that non- 
manual workers are less able to link changes to their annual settlements. All five types of 
change were less common across the service industries, whilst paper and publishing 
witnessed significantly more of all change but shift working. AC AS (1988) identified size 
as an important variable in determining workplace change; in the CBI data set the 
introduction of most forms of change is positively correlated with the largest settlement 
groups, those of 500 or more, and negatively related to those of less than 25 employees. 
Where small groups reflect small establishments lower change may be due to differences in 
unionisation by size (Millward et al: 2000) and the lack of formal human resource 
management (Scase: 1995), both of which will impact upon employee influence over 
change.
Multiple incidences o f  workplace change
Next we examine the number of simultaneous workplace changes introduced in a single 
year. What are the probabilities that settlement groups will experience multiple instances of 
workplace change within one annual settlement? We anticipate multiple changes are 
introduced at a time of crisis so occurrence should be more common in the early 1980s and 
1990s when unemployment was rising, and where firms are laying off employees or about 
to exit the data set. Again ordinary least squares techniques are inappropriate, but so too is 
the standard probit technique. Having a categorical dependent variable requires that we 
undertake an ordered probit regression.
Firms were able to introduce four and, between 1985 and 1997, five, types of change as 
part of each annual settlement. We condense the categories into four groups due to small 
cell sizes. The appropriate category will depend on certain cut-off points on the continuous 
scale. We define an unobserved underlying latent variable, n*, which represents the 
propensity to introduce workplace changes. Then the observed incidence of change is given
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by n=0 if n*<co, n=l if co<n*<ci, n=2 if ci<n*<C2 , n=3 if C2 <n*<C3 , and n=4 if C3 <n* where 
the c's are the cut-off points between which the latent variable falls. Then, the probability 
that a settlement group belongs in the first category, n=0, can be given as:
Pr (n=0) = Pr (n*< Co) Equation 5
= Pr (px + u < Co)
= Pr (u < Co -  px)
= 0 > ( c0  -  px)
<D is the cumulative normal distribution. Similarly,
Pr (n = 1) = O ( ci -  px ) - O ( Co -  Px )
Pr (n = 2) = O ( C2  -  px) - O ( Ci -  px )
Pr (n = 3) = O ( C3  -  px) - O ( C2 -  px )
Pr (n = 4) = 1 - O ( c3 -  px)
Taking the log of each probability and summing gives the log likelihood function. This 
can then be maximized, using a suitable optimisation technique, with respect to the 
parameters of interest and the cut-off points. The results of this ordered probit estimation 
are presented in table 7. Again lagged workplace change and union recognition prove to be 
significantly positively related to multiple change, and falling employment becomes 
significantly positively associated in the 1990s. However, although the coefficients in table 
7 indicate which explanatory variables are significant and in what direction, the magnitude 
of the effect cannot easily be determined. The size of the influence is best explored using 
benchmark settlement groups, ideal types constructed to offer a clearer narrative.
Benchmark settlement groups
Table 8a looks at the probabilities that three benchmark settlement groups underwent 
multiple changes in any one year, using the entire range of the dataset. The benchmarks are: 
type a “MechEng”, a unionised manual group of 26-50 employees in a mechanical
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engineering plant in the West Midlands; type b “TransDib”, a mixed occupational group of 
201-500 bodies in a unionised transport and distribution firm in East Anglia; and type c 
“Bricks”, a group of less than 26 non-manual workers in a non-union brick plant in the 
South West. The differences are greatest when comparing MechEng and TransDib with 
Bricks across the whole sample period. MechEng has an 11.6 percentage probability of 
experiencing one change; TransDib has a 10.5 per cent chance; and Bricks has just a 6.1 
per cent chance. Type a and b have around a 4 percentage probability of two forms of 
change in a given year, whilst the probability for Bricks is just half that. The probability of 
the introduction of three or four changes simultaneously is slight for all groups, but again 
MechEng and TransDib have a chance roughly twice as large as Bricks. Type a and b 
groups differ in industry, size and region but the factor common to MechEng and TransDib 
type groups is union recognition; as shown in earlier tables union recognition seems to be 
closely related to change. There are two possible explanations for this: the presence of a 
union may have formalised relations so that changes of this nature are considered to be 
issues for negotiation and inclusion in the annual wage deal; or unions’ associations with 
inefficiencies such as restrictive practices mean more change is required. We pursue the 
source of the variation by examining shorter time periods.
As before the data set is broken in to four periods corresponding to two upturns and 
two downturns in the economic cycle, table 8b. As not all forms of workplace change were 
investigated over the entire period, comparisons are between the probability of just one, 
two or three changes in an annual deal. For the earlier period it is only possible to compare 
benchmark groups for the manufacturing industries, MechEng and Bricks. MechEng has 
double the probability of experiencing one change, three times the probability of two 
changes and four times the likelihood of three or more changes as Bricks. As both 
benchmark types are small groups, with associated capital constraints and more informal 
industrial relations climates, this divergence of probabilities must surely be linked to union 
recognition.
In later periods the contrast is between a large mixed occupation service sector group, 
TransDib, and MechEng, a small manual group in an engineering plant. The variation
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between these is much greater across the shorter time periods than indicated by analysis of 
the full twenty year dataset. Between 1987 and 1991 MechEng was twice as likely to 
undergo one change as Transdib, but the probability that Mecheng would undergo multiple 
changes was far greater. The recession of the early 1990s damaged industrial sectors more 
evenly than the first recession. However, over the period 1991-1995 workplace change is 
still much more likely to involve MechEng groups. The final period, 1996-2000, shows 
even greater polarity. MechEng groups have a 16 per cent probability of bearing one 
change, and a 0.05 probability of witnessing three or more, this compares to 4.5 per cent 
and 0.005 for TransDib. Comparisons of MechEng and Bricks showed that type a groups 
had a greater likelihood of change, and we suggested that this difference reflects different 
union recognition status. However, later comparisons are between two unionised groups, 
and still MechEng is much more likely to undergo change. That a small group is likely to 
undergo more changes than a much larger one is counterintuitive, and as both benchmark 
types are unionised this is unlikely to be a factor in the divergent picture of change. The 
high rate of change in engineering fits with the recorded problems manufacturing faced 
(Nolan and Walsh: 1995) and the opportunities to introduce new technology.
b) “Rewards” For Workplace Change
It was hypothesised that workplace change would be accompanied by a higher than 
average wage increase, or improvements to hours and holidays in recognition of the greater 
effort expected of employees, and that groups with recognition will be better able to extract 
these rewards than employees without union representation. Correlation coefficients 
between the workplace change dummy and “reward” variables over different time periods 
are presented in table 9. The wage variable used is a dummy which indicates that a positive 
real wage increase was obtained, hours and holidays improvements are also represented by 
dummy variables. Row 1 presents correlations across the whole 22 year period. There is a 
small, but significantly positive relationship between workplace change and forms of 
“reward”, with changes to holidays the most strongly associated with change.
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The remaining rows of the table look at the four shorter periods. There is no evidence 
that the ability of employees to obtain compensation for change is strongly cyclically 
determined or that there has been a downward trend in “rewards” for change: real wage 
increases were positively associated with change in each period. Beatson (1995a) finds that 
the UK has seen far fewer concessions over working time than other EU nations. However, 
improvements to hours and holidays become more common towards the end of the period, 
particularly since 1996. As inflation was low and stable at the end of our sample this 
probably reflects a reduced need to take rewards in the form of pay rises. This would 
suggest that whilst obtaining compensation for change has not declined over time or varied 
with the economic cycle, the type of reward is cyclically influenced
Econometric estimation
Regression analysis is employed to look for the influences behind changes to wages, 
hours and holidays. For the analysis of wage changes the dependent variable is a 
continuous percentage increase, meaning that ordinary least squares techniques are 
appropriate for an equation taking the form of 6:
A Remuneration = aX + bU + cWorkplace changet.i + Equation 6
dP + Workplace changet +e
where X is a vector of settlement group characteristics, U represents a dummy for union 
recognition, both current and lagged workplace change are explanatory variables, P is a 
vector of variables indicating potential financial difficulties and e represents the error term. 
Full results are presented in appendix C3. Placing workplace change on the right-hand side, 
as an explanatory variable, gives rise to concerns about endogeneity. This will be a factor if 
workplace change is correlated with the error term in equation 6, and the OLS coefficients 
will be biased. In such circumstances the best action is to employ an instrument for the 
endogenous variable, exemplified by the use of lagged absenteeism in the turnover equation 
of chapter 3. However, in this particular case there is no obvious instrument; we cannot use 
lagged workplace change as this would alter the nature of the wage-effort bargain so that it
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became one of post-change gain sharing. In order to ascertain whether this is a problem we 
will examine the size and significance of the resulting coefficients.
Looking at the whole sample, column 1 of table 10, the introduction of change, union 
status, occupational identity and financial pressures are all significant variables. The mean 
real wage increase is very small, but with the introduction of change it increases tenfold. 
The size and significance of the coefficient on change, both overall and in each of the 
shorter periods, is such that it is unlikely to purely reflect endogeneity bias. Unionisation is 
significantly associated with an actual real wage cut, of 54 percentage points, which is in 
line with the decay of the union wage premium over the 1980s (Gregg and Machin: 1991). 
Both manual and non-manual groups achieve better rises than the default of mixed 
bargainers, manuals achieving nine times the average and non-manuals around 14 times. 
The influence of pressure on the firm is mixed: a fall in employment is an insignificant 
factor, but in the last year that a firm appears (taken to imply closure) the settlement wage 
outcome is a negative in real terms which contrasts sharply with Lawrence and Lawrence 
(1985) who found employees were able to achieve real wages gains right up to the point of 
closure.
As one would expect in a recession, the real wage settlement outcome between 1979 
and 1983 is negative. Unionisation and imminent disappearance from the dataset are 
strongly negatively related to the wage outcome. Those groups with recognition or whose 
firm folds are predicted to see a cut of around 2.5 per cent, compared to an average fall of 
1.6 per cent. Where workplace change has been introduced the cut is smaller, just over 1 
per cent, indicating the resilience of rewards for change. Lagged change is also associated 
with a lower wage cut, of around 1 per cent rather than 1.6 per cent. The relationships 
between wages and occupation are greater than overall, both manual and non-manuals have 
significantly smaller losses than the default mixed groups. This is the only period in which 
manuals obtain a positive wage outcome compared to the default, which may indicate that 
they were being rewarded to reduce resistance to radical change. The second period, 1987- 
1991, representing an economic upturn, saw a very slightly negative real wage change, 0.17 
per cent, reflecting the inflationary fall out of the Lawson boom. However, where change
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was introduced the settlement became slightly positive, at around half of one per cent. 
Lagged change is now associated with a negative wage outcome, possibly indicating that 
firms failed in get out of trouble by introducing change. Kelly (1990) reports that unions 
were able to win pay rises which exceeded the rate of inflation from the mid 1980s 
onwards, despite a slowdown in productivity growth. These data show that union 
recognition is positively related to wage rises, leading to a neutral wage outcome. It may be 
that the upturn allowed unions to attempt to restore their wage premium. This idea of catch 
up is consistent with the fact that manufacturing groups out performed service ones on the 
whole. The firm’s position has a different role, with imminent disappearance no longer 
related to wage change. However, where employment fell significantly the predicted wage 
change outcome is negative at around half of one per cent.
During the third period the average real wage outcome was slightly positive, at 0.3 per 
cent. The only significant factors are workplace change and firms’ “strength”. Both a drop 
in employment and imminent departure from the dataset cancel out the small wage 
increase. Change in the current round is associated with a wage increase of around 60 
percentage points, yet groups who experienced change as part of the previous settlement are 
likely to experience no increase. Non-manual groups achieve a very small additional wage 
rise. During the economic upturn of the late 1990s the average real settlement is predicted 
to be a rise of around one half of one per cent. The strength of the firm is still influential: 
the increase is slightly lower where employment has fallen and an imminent disappearance 
leads to a neutral wage outcome. Groups who experienced change in the last settlement 
have no wage penalty whilst a positive premium for contemporaneous change is still 
observed, at around one half of one per cent. Non-manuals again outperform other 
occupational groups.
Workplace change is positively related to a wage increase across the twenty year period, 
even during the severe recession of the early 1980s at which point competitive pressures 
and economic and political changes impacted upon employment levels and industrial 
relations climates. This indicates that employees retain an ability to extract rewards for 
change. However, the union coefficients indicate that this is not due to a positive union
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voice effect. Gregg and Machin (1991) find the positive union wage premium was attacked 
during the 1980s, which is consistent with the wage cut experienced by unionised groups in 
our first period. Kelly (1990) finds that unions were able to restore their influence in the 
late 1980s as unemployment fell, and this again fits with the positive coefficient in the CBI 
data set between 1987 and 1991. If unions are not able to demand remuneration in return 
for undergoing workplace change it indicates that employers are choosing to offer better 
wage rises to prevent employee resistance. That lagged change is not positively related to 
positive wage settlements over the period is consistent with our model of a sequential one 
period wage-effort bargain. The negative association between both employment falls and 
disappearance from the data set and wage outcomes confirms our hypothesis that 
employees would not profit from firm problems.
Improvements in working hours and holidays
Tables 11 and 12 perform the similar search for evidence of rewards for workplace 
change using hours and holidays as the dependent variables, using equations 7 and 8. Full 
results are presented in appendices C4 and C6, with probit coefficients offered in 
appendices C5 and Cl.
A working hours = aX + bU + cWorkplace changet.i Equation 7
+ dP + Workplace changet + e
A holidays = aX + bU + cWorkplace changet.i Equation 8
+ dP + Workplace changet + e
where estimations use probit techniques and X is a vector of settlement group 
characteristics, U represents a dummy for union recognition, both current and lagged 
workplace change are explanatory variables, P is a vector of variables indicating potential 
financial difficulties and e represents the error term.
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The predicted probability of reduced working hours is low across the sample. Looking 
at the marginal coefficients in table 11, it is clear that the crucial factors associated with 
changes in working hours are union recognition, workplace change and the firm’s financial 
position. Workplace change becomes more strongly associated with improved hours over 
time, with some cyclicality evident. Initially it has no impact, whereas during the first 
economic upturn, 1987-1991, it raises the probability of changed hours by 13 percentage 
points and by the final period the probability is 25 points higher. In contrast to the wage 
analysis but in line with the arguments of Kochan (1980) and Green et al (1985), union 
recognition is positively related to shortter hours in all but the first period, though this 
effect lessens over time. There does not appear to be a negative relationship between firms 
in trouble and cuts in working hours: whilst a fall in employment might be expected to 
reduce the likelihood of improved working hours, this relationship is only observed in the 
first five and last five years of the sample; during the early 1990s the probability of changed 
hours rose from 1.5 per cent to 2.5 per cent where employment fell.
Improved holiday entitlements are more likely than reduced hours across the whole 
sample. The relationships between both workplace change and union recognition and the 
likelihood of longer holidays are stronger than with improved working hours. During the 
first recession, the probability of better holidays being introduced was 24 per cent, rising to 
33 per cent where unions are recognised or 27 per cent with the introduction of change. The 
union coefficient was greatest between 1979 and 1983, decreased over the late 1980s and 
then increased. The relationship between workplace change and holidays fluctuated over 
the period, disappearing in the two middle periods but boosting the probability of longer 
holidays to 6 per cent in the final few years. A poor firm position was associated with less 
chance of change early in the sample, but thereafter proved insignificant. During the 1980s 
recession lagged workplace change was associated with a reduced the probability of change 
from 24 per cent to 18 per cent, though this relationship was also short lived.
Overall the data suggest that workers undergoing workplace change continue to enjoy 
“rewards” in the form of a better than average pay deal, or possibly improved hours or 
holidays. There is no sign that this ability to obtain rewards has decreased due to secular or
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cyclical influences. However, cyclical pressures do seem to influence the type of reward 
employees enjoy. The size of the wage increase accompanying workplace change has fallen 
over time, as the probability of improved hours and holidays increased: this is against a 
backdrop of falling and increasingly stable inflation which makes wage rises less crucial. 
Whilst we predicted a positive union voice effect this is only evident in terms of wages 
during the late 1980s. Prior to this the positive relationship between workplace change and 
wage increases suggest employers were choosing to buy industrial peace. However, union 
recognition is associated with a greater probability of better hours and holidays. Green 
(1997) outlined the importance of increasing holiday entitlement as part of a union strategy 
to control the wage-effort bargain, and the same argument can be applied to reducing 
working hours. Unsurprisingly, where change is introduced in tandem with economic 
problems the wage outcome is negatively affected, but this also significantly lowers the 
probability of reduced working hours. Analysis of wage increases highlighted the strong 
position of non-manual workers relative to manuals and particularly the default, mixed 
groups. However, when we broaden our focus to examine the probability of improved 
holidays and hours, we find mixed groups are more likely to be rewarded in this way.
Compensation fo r  multiple workplace changes
The introduction of multiple changes is likely to be more disruptive and more 
demanding so it seems logical to look for variation in the size of “reward” according to the 
number of workplace changes witnessed. Table 13 presents OLS estimates for equation 9:
A Remuneration = aX + bU + c Workplace changet.i Equation 9
+ dP + f One changet + g Two changest 
+ h three or more changest + e
where X is a vector of settlement group characteristics, U represents a dummy for union 
recognition, lagged workplace change and the number of contemporaneous changes are 
explanatory variables, P is a vector of variables indicating potential financial difficulties 
and e represents the error term. Up to five changes may be introduced in certain years, but
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as shift working is not an option prior to 1985 and productivity enhancing change is 
dropped after 1997, and to boost cell sizes, we consider only one, two or three or more 
changes as explanatory variables. The diagnostics are marginally better in this model than 
where change is a simple dichotomous variable.
Separating out the number of changes introduced does seem important. Overall 
undergoing three or more changes is associated with a better pay deal than two, and two is 
better than one, which is better than none. The average predicted wage change for the full 
period is 0.03, rising by 22 percentage points with one change, 37 percentage points with 
two and 56 percentage points for three or more. This indicates that employees enjoy an 
escalating pattern of rewards for the disruption or demands for extra effort they experience. 
However, this pattern of increasing returns accompanying multiple changes is not 
consistent over the shorter time periods, which highlights the importance of lmore detailed 
ongitudinal analysis. During the early 1980s recession there is a slight premium attached to 
experiencing one change; subsequently returns to one or two incidences of change first 
increase but then fall; returns to three or more types of change are only witnessed between 
1987 and 1995. Originally we hypothesised that those firms introducing simultaneous 
change would be those in trouble, and hence they would be unable to offer compensation 
for extra employee effort. Although the wage increases do decrease over time, their 
existence is not consistent with the idea that introducing simultaneous changes indicates 
firms are in trouble. The fall in “rewards” is more likely to be linked to the fall in inflation. 
Indeed, as in table 10, the coefficients on variables constructed to indicate firms in trouble, 
falling employment and imminent disappearance from the data set, are negatively 
associated with wages.
Improvements in working hours and holidays
We turn next to an examination of the discrete impact of one, two or three plus changes 
on working hours and annual leave. Tables 14 and 15 present marginal probit coefficients 
for equations 10 and 11:
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A hours = aX + bU + cWorkplace change^ Equation 10
+ dP + f One changet + g Two changest 
+ h three or more changest + e
A holidays = aX + bU + cWorkplace changet.i Equation 11
+ dP + f One changet + g Two changest 
+ h three or more changest + e
where the coefficients are as before, and the full marginal and probit results can be found in 
the appendices. The diagnostics are again marginally better where change is differentiated.
Across the 22 year period, the number of changes do have a differential, though non­
monotonic, impact on hours outcomes. The baseline probability of hours change is 
predicted to be 4 per cent. This rises to around 6 per cent with one change, 5.5 with two and 
7.5 with three or more changes, but again it is crucial to examine the shorter panels. During 
the 1980s there is no additional gain associated with any number of changes. By the early 
1990s, the probability of a cut in hours is just 1.5 per cent, rising to 3 per cent with one 
change or 4 per cent with three or more. Over the final five years one, two and three types 
of changes are all associated with a greater likelihood of an hours reduction. The base 
probability is half of one per cent, rising to just under 2 per cent, 5.5 per cent and 7.5 per 
cent respectively.
In contrast to Green’s (1997) findings, improved holidays became less common over 
time according to this dataset. Multiple change exerted little influence over the probability 
of changes to time off. In both the first and final period undergoing one form of workplace 
change boosted the probability of longer holidays, from a 24 to 28 percentage point 
likelihood and later from a 2.5 to 8 percentage point chance, whilst experiencing two or 
three plus changes is not significantly linked to better holidays across the five year periods.
Multiple changes are associated with escalating wage increases, though the effect fell 
over the four sub-samples. The relationship between improved working hours and multiple
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changes became stronger as wage rises dropped off, in line with falling and stable inflation. 
However, the relationship between holiday improvements and changes was inconsistent 
with this: there was no increase in the probability of longer holidays as more changes were 
introduced.
Discussion
The scope of unions’ voice has become more limited over time according to the WIRS 
data discussed earlier in this chapter, a process documented elsewhere which led to the 
coining of the term “partial derecognition” (Brown et al 1998, iii). As we know that 
unionised employees have a greater chance of exercising influence in decision making than 
non-union employees who are organised (Terry: 1999), and those who are unorganised, we 
can conclude that the scope of employee voice is reduced. CBI data show that the 
introduction of workplace change at the time of the annual pay settlement becomes less 
common over time. The introduction of change at other times would of course indicate an 
unambiguous fall in employee voice. This would suggest a partial decline in power as 
proxied by the right to negotiate over change, in tandem with the wider decline in union 
recognition and density. In this data set workplace change remained positively associated 
with union voice throughout the period, though the strength of the relationship has fallen 
over time, and is weaker for non-manual groups. There are two possible explanations for 
the continuing relationship between recognition and change: that unions retain influence 
over workplace change so that it remains tied to the establishment’s annual settlement; or 
that only workplaces with trade unions need to introduce changes to improve efficiency. 
We hypothesised that change implies greater effort and so must be rewarded. The issue of 
why unions remain associated with workplace change may be answered by looking at union 
influence over these “rewards”.
We find that workers continue to be “rewarded” for workplace change, generally in 
terms of better than average wage increases, but during the 1990s increasingly in the form 
of better hours and holidays. A positive union voice effect is short-lived in the case of 
wages, but unions remain positively associated with rewards in the form of hours and
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holidays trade offs. These results suggest that the relationship witnessed between change 
and union recognition reflects continued influence and an ability to link change to the 
annual settlement rather than a greater need for change in unionised settlement groups. 
Whilst employees were better rewarded in terms of wage rises for multiple changes during 
the late 1980s, this effect declined as inflation fell. Escalating benefits were still observed 
between 1996 and 2000 in terms of a greater probability of reduced hours as the number of 
simultaneous changes increased. We also find that whilst change is no more common for 
firms in difficulty, perhaps reflecting capital constraints, their remunerative settlements are 
less generous.
6. Conclusions
Lukes’ (1974) model identifies three levels of power: firstly, the ability of parties to 
“win” issues and influence decisions; secondly, control over the bargaining agenda; thirdly, 
ideological control which is beyond the scope of the paper. Whilst these dimensions do not 
have to be pursued sequentially, the ability to exert influence over issues of the second 
dimension indicates greater success. In the context of this paper the second dimension can 
be proxied by looking at the ability of employees to have influence over the bargaining 
agenda, in relation to the introduction of workplace change. Therefore a fall in influence 
over the introduction of workplace change as part of the annual establishment settlement 
implies a fall in power. The first dimension of Lukes’ model can be examined through 
analysis of changes in remuneration in the context of changes to working practices. The 
greater employee effort involved in accommodating changes means that the introduction of 
new working methods, technology, shifts and the end of restrictive practices should be 
accompanied by a compensatory wage increase or better working hours or holidays.
Data from the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys illustrated that the influence of 
trade union representatives in regard to workplace change had fallen, particularly since 
1990, in line with the idea that union have suffered partial recognition for certain issues 
even where they continue to have a formal relationship with management. Given trade 
union representatives are likely to exert greater influence than non-union representatives or
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unorganised employees, we can be confident that employees’ influence has decreased. 
Recent WIRS data, along with other sources, suggest that workplace change is extremely 
common, which is inconsistent with the picture from CBI settlement data. In the context of 
continued intense competition and technological innovation it is unlikely that all of this 
recorded fall in workplace change in the CBI data is due to an actual decline in change. We 
must infer that workplace change is occurring outside of the annual establishment 
settlement. The hypothesis that unions would have a greater chance of retaining influence 
over workplace change that non-union representatives or unorganised workers is borne out 
as union recognition is strongly and consistently associated with change. This may reflect a 
greater need for change in practices associated with unionised groups, or their ability to link 
change and settlements. A definitive conclusion requires we look at union influence over 
remuneration at the time of change.
Wage increases are significantly higher for settlement groups experiencing workplace 
change. Improved working hours and holidays were also significantly associated with the 
likelihood that groups experienced change, increasingly so towards the end of our period as 
inflation falls and makes real wage rises less essential. The association between union 
recognition and pay for workplace change varies over the twenty-year period. Initially 
union recognition is associated with both changes in working practices and real wage cuts. 
This is consistent with the need to remove union inefficiencies and their positive wage 
premium at a time of intense competition and profound economic and political change. 
Subsequently, unionised groups showed a slightly greater probability of gaining positive 
remuneration, generally in the form of better hours and holidays. This supports the 
argument that union recognition and workplace change remain correlated because 
unionised groups have enough power to link the two for bargaining purposes.
We considered that settlement groups in organisations facing difficulties, forcing them 
to cut significant number of staff or to close, would be positively linked to the incidence of 
workplace change and negatively associated with compensatory remuneration. Whilst there 
is no relationship between indicators of firm distress and the introduction of change, firms 
who significantly cut employment or subsequently disappear from the data set do offer
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significantly lower remunerative packages. The introduction of multiple changes as part of 
a single annual settlement might also be indicative of a workplace experiencing problems. 
We found that the probability of experiencing multiple changes was accompanied by 
escalating wage increases for the late 1980s and early 1990s, and each change was 
associated with a grater likelihood of reduced hours in the late 1990s. This implies that 
multiple change might have been a reaction to difficulties in the early 1980s, but not in our 
later sub-samples.
Overall our results suggest a fall in the ability of employees to influence the 
introduction of workplace change, in so far as fewer annual settlements are associated with 
change despite an economic environment of continued competitive pressure and technical 
development. The continuing association of positive remuneration with workplace change 
is consistent with the concept of an equitable wage-effort bargain. The positive relationship 
between union recognition and rewards for change across the period, save for the early 
1980s recession, indicates continuing union influence in one of the core areas of the 
employment relationship.
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Table 1: Negotiations over Workplace Change, Workplace Industrial Relations
Surveys 1980,1990,1998
Issues 1980 1990 1998
Manual
staff
Non-
manual staff
Manual
staff
Non-
manual staff
All Staff
Holidays 12.2 13.1 NA NA NA
Length of working 
week1
11.5 11.9 86.1 83.8 NA
Pensions2 8.7 6.2 NA NA 53.0
Physical conditions3 48.6 42.5 76.9 74.0 12.1
Number of recruits 31.7 26.1 29.0 34.5 2.5
Redeployment 47.4 41.1 67.4 68.3 NA
Redundancy4 38.5 30.8 48.1 50.8 NA
Staffing levels 37.1 28.0 54.7 55.5 5.6
Major changes in
productivity
methods5
36.0 26.8 23.8 15.9 NA
Capital investment! 10.4 8.2 9.2 8.4 NA
The columns show t le proportion of managerial respondents in the 1980, 1990 and 1998
samples who claimed to negotiate over these issues.
NA indicates a question was not asked in this year.
1 The 1980 question refers to the length of the working week, whereas the 1990 survey limits the 
question to reorganising work hours.
2 in 1998 the questions asked were very different: pensions would be subject to discussion under the 
heading pay and conditions of employment.
3 Physical conditions were covered only in so far as they had health and safety implications.
4 Whilst in 1980 the question referred only to redundancy, by 1990 mangers were only being asked 
if they discussed redundancy payouts -  which infers a fall in influence.
5 Respondents are asked if this has been discussed in the last three years in the 1990 questionnaire, 
whereas 1980 does not specify a time period.
177
Table 2. CBI Sample Means
Whole 
Sample 
August 1979 
-July 2001
1979-
1983
1987-91 1991-95 1996-
2000
Industry
Food, Drink, Tobacco 8.19 11.08 7.96 6.10 6.22
Chemicals 13.65 13.99 14.49 12.68 12.48
Metals 5.97 7.36 5.34 5.58 5.37
Mech. Eng 24.48 32.28 24.72 19.87 18.56
Inst. Eng 11.50 14.29 12.18 10.63 8.34
Textiles 5.86 7.81 5.68 4.61 4.79
Bricks 4.27 5.20 3.70 3.39 4.43
Paper, Publishing 5.52 8.00 5.10 4.57 4.48
Construction 0.54 0.32 0.82 1.14
Transport & Communications 2.83 2.71 4.22 5.30
Distributive Trades 4.29 5.98 5.88 7.23
Insurance 3.25 5.36 5.17 3.98
Prof. Services 8.39 4.89 14.57 15.65
Leisure Services 0.67 0.97 0.95 1.08
Misc. Services 0.59 0.62 0.96 0.95
Regional Unemployment 8.66 8.84 7.77 9.22 5.76
Unionised 48.08 76.13 52.77 32.60 23.98
Group Size 762 288 957 879 1121
Occupation
Manual** 36.52 40.53 38.43 32.62 28.90
Non-Manual** 38.64 26.32 40.20 46.84 40.41
Mixed** 22.07 21.52 21.34 20.51 22.51
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Table 2. CBI Sample Means cont.
Settlement Detail Whole
Sample
1979-
1983
1987-91 1991-95 1996-
2000
Any type of workplace change 14.40 23.26 17.52 8.90 5.58
Removal of restrictive practices 4.34 7.67 5.09 2.86 1.45
Shift Work 1.75 2.10 2.20 1.45 1.09
New Technology 4.54 8.20 4.90 2.50 1.87
Flexible working time 
arrangements (only introduced 
from 1985)
5.53 7.59 5.05 3.39
Other productivity improving 
changes (not asked from 1998 
onwards)
8.31 16.35 8.52 1.97 0.89
Real pay rise (%) 0.21 -1.69 0.35 0.53 0.88
Nominal pay rise (%) 5.39 8.28 6.74 3.35 3.32
Hours Change 4.84 12.16 5.76 1.91 1.11
Holidays Change 10.21 24.46 7.70 3.38 3.76
Attrition dummies
10% or more drop in 
employment from previous year
21.22 15.67 25.06 24.51 20.08
Last time firm is in dataset*** 11.16 10.55 10.26 10.89 12.94
Last time firm is in dataset & 
10%+ drop in employment ***
2.28 1.44 2.93 2.48 2.01
Services were only included in the CBI dataset from 1987 making comparison between the first and other 
columns difficult. **There are settlement groups that are not assigned to any of the three occupational 
categories as from 1998 no data on occupational group was collected. For these years group was inferred from 
previous years’ entries, which leads to omission in the case of new settlement groups. For 1998 and 1999 this 
means we are unable to infer skill level for around 10% of all settlement groups, though this rises to almost 
20% in 2000. However, the construction of all regressions places such observations in the default mixed 
category. If anything, this will negatively bias the coefficients on manual and non-manual groups. *** These 
dummies are taken to imply that the firm has gone out of business.
This table shows the percentages falling in to each category.
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Table 3. Incidence Of The Introduction Of Workplace Change By Region
Year Groups Scotland North Yorkshire East
Midlands
East
Anglia
South East South West West
Midlands
North West Wales
1979 930 41.4 (5.9) 14.0 (7) 31.8 (4.2) 22.2 (3.3) 28.0 (3) 22.9 (2.5) 14.8 (3.8) 33.6 (4.2) 26.9 (5.4) 25.5 (5.7)
1980 1361 31.6 (9.1) 36.3 (10.8) 20.6 (7.9) 23.8 (6.6) 23.5 (5.8) 25.8 (4.8) 21.7 (6.1) 26.9 (8.6) 27.3 (8.4) 29.2 (9.5)
1981 1430 26.9(11) 22.8 (13) 16.2 (9.9) 20.7 (8.2) 14.0 (7) 22.4 (6.4) 16.5 (7.5) 26.3(11.4) 24.9(11.6) 24.7(11.6)
1982 1308 20.9(12.1) 34.3(14.1) 16.4(11.3) 17.1 (9.3) 7.9 (7.9) 24.1 (7.3) 17.4 (8.6) 19.2(12.7) 28.0(13.1) 18.8 (12.8)
1983 1361 24.4 (12.4) 18.8 (14.8) 16.6(11.5) 14.7 (9.7) 17.5 (7.8) 17.9 (7.6) 18.8 (8.8) 21.5 (12.6) 22.5 (13.5) 28.6(13)
1984 1261 21.0(12.9) 35.6(15.5) 15.6(12) 9.1 (10) 35.7 (8) 17.2 (8) 21.4 (9.2) 25.2(12.9) 21.2(13.7) 24.1 (13.6)
1985 1156 25.5 (13.2) 26.1(15.5) 11.9(12.5) 19.8 (10) 20.0 (8.4) 16.5 (8.2) 16.9 (9.5) 26.8 (12.8) 25.8 (13.8) 27.0(13.8)
1986 1175 16.5 (14.3) 21.1(15.5) 13.5 (12.6) 16.5 (10) 14.6 (7.7) 18.8 (7.8) 19.6 (9.1) 25.0(12.4) 28.6 (13.9) 17.5 (13.8)
1987 1271 25.5 (12.5) 28.2(13) 14.2(10.5) 23.0 (8.1) 17.3 (5.6) 15.1 (5.9) 15.0 (7.1) 23.2 (9.8) 26.4(11.6) 24.6(11.6)
1988 1189 23.8(10.1) 28.2(10.5) 13.0 (8) 8.5 (6.2) 10.2 (3.8) 18.8 (4.2) 23.2 (4.8) 21.6 (6.8) 18.5 (9) 33.3 (8.9)
1989 1469 20.4 (8.5) 25.8 (8.7) 23.5 (6.8) 12.4 (5) 4.7 (3.7) 14.1 (3.7) 13.0 (4.2) 24.2 (5.9) 28.3 (7.5) 25.0 (6.7)
The table shows t le percentage of workplaces in each region experiencing any workplace change as part of t leir annual settlement.
Figures in parentheses are the annual average regional unemployment rate
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Table 3. Incidence Of The Introduction Of Workplace Change By Region, cont
Year Groups Scotland North Yorkshire East
Midlands
East
Anglia
South East South
West
West
Midlands
North
West
Wales
1990 1426 21.9 (8.6) 34.4 (9.9) 12.4 (8.2) 14.1 (6.7) 14.9 (5.4) 13.9 (6.1) 22.4 (6.6) 30.3 (7.9) 24.3 (9.1) 23.1 (7.8)
1991 1603 15.5 (9.4) 19.2(11) 5.7 (9.7) 5.1 (8.7) 2.9 (7.3) 6.3 (8.9) 7.8 (8.8) 9.2(10.1) 13.6(10.4) 13.0 (9.6)
1992 1662 11.4 (9.8) 12.2(12.2) 8.4 (10.5) 6.2 (9.7) 6.0 (8.6) 5.7(10.3) 9.1(10) 9.0(11.2) 8.6(11) 7.2(10.3)
1993 1673 12.9 (9.6) 9.6(11.7) 10.9(10) 4.3 (9.6) 6.7 (7.7) 5.9 (9.7) 9.0 (9) 11.6(10.3) 8.1 (10.4) 11.2 (9.9)
1994 1629 19.0 (8.6) 11.4(10.9) 8.0 (9.2) 10.6 (8) 8.9 (6.6) 7.9 (8.3) 10.5 (7.6) 15.4 (8.8) 10.1 (9.1) 10.0 (8.7)
1995 1751 9.8 (7.7) 7.9(10.9) 2.6 (8.3) 4.6 (7.2) 4.7 (6.3) 5.9 (5.7) 6.6 (6.6) 7.7 (7.8) 10.5 (8.2) 11.1(8.2)
1996 1401 7.4 (7.6) 16.3 (10.2) 6.4 (7.7) 8.6 (6.6) 11.5 (5.8) 3.8 (5) 5.0 (6) 10.2 (7) 9.5 (7.6) 11.5 (7.9)
1997 1512 10.7 (6.3) 6.2 (8.2) 8.9 (6.2) 3.7 (4.7) 1.5 (4) 3.6 (3.3) 5.8 (4.2) 9.9 (5.4) 9.3 (5.9) 7.6 (6.3)
1998 1394 4.2 (5.7) 4.2 (7.3) 7.1 (5.5) 5.0(4) 7.1 (3.3) 1.7 (2.6) 3.9 (3.4) 7.8 (4.6) 3.3 (5.2) 2.7 (5.5)
1999 1342 5.5 (5.3) 0(7.1) 5.8 (5.1) 3.0 (3.7) 6.8 (2.9) 3.9 (2.3) 4.7 (3.1) 5.8 (4.5) 6.3 (4.7) 4.2 (5.1)
2000 1392 9.6 (4.8) 7.6 (6.4) 2.7 (4.5) 6.1 (3.5) 0(2.5) 1.2 (1.9) 5.0 (2.5) 4.0 (4.1) 3.7 (4.2) 5.6 (4.5)
The table shows the percentage of workplaces in each region experiencing any workplace c range as part of their annua settlement.
Figures in parentheses are the annual average regional unemployment rate.
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Table 4. Incidence Of Workplace Change By Sector
Year Food,
drink,
tobacco
Chemicals Metals Mech.
engineering
Instrument
engineering
Textiles Bricks Paper & 
publishing
1979 22.1 22.2 21.6 30.4 31.4 5.8 26.6 46.3
1980 34.0 26.2 25.5 25.4 24.9 14.3 20.8 41.3
1981 32.3 19.7 26.3 20.6 22.5 15.7 18.2 25.4
1982 25.9 28.3 14.9 20.8 16.7 10.9 21.4 31.7
1983 23.7 15.9 28.6 19.6 19.5 9.5 15.0 33.3
1984 20.1 22.2 24.7 21.5 17.6 13.3 11.1 32.5
1985 25.7 21.8 26.8 19.0 17.7 14.4 20.3 32.3
1986 17.9 16.5 23.5 20.7 15.7 17.4 18.8 41.8
The table shows the percentage of workplaces in eac i sector experiencing any workplace change as part of t aeir annual sett
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Table 4. Incidence Of Workplace Change By Sector, cont.
Food, 
D, T
Chem Metals Mech.
Eng
Instrum
Eng
Textiles Bricks Paper
&
publish
Const’n Trans&
comms
Distrib
trades
Insur’n Prof & 
Sc’fic
Leisure Misc
Service
s
1987 22.7 14.0 26.7 21.2 14.5 17.5 30.6 51.8 100 26.3 15.4 5.6 9.5 0 0
1988 23.6 22.1 23.8 21.1 20.0 15.3 23.2 40.3 0 3.7 9.4 4.5 3.9 0 16.7
1989 20.8 21.6 23.4 27.5 17.3 18.5 22.6 29.8 25.0 19.6 1.8 4.0 9.8 0 0
1990 26.9 22.4 26.8 23.7 21.5 18.3 12.2 34.9 0 26.4 10.8 4.1 7.1 9.1 0
1991 10.4 14.8 9.0 12.1 8.3 8.0 14.6 16.5 0 17.5 5.6 1.2 2.2 6.7 21.4
1992 14.1 14.1 10.0 6.3 6.6 6.3 6.8 9.7 0 12.7 2.9 3.5 7.2 0 0
1993 11.5 11.3 5.9 9.0 4.1 20.6 5.7 6.1 0 22.8 8.8 0 6.5 7.1 4.8
1994 16.3 15.6 21.1 11.0 5.8 11.6 10.2 22.7 0 10.7 7.1 2.4 6.8 23.5 0
1995 10.9 10.7 14.3 8.6 5.8 7.7 1.5 7.3 0 7.3 8.1 3.3 1.6 0 4.8
1996 12.6 7.1 6.3 9.9 6.7 8.2 14.3 9.5 0 6.2 12.5 1.6 2.5 18.2 7.7
1997 9.3 6.3 11.0 8.0 8.0 3.8 8.1 6.0 0 16.0 7.4 1.8 2.6 0 0
1998 7.4 3.5 7.5 4.7 4.0 7.9 3.4 4.9 12.5 5.6 4.6 0 0.5 5.3 0
1999 6.1 2.2 6.9 4.8 3.9 10.3 7.3 14.3 0 10.2 4.0 2.0 1.7 0 0
2000 5.9 7.2 6.6 4.9 5.3 4.8 4.9 5.8 0 7.1 3.0 2 0.5 0 0
The table shows the percentage of workplaces in each sector experiencing any workplace change as part of their annual settlement
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Table 5. Marginal Effects From Probit Regressions Of The Influences On The
Introduction Ol‘ Workplace Change
Independent
variables
Whole
Sample
1979-1983 1987-91 1991-95 1997-2000
Manuals 0.028***
(0.005)
-0.008
(0.015)
0.086***
(0.013)
0.013
(0.008)
0.009
(0.006)
Non-manuals -0.036***
(0.005)
-0.087***
(0.015)
-0.015
(0.012)
-0.033***
(0.008)
-0.012*
(0.006)
Unionised 0.075***
(0.004)
0.111***
(0.014)
0.027***
(0.009)
0.041***
(0.007)
0.067***
(0.008)
Workplace 
change last year
0.191***
(0.008)
0.188***
(0.017)
0.203***
(0.015)
0.131***
(0.014)
0.073***
(0.015)
Emp’ drop over 
last year (10% 
or more)
0.001
(0.005)
-0.031**
(0.015)
-0.002
(0.011)
0.012*
(0.007)
0.021***
(0.007)
Last time firm is 
in data set
-0.006
(0.007)
-0.028
(0.018)
-0.001
(0.017)
-0.003
(0.010)
-0.004
(0.08)
Interaction of 
the above
0.004
(0.015)
-0.003
(0.049)
-0.012
(0.031)
-0.006
(0.020)
-0.010
(0.015)
Up to 25 
employees
-0.007
(0.006)
-0.040**
(0.017)
-0.017
(0.015)
-0.002
(0.009)
0.015*
(0.009)
26-50
employees
-0.008
(0.006)
-0.016
(0.017)
-0.026*
(0.014)
-0.012
(0.009)
0.005
(0.009)
51 -100 
employees
-0.003
(0.006)
-0.014
(0.017)
0.000
(0.014)
0.008
(0.010)
0.001
(0.008)
201-500
employees
0.009
(0.007)
0.023
(0.018)
0.014
(0.015)
-0.005
(0.009)
-0.011
(0.007)
More than 500 
employees
0.015**
(0.007)
0.015
(0.020)
0.040**
(0.017)
-0.004
(0.010)
-0.003
(0.008)
Scotland - 0.000
(0.007)
0.009*
(0.022)
-0.004
(0.017)
0.025**
(0.013)
- 0.000
(0.009)
North East 0.020**
(0.010)
0.007
(0.025)
0.039*
(0.022)
0.014
(0.014)
0.006
(0.013)
Yorkshire -0.029***
(0.007)
-0.046**
(0.020)
-0.047***
(0.016)
-0.021*
(0.010)
-0.003
(0.010)
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Table 5. Marginal Effects From Probit Regressions Of The Influences On The
Introduction O ' Workplace Change, continued
East Midlands -0.039***
(0.007)
-0.045**
(0.021)
-0.067***
(0.016)
-0.022*
(0.011)
-0.009
(0.009)
East Anglia -0.039***
(0.009)
-0.076**
(0.029)
-0.079***
(0.017)
-0.024
(0.013)
-0.005
(0.012)
South East -0.020***
(0.006)
-0.024
(0.017)
-0.040***
(0.014)
-0.014
(0.010)
-0.021**
(0.007)
South West -0.026**
(0.008)
-0.061***
(0.021)
-0.040**
(0.016)
-0.007
(0.012)
-0.013
(0.009)
West Midlands 0.001
(0.008)
0.001
(0.021)
-0.010
(0.017)
0.004
(0.012)
0.007
(0.010)
Wales 0.003
(0.009)
0.010
(0.026)
0.005
(0.022)
0.002
(0.014)
- 0.000
(0.012)
Food, drink & 
tobacco
0.021*
(0.012)
0.036
(0.030)
-0.009
(0.025)
0.033
(0.024)
-0.004
(0.012)
Chemicals - 0.000
(0.010)
-0.012
(0.027)
-0.022
(0.022)
0.049**
(0.023)
-0.017*
(0.008)
Metals 0.015
(0.012)
-0.005
(0.031)
-0.011
(0.027)
0.047**
(0.027)
-0.009
(0.011)
Mechanical
engineering
0.018*
(0.010)
0.023
(0.026)
0.009
(0.023)
0.021
(0.019)
-0.010
(0.009)
Instrument
engineering
0.004
(0.011)
0.012
(0.028)
-0.014
(0.024)
-0.003
(0.018)
-0.009
(0.010)
Textiles -0.024**
(0.011)
-0.099***
(0.024)
-0.041
(0.023)
0.025
(0.025)
-0.011
(0.011)
Paper & 
publishing
0.076***
(0.015)
0.109***
(0.035)
0.088***
(0.035)
0.045*
(0.028)
-0.001
(0.014)
Construction -.080**
(0.020)
N/a -0.032
(0.076)
+ 0.057** 
(0.029)
-0.007
(0.025)
Transport & 
Communications
0.005
(0.015)
N/a 0.027
(0.036)
0.010
(0.016)
Distributive
Trades
-0.044***
(0.011)
N/a -0.089***
(0.018)
0.015
(0.023)
0.007
(0.015)
Insurance -0.088***
(0.008)
N/a -0 114*** 
(0.015)
-0.034
(0.017)
-0.030**
(0.008)
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Table 5. Marginal Effects From Probit Regressions Of The Influences On The
Introduction Oif Workplace Change, continued
Prof. Services -0.062***
(0.009)
N/a -0.080***
(0.020)
0.016
(0.020)
-0.036***
(0.007)
Leisure Services -0.059**
(0.020)
N/a -0.123***
(0.020)
0.038
(0.047)
0.001
(0.027)
Misc. Services -0.061**
(0.021)
N/a -0.078
(0.040)
0.026
(0.047)
-0.019
(0.022)
Predicted 
probability at 
means
0.120 0.218 0.146 0.072 0.039
No. of Obs. 30041 6390 6924 8317 6474
Pseudo R 11.05% 6.44 12.56 9.29 11.76
Log likelihood -11103.761 -3242.4812 -2809.4129 -2264.5499 1253.8865
indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% leve ; *** indicates
significance at the 1% level.
+ represents merged industry dummies to ensure cell sizes: transport & distribution. The default 
categories are 101 to 200 employees; brick industry; mixed settlement groups; the North West.
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Table 6. Marginal Effects From Probit Estimates Of Influences On The
Introduction Of The Separate Constituents Of Workplace Change
Independent vari­
ables
Flexible
working
practices
1985-2000
Shift work­
ing
1979-2000
End of restric­
tive practices 
1979-2000
New
technology
1979-2000
Other produc­
tivity
agreements
1979-97
Non-manuals -0.012***
(0.004)
-0.009***
(0.002)
-0.013***
(0.003)
-0.006**
(0.003)
-0.026***
(0.004)
Manuals 0.019***
(0.004)
0.001
(0.001)
0.015***
(0.002)
-0.003
(0.003)
0.010***
(0.004)
Unionised 0.023***
(0.003)
0.004***
(0.001)
0.025***
(0.002)
0.023***
(0.002)
0.049***
(0.003)
Workplace Change 
Last Year
0.068***
(0.006)
0.019***
(0.003)
0.048***
(0.004)
0.076***
(0.005)
0.092***
(0.006)
Emp’ drop over last 
year (10% or more)
0.011***
(0.004)
0.001
(0.001)
0.005**
(0.002)
-0.006**
(0.002)
-0.007*
(0.004)
Last time firm is in 
data set
-0.002
(0.005)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.003
(0.003)
0.002
(0.004)
-0.008
(0.005)
Interaction of the 
above
0.009
(0.011)'
0.001
(0.005)
0.009
(0.008)
0.005
(0.009)
0.010
(0.013)
Up to 25 employees 0.010**
(0.005)
-0.004**
(0.002)
-0.009***
(0.003)
-0.001
(0.003)
-0.012**
(0.005)
26 - 50 employees 0.006
(0.005)
-0.003
(0.002)
-0.008***
(0.003)
-0.007**
(0.003)
-0.005
(0.005)
51 -100 employees 0.010**
(0.005)
-0.000
(0.002)
-0.003
(0.003)
-0.004
(0.003)
0.001
(0.005)
201-500 employees 0.014***
(0.005)
0.002
(0.002)
0.004
(0.003)
0.004
(0.003)
0.008*
(0.005)
More than 500 
employees
0.014***
(0.006)
0.001
(0.002)
0.012***
(0.004)
0.008**
(0.004)
0.016***
(0.006)
Scotland -0.006
(0.005)
0.001
(0.002)
0.007**
(0.004)
0.011**
(0.005)
-0.010*
(0.005)
North East 0.004
(0.006)
0.001
(0.003)
0.007
(0.005)
0.011**
(0.006)
0.003
(0.007)
Yorkshire -0.011**
(0.005)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.009**
(0.003)
-0.007*
(0.004)
-0.022***
(0.005)
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Table 6. Marginal Effects From Probit Estimates Of Influences On The
Introduction Of The Separate Constituents Of Workplace Change, continued
East Midlands -0.015**
(0.005)
-0.007***
(0.002)
-0.009**
(0.003)
-0.004
(0.004)
-0.025***
(0.005)
East Anglia -0.015**
(0.006)
-0.007**
(0.002)
-0.008
(0.004)
-0.008
(0.005)
-0.037***
(0.005)
South East -0.010**
(0.004)
-0.003*
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.006*
(0.003)
-0.013***
(0.004)
South West -0.016***
(0.005)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.006*
(0.003)
-0.004
(0.004)
-0.019***
(0.005)
West Midlands -0.004
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.006
(0.004)
0.006
(0.004)
0.001
(0.005)
Wales -0.006
(0.006)
0.003
(0.003)
0.005
(0.005)
0.015***
(0.006)
-0.005
(0.006)
Food, drink & to­
bacco
0.005
(0.009)
0.006
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.005)
0.003
(0.006)
0.006
(0.008)
Chemicals -0.005
(0.007)
0.002
(0.004)
-0.005
(0.004)
0.000
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.008)
Metals 0.010
(0.010)
0.001
(0.004)
0.006
(0.006)
-0.001
(0.006)
0.016*
(0.010)
Mechanical
engineering
0.002
(0.007)
0.004
(0.003)
0.000
(0.004)
0.001
(0.005)
0.012
(0.008)
Instrument
engineering
-0.003
(0.008)
0.001
(0.003)
-0.006
(0.004)
-0.006
(0.005)
0.012
(0.009)
Textiles 0.016*
(0.011)
0.001
(0.004)
-0.018***
(0.003)
-0.011*
(0.005)
-0.021**
(0.007)
Paper & publishing 0.030***
(0.012)
0.003
(0.004)
0.028***
(0.008)
0.019***
(0.008)
0.049***
(0.013)
Construction -0.026
(0.013)
-0.004
(0.008)
-0.021
(0.007)
-0.020
(0.010)
-0.048*
(0.013)
Transport & 
Communications
0.039***
(0.014)
0.000
(0.005)
-0.009
(0.005)
-0.021***
(0.004)
-0.030***
(0.008)
Distributive Trades -0.003
(0.009)
-0.005
(0.003)
-0.020***
(0.003)
-0.020***
(0.004)
-0.046***
(0.005)
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Table 6. Marginal Effects From Probit Estimates Of Influences On The
Introduction Of The Separate Constituents Of Workplace Change, continued
Insurance -0.031***
(0.006)
-0.011**
(0.002)
-0.026***
(0.002)
-0.030***
(0.003)
-0.054***
(0.004)
Prof. Services -0.015**
(0.007)
-0.010***
(0.002)
-0.015***
(0.004)
-0.026***
(0.003)
-0.035***
(0.007)
Leisure Services -0.005
(0.016)
N/a -0.024*
(0.005)
-0.030**
(0.005)
-0.044**
(0.011)
Misc. Services -0.007
(0.017)
N/a -0.015
(0.010)
0.006
(0.017)
-0.019
(0.022)
Leisure & Misc 
combined
N/a -0.008
(0.004)
N/a N/a N/a
Predicted
probability
(at means of vars)
0.044 0.012 0.028 0.034 0.061
Pseudo R2 7.64% 7.25% 12.42% 9.32% 10.73%
No. of Obs. 22389 30041 30041 30041 26476
Log likelihood -4449.1857 -2487.7099 -4756.314 -5079.5695 -6772.5798
* indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. The defaults are 101 to 200 employees; brick industry; mixed 
settlement groups; the North West.
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Table 7. Ordered Probit Estimates of the Influences Affecting the Number of
Individual Constituents of Workplace Change Which Were Introduced in any
Year
Independent variables Whole
Sample
1979-1983 1987-91 1991-95 1997-2000
Up to 25 employees -0.183*
(0.031)
-0.165***
(0.059)
-0.097
(0.063)
-0.017
(0.066)
0.179**
(0.088)
26 - 50 employees -0.059**
(0.032)
-0.096*
(0.058)
-0.096
(0.065)
-0.093
(0.072)
0.048
(0.091)
51 -100 employees -0.011
(0.030)
-0.062
(0.058)
0.031
(0.060)
0.068
(0.066)
0.017
(0.089)
201-500 employees 0.062**
(0.030)
0.083
(0.056)
0.076
(0.060)
-0.004
(0.070)
-0.113
(0.096)
More than 500 
employees
0.102***
(0.032)
0.063
(0.063)
0.174***
(0.061)
0.030
(0.071)
0.015
(0.094)
Scotland 0.014
(0.036)
0.058
(0.068)
-0.030
(0.074)
0.184**
(0.078)
-0.025
(0.104)
North East 0.092**
(0.041)
0.107
(0.082)
0.080
(0.079)
0.038
(0.089)
0.014
(0.130)
Yorkshire -0.160***
(0.040)
-0.157**
(0.069)
-0.265***
(0.083)
-0.0177*
(0.092)
-0.076
(0.116)
East Midlands -0.207***
(0.044)
-0.116
(0.077)
-0.365***
(0.096)
-0.204**
(0.100)
-0.140
(0.122)
East Anglia -0.223***
(0.056)
-0.266**
(0.117)
-0.481***
(0.117)
-0.231*
(0.119)
-0.100
(0.145)
South East -0.103***
(0.032)
-0.042
(0.058)
-0.229***
(0.065)
-0.122*
(0.074)
-0.302***
(0.109)
South West -0.137***
(0.042)
-0.168**
(0.081)
-0.246***
(0.082)
-0.110
(0.091)
-0.198
(0.129)
West Midlands 0.020
(0.036)
0.069
(0.067)
-0.067
(0.075)
0.006
(0.083)
0.038
(0.100)
Wales 0.031
(0.045)
0.131
(0.084)
-0.076
(0.088)
-0.031
(0.098)
-0.010
(0.140)
Food, drink & tobacco 0.073
(0.052)
0.073
(0.091)
-0.035
(0.108)
0.231*
(0.131)
-0.062
(0.148)
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Table 7. Ordered Probit Estimates of the Influences Affecting the Number of
Individual Constituents of Workplace Change Which Were Introduced in any
Year, continued
Chemicals -0.010
(0.049)
-0.061
(0.090)
-0.093
(0.101)
0.297**
(0.118)
-0.228*
(0.135)
Metals 0.080
(0.056)
-0.004
(0.100)
-0.062
(0.116)
0.339**
(0.133)
-0.157
(0.145)
Mechanical
engineering
0.073
(0.046)
0.070
(0.082)
0.031
(0.095)
0.155
(0.115)
-0.177
(0.124)
Textiles -0.132**
(0.059)
-0.392***
(0.108)
-0.190
(0.120)
0.159
(0.140)
-0.178
(0.156)
Paper & publishing 0.311***
(0.054)
0.382***
(0.095)
0.263**
(0.110)
0.306**
(0.139)
-0.024
(0.159)
Construction -0.554**
(0.234)
N/a -0.191
(0.366)
-7.287***
(0.136)
-0.058
(0.355)
Transport & 
Communications
-0.008
(0.071)
N/a 0.104
(0.136)
0.384***
(0.137)
0.089
(0.153)
Distributive Trades -0.283***
(0.071)
N/a -0.536***
(0.128)
0.075
(0.140)
0.049
(0.153)
Insurance -0.683***
(0.097)
N/a -0.741***
(0.152)
-0.356**
(0.178)
-0.615**
(0.242)
Prof. Services -0.374***
(0.065)
N/a -0.430***
(0.134)
0.119
(0.127)
-0.628***
(0.164)
Leisure Services -0.414**
(0.162)
N/a -0.893***
(0.327)
0.203
(0.242)
-0.069
(0.0297)
Misc. Services -0.262
(0.210)
N/a -0.388
(0.297)
0.295
(0.268)
-0.168
(0.479)
Manuals 0.139***
(0.024)
-0.036
(0.050)
0.353***
(0.050)
0.085
(0.055)
0.090
(0.069)
Non-manuals -0.183***
(0.026)
-0.321***
(0.054)
-0.080
(0.054)
-0.238***
(0.057)
-0.141*
(0.075)
Unionised 0.354***
(0.019)
0.438***
(0.054)
0.120***
(0.036)
0.253***
(0.042)
0.587***
(0.057)
Workplace Change 
Last Year
0.678***
(0.022)
0.519***
(0.043)
0.667***
(0.042)
0.653***
(0.052)
0.548***
(0.076)
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Table 7. Ordered Probit Estimates of the Influences Affecting the Number of
Individual Constituents of Workplace Change Which Were Introduced in any
Year, continued
Emp’ drop over last 
year (10% or more)
0.017
(0.023)
-0.062
(0.051)
-0.005
(0.044)
0.088*
(0.048)
0.202***
(0.061)
Last time firm is in 
data set
-0.029
(0.034)
-0.112*
(0.063)
-0.027
(0.071)
-0.013
(0.075)
-0.063
(0.096)
Interaction of the 
above
0.069
(0.074)
-0.016
(0.162)
0.034
(0.138)
-0.017
(0.156)
-0.042
(0.218)
No. of Obs. 30041 6390 6924 8317 6474
Log likelihood -15342.816 -4504.9944 -3929.5069 -2904.5411 1561.1264
Pseudo R2 8.46% 5.22% 9.60% 7.92% 9.72
* indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. The default categories are 101 to 200 employees; brick industry; 
mixed settlement groups; the North West.
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Table 8a. Benchmark Effects: Probability Of Multiple Changes: 1979-2000
One change Two changes Three changes Four changes
Type a 11.6 4.3 1.3 0.3
Type b 10.5 3.7 1.1 0.3
Type c 6.1 1.8 0.4 0.1
Table shows the percentage probability that a workplace of type a, b and c will undergo one or 
more workplace changes in any year.
Type a “MechEng”: mechanical engineering, in West Midlands, 26-50 employees, unionised, 
manual group. Type b “TransDib”: transport & distribution, in East Anglia, 201-500 employees, 
unionised, mixed occupational group. Type c “Bricks”: brick making plant, in South West, <26 
employees, non-union, non-manual workers.
Table 8b. Benchmark Effects: Probability Of Multiple Changes
Period One change Two changes Three or more 
changes
1979-1983
MechEng (a) 16.8 6.3 2.3
Bricks (c) 8.1 2.1 0.5
1987-1991
MechEng (a) 23.1 16.9 15.0
TransDib (b) 10.6 3.9 1.5
1991-1995
MechEng (a) 16.3 9.1 6.0
TransDib (b) 8.4 3.4 1.5
1996-2000
MechEng (a) 15.7 8.4 5.1
TransDib (b) 4.5 1.4 0.5
Table shows the percentage probability that a workplace of type a, b and c will undergo one or 
more workplace changes in any year.
Type a “MechEng”: mechanical engineering, in West Midlands, 26-50 employees, unionised, 
manual group. Type b “TransDib”: transport & distribution, in East Anglia, 201-500 employees, 
unionised, mixed occupational group. Type c “Bricks”: brick making plant, in South West, <26 
employees, non-union, non-manual workers.
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Table 9. Correlations Between Workplace Change And Changes To Hours And 
Holidays
Time period Wages Holidays Hours
1979-2000 0.049*** 0.075*** 0.056***
1979-1983 0.056*** 0.031** 0.012
1987-1991 0.066*** 0.014 0.017
1991-1995 0.059*** 0.014 0.040***
1996-2000 0.023* 0.062*** 0.104***
The table presents correlation coefficients and * indicates significance at the 10% level; ** 
indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates significance at the 1% level. The wage 
variable used is a dummy which indicates whether the settlement group received a real wage 
increase from as part of the settlement that introduced workplace change. The variables for 
hours and holidays are also dummies indicating there was change in these areas.
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Table 10. OLS Estimates of Real Wage Increases
Independent
variables
Whole
Sample
1979-1983 1987-91 1991-95 1996-2000
Non-manuals 0.443***
(0.042)
0.819***
(0.137)
0.104
(0.084)
0.103*
(0.055)
0.257***
(0.056)
Manuals 0.272***
(0.043)
0.481***
(0.135)
-0.085
(0.082)
-0.047
(0.055)
-0.039
(0.057)
Unionised -0.543***
(0.032)
-0.673***
(0.134)
0.159***
(0.059)
-0.063
(0.044)
-0.026
(0.046)
Workplace change 
this year
0.293***
(0.051)
0.293**
(0.112)
0.715***
(0.082)
0.597***
(0.085)
0.442***
(0.084)
Workplace change 
last year
-0.003
(0.048)
0.519***
(0.125)
-0.285***
(0.080)
-0.293***
(0.064)
-0.105
(0.082)
10% drop in 
employment last year
-0.008
(0.036)
-0.094
(0.128)
-0.237***
(0.068)
-0.224***
(0.048)
-0.100*
(0.056)
Last time in dataset -0.379***
(0.060)
-0.598***
(0.178)
0.026
(0.136)
-0.254***
(0.086)
_0 444*** 
(0.071)
Last time in & big 
fall in employment
0.150
(0.124)
0.104
(0.413)
-0.399*
(0.233)
-0.003
(0.182)
0.148
(0.186)
No. of Obs. 30017 6386 6924 8317 6464
Constant 0.032 -1.639 -0.167 0.304** 0.563***
Adjusted R2 5.24% 6.03% 5.54% 3.77 8.25%
* indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. The default categories are 101 to 200 employees; brick industry; 
mixed settlement groups; the North West. Regional, sectoral and size controls are used: full 
results are reported in appendix C3.
This table presents results for a regression on real wages.
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Table 11. Marginal Effects From Probit Regressions On Changes To Working
Hours
Independent variables Whole
Sample
1979-1983 1987-91 1991-95 1996-2000
Manuals -0.013***
(0.003)
0.003
(0.012)
0.000
(0.007)
-0.002
(0.003)
- 0.000
(0.002)
Non-manuals -0.011***
(0.003)
0.003
(0.012)
-0.002
(0.007)
0.002
(0.003)
0.002
(0.002)
Unionised 0.043***
(0.003)
0.005
(0.012)
0.050***
(0.005)
0.015***
(0.003)
0.010***
(0.002)
Workplace change 0.018***
(0.004)
0.011
(0.010)
0.013*
(0.008)
0.011**
(0.005)
0.025***
(0.009)
Workplace change 
last year
-0.005*
(0.003)
-0.017
(0.011)
-0.014**
(0.007)
0.004
(0.004)
0.005
(0.004)
10% drop in 
employment last year
-0.011***
(0.003)
-0.041***
(0.010)
0.008
(0.007)
0.010***
(0.004)
-0.003*
(0.002)
Last time in data set 0.003
(0.004)
-0.005
(0.014)
0.018*
(0.011)
0.003
(0.005)
0.002
(0.003)
Last time in and big 
fall in emp.
0.012
(0.011)
0.089*
(0.053)
0.004
(0.018)
-0.006
(0.006)
dropped
No. of Obs. 30041 6390 6924 8317 6034
Log Likelihood -5570.1394 -2343.8887 1458.6219 -739.5890 -319.7646
Pseudo R2 5.33% 0.90% 4.59% 5.98% 15.21%
Predicted probability 
(at sample means)
0.040 0.120 0.050 0.015 0.005
* indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. The default categories are 101 to 200 employees; brick industry; 
mixed settlement groups; the North West. Regional, sectoral and size controls are used: full 
results are reported in appendix C4.
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Table 12. The Marginal Effects From Probit Regressions On Changes To Holidays
Independent variables Whole
Sample
1979-1983 1987-91 1991-95 1996-2000
Manuals -0.014***
(0.004)
-0.007
(0.016)
-0.007
(0.008)
-0.003
(0.005)
0.003
(0.005)
Non-manuals -0.030***
(0.004)
-0.040**
(0.016)
-0.008
(0.008)
-0.005
(0.005)
-0.002
(0.005)
Unionised 0.081***
(0.004)
0.087***
(0.015)
0.013**
(0.006)
0.017***
(0.004)
0.033***
(0.007)
Workplace change 0.035***
(0.005)
0.027**
(0.013)
0.014
(0.009)
0.002
(0.006)
0.035***
(0.012)
Workplace change last 
year
-0.009*
(0.005)
-0.055***
(0.014)
-0.006
(0.008)
0.013**
(0.007)
-0.002
(0.007)
10% drop in 
employment last year
-0.023***
(0.004)
-0.037**
(0.015)
-0.004
(0.007)
-0.001
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.004)
Last time in data set -0.001
(0.006)
0.014
(0.020)
-0.009
(0.011)
-0.003
(0.006)
-0.007
(0.005)
Last time in and big fall 
in emp.
0.011
(0.014)
0.086
(0.057)
0.010
(0.024)
-0.010
(0.010)
0.003
(0.016)
No. of Obs. 30041 6390 6924 8317 6474
Log Likelihood -9240.9211 -3444.2418 1745.4826 -1152.1208 -889.3860
Pseudo R2 7.08% 3.11% 6.97% 6.19% 9.27%
Predicted probability 
(at sample means)
0.087 0.237 0.064 0.027 0.025
* indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. The defaults are 101 to 200 employees; brick industry; mixed 
settlement groups; the North West. Regional, sectoral and size controls are used: full results are 
reported in appendix C6.
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Table 13. OLS Estimates of Real Wage Increases
Independent variables Whole
Sample
1979-1983 1987-91 1991-95 1996-2000
Non-manual 0.444***
(0.042)
0.820***
(0.137)
0.106
(0.084)
0.103*
(0.055)
0.257***
(0.056)
Manual 0.270***
(0.043)
0.480***
(0.135)
-0.090
(0.082)
-0.049
(0.056)
-0.041
(0.057)
Unionised -0.543***
(0.032)
-0.673***
(0.136)
0.157***
(0.059)
-0.062
(0.044)
-0.025
(0.046)
1 type of change 0.218***
(0.061)
0.300**
(0.131)
0.586***
(0.098)
0.462***
(0.100)
0.466***
(0.100)
2 types of change 0.370***
(0.098)
0.219
(0.206)
0.873***
(0.140)
0.917***
(0.173)
0.500***
(0.171)
3 types of change 0.560***
(0.140)
0.434
(0.315)
1.001***
(0.198)
0.663***
(0.245)
0.112
(0.254)
Workplace change last 
year
-0.009
(0.047)
0.519***
(0.125)
-0.292***
(0.080)
-0.301***
(0.063)
-0.102
(0.082)
Big fall in employment -0.009
(0.036)
-0.095
(0.128)
0.237***
(0.068)
-0.224***
(0.048)
-0.100*
(0.056)
Last time in data set -0.379***
(0.060)
-0.596***
(0.177)
0.030
(0.136)
-0.255***
(0.086)
-0.445***
(0.071)
Big fall in emp & last time 
in dataset
0.145
(0.124)
0.103
(0.413)
-0.412*
(232)
-0.001
(0.182)
0.150
(0.185)
Constant 0.034 -1.639*** -0.168 0.307** 0.566***
No. of Obs. 30017 6386 6924 8317 6464
Adjusted R2 5.27% 6.04% 5.62% 3.86 8.27%
* indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. The defaults are 101 to 200 employees; brick industry; mixed 
settlement groups; the North West. Regional, sectoral and size controls are used: full results are 
reported in appendix C8.
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Table 14. The Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Changes to Working
Hours
Independent variables Whole
Sample
1979-1983 1987-91 1991-95 1996-2000
Manuals -0.013***
(0.003)
0.003
(0.012)
0.000
(0.007)
-0.002
(0.003)
- 0.000
(0.002)
Non-manuals -0.011***
(0.003)
0.004
(0.012)
-0.002
(0.007)
0.002
(0.003)
0.002
(0.002)
Unionised 0.043***
(0.003)
0.005
(0.011)
0.050***
(0.005)
0.015***
(0.003)
0.010***
(0.004)
One workplace 
change
0.017***
(0.004)
0.010
(0.012)
0.012
(0.010)
0.014***
(0.007)
0.012**
(0.007)
Two workplace 
changes
0.016***
(0.007)
0.000
(0.018)
0.010
(0.014)
-0.004
(0.007)
0.051***
(0.024)
Three workplace 
changes
0.036***
(0.011)
0.042
(0.031)
0.027
(0.022)
0.023*
(0.018)
0.069***
(0.038)
Workplace change 
last year
-0.006*
(0.003)
-0.017
(0.011)
-0.015**
(0.007)
0.004
(0.004)
0.005
(0.004)
10% drop in 
employment last year
-0.011***
(0.003)
-0.041***
(0.010)
0.008
(0.007)
0.010***
(0.004)
-0.003*
(0.002)
Last time in data set 0.003
(0.004)
-0.005
(0.014)
0.019*
(0.012)
0.003
(0.005)
0.002
(0.003)
Last time in and big 
fall in emp.
0.011
(0.011)
0.088*
(0.053)
0.004
(0.018)
-0.006
(0.006)
dropped
No. of Obs. 30041 6390 6924 8317 6034
Log Likelihood -5568.6163 -2343.116 1458.3594 -737.8367 -316.8158
Pseudo R2 5.36% 0.92% 4.60% 6.21% 15.99%
Predicted probability 
(at sample means)
0.040 0.119 0.050 0.015 0.006
* indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. The default categories are 101 to 200 employees; brick industry; 
mixed settlement groups; the North West. Regional, sectoral and size controls are used: full 
results are reported in appendix C9 with probit coefficients in CIO.
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Table 15. The Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Concessions on 
Holidays
Independent variables Whole
Sample
1979-1983 1987-91 1991-95 1996-2000
Manuals -0.014***
(0.004)
-0.007
(0.016)
-0.007
(0.008)
-0.003
(0.005)
0.003
(0.005)
Non-manuals -0.030***
(0.004)
-0.040**
(0.016)
-0.008
(0.008)
-0.005
(0.005)
-0.002
(0.005)
Unionised 0.081***
(0.004)
0.087***
(0.015)
0.013**
(0.006)
0.017***
(0.004)
0.033***
(0.007)
One workplace 
change
0.042***
(0.007)
0.040**
(0.016)
0.014
(0.011)
0.009
(0.008)
0.053***
(0.017)
Two workplace 
changes
0.032***
(0.010)
0.017
(0.024)
0.024
(0.017)
-0.008
(0.009)
0.014
(0.017)
Three workplace 
changes
0.007
(0.013)
-0.035
(0.033)
-0.005
(0.021)
-0.014
(0.011)
-0.013
(0.013)
Workplace change 
last year
-0.008*
(0.005)
-0.054***
(0.014)
-0.005
(0.008)
0.014**
(0.007)
-0.002
(0.007)
10% drop in 
employment last year
-0.023***
(0.004)
-0.037**
(0.015)
-0.004
(0.007)
-0.002
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.004)
Last time in data set -0.001
(0.006)
0.014
(0.020)
-0.009
(0.011)
-0.003
(0.006)
-0.007
(0.005)
Last time in and big 
fall in emp.
0.012
(0.014)
0.086
(0.057)
0.011
(0.024)
-0.010
(0.010)
0.004
(0.017)
No. of Obs. 30041 6390 6924 8317 6474
Log Likelihood -9237.7473 -3442.1748 1744.8049 -1150.5987 -886.6084
Pseudo R2 7.11% 3.17% 7.00% 6.31% 9.55%
Predicted probability 
(at sample means)
0.087 0.237 0.064 0.027 0.025
* indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. The default categories are 101 to 200 employees; brick industry; 
mixed settlement groups; the North West. Regional, sectoral and size controls are used: full 
results are reported in appendix Cl 1, with probit coefficients in C l2.
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Chapter 5. Conclusions
Introduction
This thesis has explored the concepts of exit and of voice in UK workplaces using 
both statistical and case study techniques. Both longitudinal and cross-sectional data sets 
are employed to develop a picture of changing voice mechanisms within British industrial 
relations. The thesis makes a major contribution in terms of the rich data sets which are 
used, focusing on relatively unexplored areas of the labour market: low paid workers and 
(generally) service sector workplaces, employing large proportions of women and ethnic 
minorities. The empirical results constitute another major contribution of the thesis. In 
using such unique data sets to explore the hypotheses, a number of the stylised facts of 
satisfaction, absenteeism and labour turnover are challenged. Challenging stylised labour 
market facts is one of the key objectives of empirical work. The distinctiveness of the 
findings of this thesis indicates the value of using less commonly exploited sources and 
suggests avenues for future research.
Summary
In the examination of voice in UK workplaces it was hypothesised that direct, 
individual forms of involvement would have replaced collective fora; that individualistic 
voice channels would be related to higher levels of job satisfaction; and that collective 
channels, in the form of union recognition, would be associated with lower quitting rates. 
The first hypothesis was explored using WIRS data for 1980, 1990, and 1998. Direct 
communication and involvement mechanisms have become more common. Despite the fall 
in trade union recognition and this growth of direct communication channels, more than 
half the surveyed workplaces still had access to a form of collective voice, be it trade union, 
JCC or health and safety committee, though the proportion has fallen over time. However, 
WIRS data show that workplaces tend to use both types of voice channel or none at all. 
Such a finding corresponds to that of Tillsley (1994), who suggested that employers’ use of
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voice was becoming more sophisticated, with different mechanisms being used for distinct 
purposes. Therefore the first hypothesis is not confirmed.
The subsequent analysis of voice used a previously unexplored data set, based on 
five national companies in hotels, quick service restaurants, food retailing, leisure clubs and 
food manufacturing, all of whom offered relatively low wages. This data set is interesting 
not merely for its focus on services and low paid employees, it also covers a predominantly 
female pool of labour, with significant numbers of ethnic minorities and part-time students. 
The common finding of the multitude of existing studies of the relationship between union 
membership and satisfaction is that unionised workers are less content. Most researchers 
concur with Bender and Sloane (1998) that the process of unionisation leads to an emphasis 
on the negative aspects of work and the workplace, which impacts on the industrial 
relations climate. These data generate results which contradict extant findings regarding the 
relationships between collective voice and both job satisfaction and quitting. With respect 
to the second hypothesis, employees in workplaces with trade union recognition or 
presence are not less satisfied than those in establishments without collective voice.
The body of evidence on the relationship between trade unions and labour turnover 
is compelling: involuntary turnover is reduced by unions’ “dual authority” (Freeman: 1980, 
p647), whilst voluntary turnover is lessened through wage premia, fringe benefits and 
grievance protection. Using a subset of the same data, focusing on branches of the retail 
and hotel chain, we find that quitting is more common in plants with union recognition, 
disproving the third hypothesis. Recent studies have shown that this negative union 
association relies upon union strength (Wooden and Baker: 1994), so in a period when 
union membership is declining and their influence is perceived as weak, it may not be 
surprising to find no significant relationship between union recognition and quits. However, 
this positive relationship defies explanation and reinforces the importance of testing 
stylised facts on new sources of data, covering less thoroughly researched types of 
employee.
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The case study analysis of Bun Factory depicts a low paying workplace with 
extremely high rates of absence across a predominantly male, ethnic workforce. Examining 
the pattern of time off by demographic and job characteristics, a number of the established 
facts about absenteeism were challenged. In previous work women have been shown to 
take more time off due to poorer health and childcare commitments, young workers were 
absent more, whilst those living further away were more likely to miss work. This study 
contradicts these findings: women, young staff and those living far from the plant take 
fewer days off than males, older workers and those living close by; and those promoted 
during the year of analysis are much more likely to be off. An examination of employee 
satisfaction provides another distinctive result: workers were better satisfied with 
contextual aspects of the job, such as relationships, than content-related aspects including 
the challenging nature of the post. This directly contradicts extant theoretical and empirical 
work.
There are two responses employees can make when faced with a deterioration of 
conditions or they perceive the need for organisational change. Workers can chose to make 
suggestions or demands, use voice, or they can exit the employment relationship 
permanently by quitting. The chapter next investigates whether absence is being used as a 
form of voice, given the lack of other formal channels at Bun Factory, or a form of partial 
exit. To see whether absence represents voice, we analyse longitudinal absence patterns by 
skill group against a background of discrete, skill-related improvements to pay and working 
conditions. Overall, absence shows a slight downward trend over the year under analysis, 
though it is only weakly related to the staged improvements offered to employees. This is 
inconsistent with the argument that absence is used as a form of voice. It then remains to 
pursue the possibility that absence is a form of exit or, as has been suggested, a distinct 
form of behaviour. A significantly positive relationship is found when using lagged absence 
as an explanatory variable in a quits equation, implying that employees with a tendency to 
be absent in one year are likely to progress to quitting the following year. This result is 
therefore consistent with the interpretation of absence as a form of exit. Such a conclusive 
finding makes a major contribution to the literature on absence and its position on the exit- 
voice continuum.
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The CBI databank is an established source of longitudinal information on individual 
settlement groups in the private sector. These data are used to explore the linking of 
workplace change to establishments’ annual settlements, and to look at the issue of 
compensation for the extra effort associated with workplace change. The CBI data has the 
advantage of reporting on year-on-year changes to the position of groups of workers, so a 
number of unobserved characteristics are held constant. We hypothesise that external 
pressures and technical change would ensure that settlement groups continue to experience 
high levels of workplace change at the end of the 1990s. The greater effort levels associated 
with workplace changes make compensatory remuneration vital if the wage-effort balance 
is to be retained, ceteris paribus.
An initial study of WIRS data indicates that workplace change remained common 
over the late 1990s, a pattern supported by Machin’s (2001) analysis of technical change, 
but that union representatives have seen the scope of their influence decline even where 
they retained recognition rights. Employees with non-union representation or no 
representation at all are even less likely to exert influence, particularly during periods of 
low demand or high unemployment. In relation to the first hypothesis, CBI data show that 
settlements become less commonly associated with forms of workplace change over the 
twenty-year period of analysis, but that union recognition is consistently, positively 
associated with change. Consistent with our second hypothesis, compensatory remuneration 
continues to be paid in the year workers experience changes to their working pratices. 
Aside from the initial recession of the early 1980s, trade union recognition remains 
positively associated with the ability to enjoy compensation for change. Green (1985; 1997) 
emphasised the need to consider remuneration in a broader sense than mere pay, so our 
analysis looks at changes to working hours and holidays as well as pay increases. Over the 
1990s, as inflation has remained low and stable, change is more likely to be accompanied 
by shorter hours and longer holidays than above average pay rises. We conclude that whilst 
a declining proportion of change is now tied to the annual settlement which indicates a limit 
to union and employee influence, the association between recognition and higher rewards is 
consistent with unions’ ability to link change and the annual settlement rather than a greater 
need for change in unionised groups.
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Contribution
The theme of employee representation runs through the three substantive chapters. 
Over the period covered by the thesis, trade union membership and recognition has fallen in 
the UK. The CBI data set, used to analyse influence over workplace change, mirrors the 
wider economy in that trade union recognition has fallen significantly over the last twenty 
years. However, the CBI dataset enables us to observe the parallel decline in the ability to 
link workplace change with the annual settlement. A union premium in the form of 
compensation for workplace change is still evident, which is consistent with the view that 
trade unions retain some power.
The establishment chosen for our case study, Bun Factory, suffered high levels of 
absenteeism and labour turnover. Satisfaction levels with aspects of work at Bun Factory 
and the other four companies examined were surprisingly high, with the exception of wages 
which were viewed as poor. Comparisons with the wages on offer in that local labour 
market confirmed that wage levels really were low rather than being perceived as such, a 
statement with which the plant manager agreed. This suggests that the expectations of the 
employees in the data set are relatively modest. Employees at Bun Factory were granted 
their first formal voice mechanism in late 1995 in the form of team briefings; union 
recognition was not granted until 1999. This lack of voice afforded workers little 
opportunity to raise issues of concern, such as their low wage levels. Across the five- 
company sample the food manufacturer, the owners of Bun Factory, were unusual in using 
limited or no voice channels in their plants. The other organisations did not correspond to 
this authoritarian or black-hole type of employer. Of the remaining firms, two offered 
recognition on a site-by-site basis whilst the quick service restaurant and leisure firm 
refused union recognition. All of the four other firms offered a range of direct individually- 
oriented voice channels and almost all sites employed financial incentives. The analysis of 
WIRS across the twenty year period shows how these firms mirror wider trends such as the 
economy-wide growth in direct oriented voice mechanisms, and in particular merit pay and 
employee share ownership.
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Any shift from collective to individual voice mechanisms may well have 
implications for issues such as workplace democracy and the balance of power. In the 
context of voice over workplace change, declining union recognition may mean less ability 
to exercise voice in relation to the introduction of new practices and to extract 
compensation for workplace change. One might assume that the shift from collective to 
individual voice channels would have implications for employee satisfaction and labour 
turnover, as has been suggested by previous empirical work. However, this thesis 
challenges such assumptions, as neither phenomena is lower in the presence of trade unions 
and direct mechanisms showed little benefit.
It is often remarked that industrial relations as a discipline pays too much attention 
to white, male full-time workers, to manufacturing and to trade union procedures and 
outcomes. This thesis has attempted to counter this bias and to enrich the literature by using 
previously unexplored data sets which focus upon service sector companies, and 
workforces with large proportions of women, ethnic minorities and part-time staff. Beyond 
expanding the literature to cover such workers and establishments, this thesis has made a 
major contribution in terms of its results. Many of the stylised facts of job satisfaction and 
labour turnover are challenged. In particular the data show a positive relationship between 
union recognition and quits, and voluntary turnover is demonstrated to be a progression of 
absence. Future work might pursue these relationships with other data on low paid workers, 
female and ethnic minority workforces. A further project could seek to explain the 
association between union recognition and high labour turnover, through a broader, multi­
company, study of withdrawal behaviour. The uniqueness of the findings of this thesis 
emphasises the need to continually broaden the subjects chosen for analysis by those 
interested in industrial relations.
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Appendix A -  Presents Data For Chapter 2.
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Appendix Al. Primary Data Summary
The primary data was originally collected for a Centre for Economic 
Performance project examining the implementation of the UK’s first national minimum 
wage during 1996 and 1997, funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation. The original 
aim was to focus upon the effects of the minimum wage on “entry-level” jobs -  
appointments which do not require job related skills or qualifications. Researchers were 
interested in all the processes surrounding the creation of a vacancy through to the 
departure of an employee. This required that we collect payroll data; information about 
the advertisement of vacancies; the hiring process; the background and satisfaction of 
starters, current staff and leavers; institutional information from site managers; 
complemented by financial performance information.
In order to ensure that the companies had detailed computerised records and 
sufficient employees to analyse, only large, nationally operating organisations were 
considered. Individual companies were approached with a view to concentrating on the 
service sector. This reflected both the lack of research in this area compared to 
manufacturing, and the continued growth of jobs in services. The final five firms were 
in the hotel, food retail, food manufacturing, leisure and quick service restaurant (QSR) 
industries. Data was collected across five regional labour markets: North West England; 
South West England; North London; West Midlands and West Yorkshire. This allowed 
for comparisons across the firms in the same labour market, and was supplemented by 
New Earnings Survey (NES) and Labour Force Survey (LFS) data on characteristics of 
these areas. The participating organisations were offered a non-technical summary of 
their workforce as compared to industry averages and the others in this sample.
The companies in the data set offered wages in the lowest quarter of the NES 
earnings distribution. However, the low level of the UK’s first national minimum wage 
left the data set redundant: very little impact was felt by these firms. Problems in 
collecting comprehensive and consistent data were also experienced, particularly where 
the management of the participating companies changed. Therefore the data set was 
used to complete a summary report for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, see Brown et 
al (1998), but little academic use was made of the data until now.
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Company Hotels Food Retail Food Manuf QSR Leisure
Number of sites in original sample 7 12 3 28 12
Satisfaction surveys circulated Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of sites used in satisfaction sample 7 5 3 26 11
Proportion of satisfaction sample 21.5 16.6 14.3 14.4 33.1
Payroll data given Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Number of sites used in labour turnover sample 7 5 0 0 0
Proportion of labour turnover sample 43.8 56.2 Not used Not used Not used
Financial performance information offered On 69 sites On 414 sites On 3 sites On 374 sites On 136 sites
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Company Hotels Food Retail Food Manuf QSR Leisure
Regions covered* All North West 
North London 
West Midlands
North West 
North London
All All
Urban/rural site position On the edge of 
towns/cities
Split between 
urban centres and 
the edge of 
towns/cities
On the edge of 
towns/cities
Generally in 
city/town centres
Split between 
urban centres and 
the edge of 
towns/cities
Average wage (£ per hour) 3.93 4.04 3.91 3.37 3.64
Managers’ views on wages relative to rivals’ 
(company average)
About average Slightly better 
than average
About average About average About average
Managers’ views on labour turnover relative to 
rivals’ (company average)
About average About average Slightly better 
than average
About average About average
Fringe benefits offered Free food for 
staff
Free/subsidised 
transport 5 sites 
No childcare
Subsidised 
canteen/food 
No help with 
transport 
No childcare
Subsidised 
canteen all sites 
No help with 
transport 
No childcare
Almost all (25) 
offer free food 
Almost all (22) 
offer no help with 
transport 
No childcare
Subsidised 
canteen all sites 
Almost all (11) 
offer no help 
No childcare
*The regions used were North West England; South West England; North London; West Midlands and West Yorkshire.
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Appendix A2. Probit Estimates Of Influences On Job Satisfaction And Labour 
Turnover
Variable Probit coefficients 
Job satisfaction
Probit coefficients all 
labour turnover
Probit coefficients 
voluntary turnover
Union recognition or -0.199 0.136 0.490***
presence of members (0.221) (0.397) (0.133)
Newsletter 0.005 -0.272** -0.244*
(0.113) (0.124) (0.146)
Bonus schemes 0.052 -0.422** -0.317*
(0.174) (0.183) (0.178)
Team briefings -0.443** 0.250*** 0.267***
(0.176) (0.069) (0.082)
Cascade 0.160 -0.083 -0.042
(0.195) (0.094) (0.078)
Hotel chain 0.568*
(0.310)
N/a N/a
Quick service 
restaurant
0.493*
(0.297)
N/a N/a
Food retailer 1.265*** -1.179*** -1.507***
(0.316) (0.434) (0.195)
Leisure firm 1.331***
(0.295)
N/a N/a
Female -0.020 0.257 0.288*
(0.101) (0.158) (0.148)
Age -0.074* -0.192*** -0.138***
(0..40) (0.043) (0.046)
Age2 0.100** 0.222*** 0.142**
(0.049) (0.051) (0.056)
Ethnic minority 0.116 -0.084 -0.033
(0.188) (0.291) (0.327)
Married/co-hab 0.022 -0.289* -0.229
(0.108) (0.161) (0.176)
One child 0.192 0.241 0.063
(0.141) (0.218) (0.228)
Two or more children 0.179 0.278 0.155
(0.160) (0.274) (0.283)
CSEs 0.061 0.191 0.322
(0.272) (0.281) (0.274)
A levels -0.169 0.127 0.205
(0.148) (0.298) (0.263)
Degree -0.433** 0.558*** 0.598***
(0.236) (0.182) (0.181)
Vocational 0.155 -0.463** -0.292
qualifications (0.157) (0.223) (0.262)
No qualifications -0.190 0.102 0.016
(0.137) (0.210) (0.216)
Much more than other 
local wages
-0.276
(0.237)
N/a N/a
A little more than 
other local wages
-0.304**
(0.137)
N/a N/a
A little less than other 
local wages
0.355**
(0.167)
N/a N/a
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Appendix A2. Probit Estimates Of Influences On Job Satisfaction And Labour
Turnover, cont.
Variable Probit coefficients 
Job satisfaction
Probit coefficients all 
labour turnover
Probit coefficients 
voluntary turnover
A lot less than other 
local wages
-0.043
(0.163)
N/a N/a
Relative wage rate N/a 1.806***
(0.390)
2.387***
(0.574)
South East -0.752***
(0.175)
N/a N/a
South West 0.057
(0.226)
N/a N/a
West Midlands -0.335**
(0.152)
N/a N/a
North West -0.059
(0.227)
N/a N/a
Unemployment in 
travel to work area 
1997ql
N/a -0.036
(0.048)
-0.004
(0.045)
Tenure 0.039 x 10'2 
(0.132) x 10'2
-0.007**
(0.003)
-0.009***
(0.003)
Unskilled or trainee N/a 0.472*
(0.277)
0.520*
(0.285)
Semi-skilled with 
some responsibility
N/a 0.002
(0.229)
-0.014
(0.179)
Skilled or supervisory N/a -0.140
(0.239)
-0.216
(0.272)
Junior mgt or 
professional
N/a -0.772**
(0.346)
-0.908**
(0.462)
Full time (30 or more 
hours per week)
N/a 0.556**
(0.252)
0.207
(0.343)
Sample size 909 660 660
Log likelihood -516.420 -273.704 -241.580
Pseudo R2 13.60% 24.17% 25.91%
Statistically significant results are reported at the 1% ***, 5% ** and 10% * significance levels. The 
variable appraisal is dropped due to lack of variation across the sample.
Analysis of satisfaction uses data on all five companies. The default categories for the first two 
columns are the food manufacturer, GCSE qualifications, Yorkshire and Humberside, paying 
about the same as other local jobs.
Separation analysis uses information on the hotel and retail chains. The default categories for 
the last two columns are the hotel chain, GCSEs, se mi-skilled occupations. N/a indicates not 
applicable.
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Appendix B -  This Appendix Contains Data For Chapter 3.
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Appendix B l. The Manager’s View On Plant Performance, Market Position And 
HRM Practices
Question Response Questions response
How would you assess 
the financial 
performance of this 
establishment 
compared with other 
establishments in the 
same industry and local 
area?
About the same Does your store 
perform individual 
appraisals?
Claim to conduct 
and highly value 
appraisals.
How would you assess 
wages offered by this 
establishment 
compared with others 
in the local labour 
market?
A little worse than 
average
How many hours does 
induction take?
2 hours per 
employee but claim 
that managers and 
admin staff spend 6 
hours on it per 
week. Highly 
valued but 
manager’s role was 
to perform exit 
interviews under 
this heading
How would you assess 
the turnover 
performance of this 
establishment 
compared with other 
establishments in the 
same industry and local 
area?
A little worse than 
average
Performance of new 
employee compared to 
skilled staff:
30%
What services do you 
provide for your 
employees?
No help with 
transport
No help with child 
care
A subsidised 
canteen -  from 
1996
Time taken to become 
100% efficient
7.5 weeks
Does your store have a 
newsletter (non­
company wide)?
Yes Does your store have 
any bonus schemes?
No
Does your store have 
regular staff, team or 
star group meetings?
Yes , All staff meet Does your store consult 
trade union 
representatives for 
individual grievance 
and health and safety 
issues?
Not recognised until 
1999
No
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Appendix B2. Probability Off July 1995 -  June 1996: Log Likelihood Ratio 
(Chow) Test
Time off -  Both sexes Male sample only Female only
Variable Coefficient (sd) Coefficient (sd) Coefficient (sd)
Afro-Caribbean -0.031 -0.028 0.043
(0.024) (0.026) (0.090)
White or other ethnic -0.178** - 0.111 Dropped
group (0.084) (0.095)
Married -0.021 -0.004 -0.252***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.093)
Other marital status - 0.107** 0.132** 0.106
divorced, widowed or (0.051) (0.055) (0.263)
not stated.
Women -0.012
(0.034)
Trainee 0.065 -0.006 -0.136
(0.040) (0.044) (0.361)
Unskilled 0.112*** 0.081** -0.253
(0.031) (0.032) (0.357)
High Skilled -  skilled, -0.012 0.016 -0.202
line leaders, or (0.050) (0.051) (0.351)
engineers.
Aged < 26 years -0.038
(0.037)
0.013
(0.040)
-0.327***
(0.083)
Aged 26-35 years 0.036
(0.028)
0.054*
(0.031)
-0.013
(0.072)
Aged 46 years and 0.060 0.127*** -0.186
older (0.042) (0.049) (0.210)
Promoted this year 0.354*** 0.354*** 0.012
(0.019) (0.021) (0.237)
Lives less than 2 -0.034 -0.003 -0.178**
miles away (0.025) (0.027) (0.078)
Lives more than 5 -0.019 0.019 -0.207*
miles away (0.026) (0.027) (0.104)
Tenure -0.019 x 10-2*** -0.030 x 10"2*** -0.008 x 10-2***
(0.003) x 10"2 (0.004) x 10"2 (0.005) x 10"2
Night shifts 0.023 0.027 -0.040
(0.022) (0.023) (0.087)
Other shifts - -0.151** -0.142* dropped
afternoons, mornings (0.074) (0.075)
or rotating
No of obs 2780 2457 318
Log likelihood -1730.4181 -1498.7576 -198.1865
Pseudo R2 0.094 0.107 0.095
The table presents marginal coefficients from a probit estimation. It is not possible to use robust 
coefficients in a likelihood ratio (chow) test, so the standard errors may differ from those presented in the 
main body of the paper. The default category is semi-skilled ethnically Asian men, who are single, aged 
36-45 years, working days. *** indicates significance at the 1% level of confidence, ** at the 5% level, * 
at the 10% level.
Likelihood ratio test
LR chi2( 14) = 66.95 prob>chi2 = 0.000.
This indicates that separate models might fit the data better than a joint model. However, as the 
female sample size is so small compared to that for males we will continue with joint models.
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Appendix B3. Probit Coefficients For Probit Estimates Of The Probability Of
Time Off July 1995 -  June 1996, Corresponding To Table 6 Of Chapter 3.
Model Any time off Attitudinal absence Voluntary absences 
only
Variable Coefficient (sd) Coefficient (sd) Coefficient (sd)
Afro-Caribbean -0.079 0.044 -0.045
(0.062) (0.065) (0.062)
White or other -0.451** -0.436* -0.599***
ethnic group (0.203) (0.238) (0.208)
Married -0.054 -0.137** -0.081
(0.060) (0.062) (0.060)
Other marital status 0.283** -0.048 0.245*
-  divorced, widowed (0.143) (0.148) (0.144)
or not stated.
Women -0.030 -0.086 -0.046
(0.086) (0.092) (0.086)
Trainee 0.169 -0.046 0.149
(0.105) (0.112) (0.107)
Unskilled 0.284*** 0.094 0.248***
(0.080) (0.085) (0.081)
High Skilled - -0.030 -0.074 0.089
skilled, line leaders, (0.134) (0.146) (0.136)
or engineers.
Aged < 26 years -0.095 -0.134 -0.076
(0.093) (0.097) (0.093)
Aged 26-35 years 0.092 0.044 0.100
(0.071) (0.075) (0.071)
Aged 46 years and 0.156 0.172 0.165
older (0.113) (0.118) (0.114)
Promoted this year 1.059*** 0.643*** 0.964***
(0.076) (0.069) (0.074)
Lives less than 2 -0.087 0.022 -0.067
miles away (0.063) (0.064) (0.063)
Lives more than 5 -0.049 -0.051 -0.027
miles away (0.065) (0.069) (0.065)
Tenure -0.049 x 10'2*** -0.035 xlO'2*** -0.060 x 10‘2***
(0.008) x 10"2 (0.008) x 10'2 (0.009) x 10"2
Night shifts 0.059 -0.062 0.068
(0.055) (0.057) (0.055)
Other shifts - -0.382** -0.273 -0.404**
afternoons, (0.184) (0.199) (0.185)
mornings or rotating
No of obs 2780 2780 2780
Log likelihood -1730.4181 -1580.9828 -1736.6012
Pseudo R2 9.4% 5.3% 9.9%
Constant 0.119 -0.458 0.058
The default category is semi-skilled ethnically Asian men, who are single, aged 36-45 years, live 2-5 
miles from the plant, and are working days. *** indicates significance at the 1% level of confidence, ** at 
the 5% level, * at the 10% level.
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Appendix B4. Probit And Marginal Coefficients For Probit Estimates Of The
Probability Of Involuntary Time Off July 1995 -  June 1996
Variable Probit coefficients Marginal coefficients
Afro-Caribbean -0.108 -0.010
(0.102) (0.010)
White or other ethnic group 0.365 0.045
(0.287) (0.045)
Married 0.096 0.009
(0.105) (0.010)
Other marital status - 0.166 0.017
divorced, widowed or not (0.228) (0.026)
stated.
Women 0.011 0.001
(0.141) (0.013)
Trainee -0.087 -0.007
(0.179) (0.015)
Unskilled 0.050 0.004
(0.129) (0.011)
High Skilled -  skilled, line -0.392 -0.026
leaders, or engineers. (0.243) (0.012)
Aged < 26 years -0.076 -0.007
(0.158) (0.013)
Aged 26-35 years -0.040 -0.004
(0.115) (0.010)
Aged 46 years and older 0.016 0.001
(0.171) (0.016)
Promoted this year 0.059 0.006
(0.119) (0.012)
Lives less than 2 miles away -0.046 -0.004
(0.104) (0.009)
Lives more than 5 miles -0.077 -0.007
away (0.111) (0.009)
Tenure 0.233 x 10"3** 0.021xl0'3**
(0.097) x 10-3 (0.009) x 10'3
Night shifts -0.029 -0.003
(0.091) (0.008)
Other shifts -  afternoons, 0.169 0.018
mornings or rotating (0.306) (0.036)
No of obs 2780 2780
Log likelihood -501.5064 -501.5064
Pseudo R2 2.2% 2.2%
Predicted probability 0.043
Constant -1.770
The table presents robust ordinary and marginal coefficients from a probit estimation.
The default category is semi-skilled ethnically Asian men, who are single, aged 36-45 years, living 2-5 
miles from the plant, and are working days. *** indicates significance at the 1% level of confidence, ** at 
the 5% level, * at the 10% level.
That this model performs so poorly compared to that using voluntary absence indicates 
the need to have health data to examine involuntary absence.
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Appendix B5. Negative Binomial Estimates Of Voluntary Absences: Total Days
And Spells Between July 1995 -  June 1996
Model Total days off Spells off Number of attitudinal 
absences
Variables Coefficient (sd) Coefficient (sd) Coefficient (sd)
Afro-Caribbean 1.105* 1.063 1.119**
(0.066) (0.045) (0.054)
White or other ethnic 0.464*** 0.519*** 0.592***
group (0.082) (0.073) (0.094)
Married 1.049 0.962 0.862***
(0.061) (0.041) (0.042)
Other marital status - 1.337** 1.272** 1.053
divorced, widowed or (0.187) (0.124) (0.113)
not stated.
Women 1.087 0.860** 0.830**
(0.091) (0.057) (0.063)
Trainee 1.066 1.096 1.136
(0.114) (0.087) (0.102)
Unskilled 1.097 1.059 1.075
(0.095) (0.065) (0.073)
High Skilled -  skilled, 0.704** 0.722*** 0.664***
line leaders, or (0.097) (0.071) (0.074)
engineers.
Aged < 26 years 0.925 0.849** 0.798***
(0.083) (0.057) (0.061)
Aged 26-35 years 1.054 1.050 1.052
(0.074) (0.055) (0.063)
Aged 46 years and older 1.158 1.090 1.183*
(0.125) (0.086) (0.106)
Promoted this year 2.707*** 2.821*** 3.272***
(0.212) (0.153) (0.194)
Lives less than 2 miles 0.801*** 0.945 1.061
away (0.047) (0.041) (0.051)
Lives more than 5 miles 0.975 0.948 0.912*
away (0.061) (0.043) (0.047)
Tenure 1.000* 1.000*** 1.000***
(0.008) x 10‘2 0.006 x 10'2 (0.007) x 10'2
Night shifts 1.107** 1.062 0.987
(0.057) (0.041) (0.043)
Other shifts - 0.430*** 0.637*** 0.756*
afternoons, mornings or (0.080) (0.089) (0.117)
rotating
No of obs 4217 4217 4217
Log likelihood -12154.594 -8913.0761 -7040.2224
Pseudo R2 1% 2% 3%
The table presents incidence rates from a negative binomial regression. *** indicates significance 
at the 1% level of confidence, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level.
The default category is semi-skilled ethnically Asian men, who are single, aged 36-45 years, working the 
day shift.
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Appendix B6. Marginal Probit Coefficients Showing The Pressures On The Probability Of Being Off Work, July 1995-Junel996, Corresponding To Table 9
Pressures Version 1-last 
month’s 
employment & 
last month’s 
unemployment
Version 2 - 
last month’s 
employment 
& this 
month’s 
unemp’
Version 3 - 
last month’s 
employment & 
next month’s 
unemp’
Version 4 - 
this month’s 
employment & 
last month’s 
unemp’
Version 5 - 
this month’s 
employment & 
this month’s 
unemp’
Version 6- this 
month’s 
employment & 
next month’s 
unemp’
Version 7- 
next month’s 
employment & 
last month’s 
unemp’
Version 8- 
next month’s 
employment & 
this month’s 
unemp’
Version 9- 
next month’s 
employment & 
next month’s 
unemp’
Afro-Caribbean -0.041 -0.034 -0.021 -0.038 -0.029 -0.023 -0.040 -0.035 -0.023
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
White or other ethnic 0.039 0.048 0.007 0.058 0.015 -0.027 0.241* 0.149 0.050
group (0.157) (0.143) (0.126) (0.160) (0.142) (0.124) (0.125) (0.116) (0.102)
Married -0.024 0.007 0.011 -0.023 0.001 0.004 -0.015 -0.008 -0.012
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.031) (0.032)
Other marital status - 0.053 0.114 0.121* 0.042 0.100 0.114 0.111 0.112 0.010
divorced, widowed or 
not stated.
(0.078) (0.069) (0.071) (0.079) (0.069) (0.069) (0.080) (0.072) (0.073)
Women -0.023 -0.021 -0.024 -0.043 -0.020 -0.020 -0.029 -0.014 -0.014
(0.044) (0.042) (0.043) (0.045) (0.042) (0.043) (0.046) (0.043) (0.044)
Trainee 0.100* 0.066 0.054 0.109* 0.073 0.060 0.038 0.036 0.035
(0.058) (0.055) (0.056) (0.058) (0.054) (0.055) (0.062) (0.058) (0.058)
Unskilled 0.070 0.053 0.039 0.071 0.055 0.043 0.035 0.036 0.028
(0.044) (0.040) (0.040) (0.044) (0.040) (0.040) (0.044) (0.041) (0.041)
High Skilled -  skilled, 0.039 0.015 0.010 0.029 0.015 0.016 0.044 0.032 0.029
line leaders, or 
engineers.
(0.074) (0.066) (0.065) (0.076) (0.066) (0.064) (0.069) (0.064) (0.063)
Aged < 26 years -0.015 0.017 0.018 -0.023 0.009 0.014 -0.002 -0.001 -0.008
(0.048) (0.046) (0.047) (0.049) (0.046) (0.046) (0.051) (0.048) (0.048)
Aged 26-35 years -0.028 -0.002 -0.004 -0.027 -0.003 -0.006 0.002 0.001 -0.009
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.039) (0.036) (0.036)
Aged 46 years and -0.069 -0.061 -0.041 -0.081 -0.060 -0.038 -0.065 -0.062 -0.038
older (0.059) (0.056) (0.056) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059)
Promoted this year 0.026 0.075* 0.069 0.032 0.051 0.063 0.084* 0.062 0.036
(0.051) (0.044) (0.044) (0.051) (0.045) (0.043) (0.051) (0.047) (0.048)
The table presents robust marginal coefficients from a probit estimation. The default category is semi-skilled ethnically.Asian men, who are single, aged 36-45 years, living 2-5 miles
from the plant, on days. Unemployment information is from the National Office of Statistics, and refers to the monthly unemployment rate for the North London travel-to-work area.
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Appendix B6. Full Results Corresponding To Table 9 - Pressures On Absenteeism (Cont.)
Pressures Version 1-last Version 2 - last Version 3 - last Version 4 - Version 5 - Version 6- this Version 7- Version 8- Version 9-
month’s month’s month’s this month’s this month’s month’s next month’s next month’s next month’s
employment & employment & employment & employment & employment & employment & employment & employment & employment &
last month’s this month’s next month’s last month’s this month’s next month’s last month’s this month’s next month’s
unemployment unemployment unemployment unemployment unemployment unemployment unemployment unemployment unemployment
Lives less than 2 0.015 0.012 0.001 0.007 0.002 -0.001 0.009 -0.016 -0.032
miles away (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.030) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032)
Lives more than 5 -0.018 -0.010 0.004 -0.021 -0.012 0.005 -0.013 -0.012 0.005
miles away (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034)
Tenure -0.017 xlO'2 -0.017 xlO"2 -0.019 xlO"2 -0.016 xlO'2 -0.018 x 10'2 -0.021 x 10’2 -0.014 xlO'2 -0.018 xlO’2 -0.023 x 10‘2
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
(0.004) x 10‘2 (0.004) x 10‘2 (0.004) x 102 (0.004) x 10'2 (0.004) x 10‘2 (0.004) x 10'2 (0.004) x 10‘2 (0.004) x 10’2 (0.004) x 10‘2
Night shifts 0.041 0.062** 0.055** 0.037 0.056** 0.054** 0.048 0.041 0.027
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
Other shifts - -0.090 -0.080 -0.058 -0.109 -0.080 -0.058 -0.067 -0.070 -0.041
afternoons, (0.138) (0.106) (0.106) (0.135) (0.112) (0.108) (0.109) (0.104) (0.113)
mornings or
rotating
Plant employment 0.055*** -0.026 -0.085** 0.091*** 0.045*** 0.020 0.132*** 0.071*** 0.064***
variable (0.007) (0.030) (0.038) (0.008) (0.006) (0.018) (0.018) (0.007) (0.006)
Unemployment rate 0.614*** -1.921 -4.024*** 1.710*** 0.539*** -0.0412 2.575*** 1 247*** 1.099***
variable (0.206) (1.002) (1.242) (0.202) (0.166) (0.581) (0.525) (0.191) (0.179)
Interaction term -0.006*** 0.003 0.009** -0.010*** -0.005*** -0.002 -0.013*** -0.008*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Total voluntary -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.007***
days off last year (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Diagnostics
N 2629 2629 2629 2654 2654 2654 2602 2602 2602
Log likelihood -933.1299 -1081.0193 1056.7855 -928.6131 -1061.3532 -1062.0945 -885.4970 -991.4804 -964.8335
Pseudo R2 48.56% 40.41% 41.75% 49.35% 42.11 42.07 50.79% 44.89% 46.38%
The table presents robust marginal coefficients from a probit estimation. The default category is as above, *** indicates significance at the 1% level of confidence, ** at the 5% level, *
at the 10% level. Unemployment information is from the National Office of Statistics, and refers to the monthly unemployment rate for the North London travel-to-work area.
221
Appendix B7. Probit Coefficients Corresponding To Table 9, Pressures On The Probability Of Being Off Work, July 1995-Junel996.
Pressures Version 1-last 
month’s 
employment & 
last month’s 
unemployment
Version 2 - 
last month’s 
employment & 
this month’s 
unemployment
Version 3 - 
last month’s 
employment & 
next month’s 
unemployment
Version 4 - 
this month’s 
employment & 
last month’s 
unemployment
Version 5 - 
this month’s 
employment & 
this month’s 
unemployment
Version 6- this 
month’s 
employment & 
next month’s 
unemployment
Version 7- 
next month’s 
employment & 
last month’s 
unemployment
Version 8- 
next month’s 
employment & 
this month’s 
unemployment
Version 9- 
next month’s 
employment & 
next month’s 
unemployment
Afro-Caribbean -0.103 -0.085 -0.052 -0.094 -0.072 -0.058 -0.100 -0.089 -0.057
(0.083) (0.080) (0.080) (0.084) (0.080) (0.081) (0.086) (0.083) (0.084)
White or other ethnic 0.099 0.120 0.016 0.146 0.037 -0.068 0.624* 0.385 0.125
group (0.400) (0.363) (0.316) (0.408) (0.357) (0.310) (0.356) (0.318) (0.262)
Married -0.061 0.016 0.028 -0.058 0.002 0.011 -0.037 -0.019 -0.031
(0.078) (0.075) (0.076) (0.079) (0.075) (0.075) (0.083) (0.079) (0.080)
Other marital status - 0.133 0.291 0.304* 0.104 0.257 0.292 0.278 0.287 0.255
divorced, widowed or 
not stated.
(0.199) (0.180) (0.183) (0.200) (0.182) (0.181) (0.203) (0.189) (0.191)
Women -0.057 -0.052 -0.060 -0.107 -0.051 -0.049 -0.072 -0.035 -0.034
(0.111) (0.106) (0.109) (0.112) (0.106) (0.108) (0.117) (0.108) (0.112)
Trainee 0.256* 0.167 0.137 0.277* 0.185 0.150 0.095 0.091 0.089
(0.150) (0.138) (0.140) (0.150) (0.140) (0.140) (0.155) (0.145) (0.147)
Unskilled 0.175 0.134 0.098 0.179 0.138 0.108 0.088 0.090 0.070
(0.110) (0.100) (0.101) (0.110) (0.100) (0.101) (0.111) (0.102) (0.104)
High Skilled -  skilled, 0.097 0.038 0.025 0.073 0.038 0.040 0.111 0.080 0.073
line leaders, or 
engineers.
(0.188) (0.165) (0.163) (0.192) (0.165) (0.160) (0.174) (0.161) (0.159)
Aged < 26 years -0.038 0.042 0.044 -0.058 0.023 0.034 -0.004 -0.003 -0.021
(0.120) (0.116) (0.118) (0.123) (0.115) (0.116) (0.130) (0.122) (0.121)
Aged 26-35 years -0.069 -0.006 -0.009 -0.067 -0.008 -0.015 0.004 0.002 -0.022
(0.091) (0.088) (0.089) (0.093) (0.087) (0.088) (0.098) (0.091) (0.091)
Aged 46 years and -0.172 -0.153 -0.102 -0.203 -0.150 -0.096 -0.165 -0.156 -0.095
older (0.150) (0.142) (0.143) (0.147) (0.142) (0.144) (0.153) (0.147) (0.148)
Promoted this year 0.065 0.188* 0.174 0.081 0.129 0.158 0.212* 0.155 0.090
(0.128) (0.111) (0.110) (0.129) (0.113) (0.110) (0.127) (0.120) (0.121)
The table presents robust ordinary coefficients from a probit estimation. The default category is semi-skilled ethnically Asian men, who are single, aged 36-45 years, living 2-5 miles
from the plant, and are working days. Unemployment information is from the National Office of Statistics, and refers to the monthly unemployment rate for the North London travel-to-
work area.
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Appendix B7. Probit Coefficient.s From Estimates Of Pressures On Absenteeism, Cont.
Pressures Version 1-last Version 2 - Version 3 - Version 4 - Version 5 - Version 6- this Version 7- Version 8- Version 9-
month’s last month’s last month’s this month’s this month’s month’s next month’s next month’s next month’s
employment & 
last month’s
employment & 
this month’s
employment & 
next month’s
employment & 
last month’s
employment & 
this month’s
employment & 
next month’s
employment & 
last month’s
employment & 
this month’s
employment & 
next month’s
unemployment unemployment unemployment unemployment unemployment unemployment unemployment unemployment unemployment
Lives less than 2 0.037 0.030 0.003 0.019 0.006 -0.003 0.023 -0.039 -0.080
miles away (0.081) (0.076) (0.077) (0.082) (0.077) (0.076) (0.085) (0.080) (0.080)
Lives more than 5 -0.045 -0.025 0.010 -0.052 -0.029 0.013 -0.033 -0.029 0.013
miles away (0.087) (0.082) (0.084) (0.087) (0.082) (0.083) (0.088) (0.084) (0.085)
Tenure -0.043 xlO'2 -0.042 xlO'2 -0.047 xlO'2 -0.039 xlO'2 -0.046 x 10'2 -0.052 x 10'2 -0.035 xl0‘2 -0.046 xlO'2 -0.058 x 10'2
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
(0.010) X 10'2 (0.009) x 10‘2 (0.009) x 102 (0.010) X 10‘2 (0.009) x 10‘2 (0.009) x 10'2 (0.010) X 10'2 (0.010) X 10'2 (0.010) X 10‘2
Night shifts 0.103 0.155** 0.140** 0.092 0.141** 0.136** 0.120 0.102 0.068
(0.071) (0.068) (0.069) (0.072) (0.068) (0.069) (0.074) (0.071) (0.072)
Other shifts - -0.226 -0.201 -0.150 -0.276 -0.200 -0.145 -0.171 -0.176 -0.102
afternoons, mornings (0.350) (0.269) (0.272) (0.349) (0.284) (0.272) (0.283) (0.264) (0.282)
or rotating
Plant employment 0.138*** -0.066 -0.215** 0.229*** 0.114*** 0.049 0.332*** 0.178*** 0.162***
variable (0.018) (0.076) (0.095) (0.019) (0.015) (0.046) (0.045) (0.018) (0.016)
Unemployment rate 1.542*** -4.817 -10.124*** 4.289*** 1.354*** -1.033 6.492*** 3.130*** 2.764***
variable (0.517) (2.511) (3.158) (0.507) (0.416) (1.458) (1.316) (0.479) (0.449)
Interaction term -0.016*** 0.007 0.023** -0.025*** -0.013*** -0.005 -0.033*** -0.020*** -0.019***
(0.002) (0.008) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Total voluntary days -0.019*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.018***
off last year (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Diagnostics
N 2629 2629 2629 2654 2654 2654 2602 2602 2602
Log likelihood -933.1299 -1081.0193 1056.7855 -928.6131 -1061.3532 -1062.0945 -885.4970 -991.4804 -964.8335
Pseudo R2 48.56% 40.41% 41.75% 49.35% 42.11 42.07 50.79% 44.89% 46.38%
Constant -8.920 47.043 94.781 -37.856 -9.142 11.126 -65.017 -25.740 -20.388
The table presents robust ordinary coefficients from a probit estimation. The default category is semi-skilled ethnically Asian men, who are single, aged 36-45 years, living 2-5 miles 
from the plant, and are working days. *** indicates significance at the 1% level of confidence, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. Unemployment information is from the National 
Office of Statistics, and refers to the monthly unemployment rate for the North London travel-to-work area.
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Appendix B8. Sample Means For The Subset Of Employees Returning Satisfaction 
Questionnaires
Variable Variable
Gender 76.9% male Wage rate May 1994 
- trainee
£3.00 per hour
Distance from home 
to work (miles)
4.85 (3.56) Wage rate May 1994 
-  unskilled
£3.34
Marital status - single 32.3% Wage rate May 1994 
-  semi-skilled
£4.22
Marital status -  
married
42.4% Wage rate May 1994 
-  skilled
£4.67
Marital status -  other 
(divorced, separated, 
widowed)
25.3% Wage rate May 1994 
-  team leader
£5.11
Ethnic status -  afro- 
Caribbean
28.8% Wage rate May 1994 
-  engineer
£6.56
Ethnic status -  Asian 71.2% Wage rate May 1995 
-  trainee
£3.16 per hour
Ethnic status -  white 
& other
0 Wage rate May 1995 
-  unskilled
£3.52
Tenure (days) 1047 (793) Wage rate May 1995 
-  semi-skilled
£4.32
Age (years) 36.5 (9.7) Wage rate May 1995- 
skilled
£4.78
Promoted 1/7/95- 
30/6/96
7.4% Wage rate May 1995 
-  team leader
£5.23
Grade -  trainee 7.9% Wage rate May 1995 
-  engineer
£6.72
Grade -  unskilled 59.0% Wage rate May 1996 
- trainee
£3.19 per hour
Grade -  semi-skilled 21.4% Wage rate May 1996 
-  unskilled
£3.75
Grade -  high (skilled, 
team leaders, 
engineers)
11.8% Wage rate May 1996 
-  semi-skilled
£4.45
Night shifts 59.3% Wage rate May 1996 
-  skilled
£4.92
Day shifts 39.8% Wage rate May 1996 
-  team leader
£5.39
Other shifts 1% Wage rate May 1996 
-  engineer
£6.92
Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
The table shows that the respondents to the satisfaction questionnaire were older; more 
likely to be of Asian descent; to be female; to be divorced, separated or widowed; and 
had longer tenure than the population of all staff.
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Appendix B9. Correlations Between Satisfaction And Absenteeism Variables
Facet of 
satisfaction
Probability
of
voluntary
absence
Number
of
voluntary
spells
Total 
number 
of days 
off
Probability 
of any 
attitudinal 
absences
Number
of
attitudinal
absences
Number
of
voluntary 
spells last 
year
Total 
number 
of days 
off last 
year
Job content
I feel like I 
could stay in 
the job 
forever.
-0.015 -0.428***
0.375***
-0.040 -0.341*** -0.457***
0.241***
I find the job 
challenging.
0.081 0.080 0.231*** -0.027 -0.104 -0.106 0.098
I am
interested in 
this type of 
business.
-0.073 -0.394***
0.185***
-0.109 -0.441*** -0.387*** -0.114
My
promotion 
prospects are 
good.
0.135* -0.185*** 0.001 0.048 -0.237*** -0.448*** -0.170**
When I get 
home from 
this job I am 
tired.
0.157** 0.196*** 0.070 0.131* 0.306*** -0.048
0.278***
Job context
I get along 
well with my 
supervisor.
-0.095 -0.294*** -0.016 -0.145** -0.428*** -0.267*** -0.056
Getting to 
work is not a 
problem.
0.048 -0.313***
0.326***
0.073 -0.211*** -0.365*** -0.170**
The hours 
suit me.
0.028 0.219*** -0.019 0.103 0.336*** 0.081 0.095
I get on well 
with the 
other 
workers.
-0.130* 0.176** 0.176** -0.109 0.148** 0.298*** 0.128*
This
company is a 
good
employer.
0.050 -0.391***
0.390***
0.006 -0.352*** -0.496***
0.198***
Job content 
and context 
variables
The pay is 
good.
0.022 -0.150*** 0.036 -0.042 -0.210*** -0.229*** 0.085
All in all, I 
am satisfied 
with the job.
0.089 -0.090 -0.065 0.042 -0.125* -0.250*** -0.141**
Respondents are asked to show their agreement with these statements on a scale of 1, for agree strongly, 
to 5, for disagree strongly. The time period for all absence variables is 1st July 1995 until 30th June 1996. 
Satisfaction questionnaires were returned during Autumn 1996. *** indicates significance at the 1% level 
of confidence, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. This table corresponds to table 11, discussed in the 
text.
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Appendix BlOa. Difference In Difference Equation For March To May 1995
March -  May 
1995
Trainees Unskilled Semi-skilled High skilled
Time dummy -0.067***
(0.012)
0.000
(0.016)
-0.070***
(0.015)
-0.069***
(0.015)
Grade -0.077***
(0.011)
0.086***
(0.016)
-0.077***
(0.015)
-0.065***
(0.016)
Interaction 0.567
(0.355)
-0.087***
(0.023)
0.060***
(0.017)
0.049***
(0.018)
Constant 0.077***
(0.011)
0.015**
(0.006)
0.086***
(0.013)
0.085***
(0.013)
No of obs 466 466 466 466
Rl 9.71% 8.30% 6.35% 6.00%
These tables dif: er from tables 13a-13d (chapter 3) in that they use al absence data, wh
tables 13a-13d use simply voluntary absences. *** indicates significance at the 1% level of 
confidence, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level.
Appendix BlOb. Difference In Difference Equation For April To June 1995
April -  June 
1995
Trainees Unskilled Semi-skilled High skilled
Time dummy -0.051***
(0.017)
-0.040
(0.025)
-0.059***
(0.019)
-0.057***
(0.019)
Grade 0.252
(0.274)
0.049*
(0.030)
-0.062*
(0.034)
-0.049
(0.033)
Interaction -0.283
(0.273)
-0.020
(0.032)
0.039
(0.037)
0.024
(0.035)
Constant 0.082***
(0.014)
0.049**
(0.024)
0.092***
(0.016)
0.092***
(0.016)
No of obs 522 522 522 522
Rz 2.91% 2.83% 2.59% 2.43%
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Appendix BlOc. Difference In Difference Equation For October To December 1995
October -  
December 
1995
Trainees Unskilled Semi-skilled High skilled
Time dummy -0.004
(0.013)
-0.017
(0.015)
-0.002
(0.016)
-0.005
(0.016)
Grade 0.145
(0.103)
0.037**
(0.019)
-0.037**
(0.017)
-0.043***
(0.014)
Interaction -0.041
(0.121)
0.020
(0.026)
-0.024
(0.021)
-0.004
(0.021)
Constant 0.052***
(0.009)
0.036***
(0.013)
0.063***
(0.011)
0.063***
(0.011)
No of obs 538 538 538 538
R2 2.43% 2.18% 1.28% 0.96%
Appendix BlOd. Difference In Difference Equation For April To June 1996
April -  June 
1996
Trainees Unskilled Semi-skilled High skilled
Time dummy -0.011
(0.010)
-0.010
(0.015)
-0.002
(0.011)
-0.003
(0.011)
Grade -0.024***
(0.007)
0.005
(0.014)
0.003
(0.022)
0.004
(0.026)
Interaction 0.047
(0.037)
0.007
(0.020)
-0.022
(0.023)
-0.022
(0.027)
Constant 0.024***
(0.007)
0.019
(0.012)
0.021***
(0.007)
0.021***
(0.006)
No of obs 562 562 562 562
R2 0.44% 0.22% 0.27% 0.23%
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Appendix B ll. Correlations Between Measures Of Absenteeism And Labour
Turnover
Absenteeism 
variable 
July 1995- 
Junel996
Labour
turnover
(1/7/95-
30/6/96)
Voluntary
labour
turnover
1/7/95-
30/6/96)
Absenteeism 
variable 
July1994- 
Junel995
Labour
turnover
(1/7/95-
30/6/96)
Voluntary
labour
turnover
1/7/95-
30/6/96)
Any time off -0.018 -0.106*** Voluntary 
time off
-0.121*** -0.032
Voluntary 
time off
0.004 -0.082*** Attitudinal
absences
0.031* 0.016
Attitudinal
absences
-0.092*** -0.099*** Number of
attitudinal
absences
0.115*** 0.131***
Voluntary 
total days off
0.452*** 0.122*** Voluntary
spells
0.084*** 0.088***
Voluntary
spells
0.362*** 0.059*** Voluntary 
total days off
0.015 0.015
Number of
attitudinal
absences
0.241*** 0.000
*** indicates significance at the 1% level of confidence, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. 
Voluntary labour turnover defined as termination not due to misconduct, sackings, end of 
temporary or seasonal contracts, redundancy, retirement, bad time keeping, ill health or a 
transfer to staff.
228
Appendix B12. Probit Coefficients From Estimates Of The Probability Of Leaving
July 1995 -  June 1996, Corresponding To Table 15
Model Turnover Voluntary turnover Voluntary turnover
(1) (2)
rariable Coefficient (sd) Coefficient (sd) Coefficient (sd)
dro-Caribbean -0.095 -0.274*** -0.315***
(0.064) (0.069) (0.070)
yhite or other ethnic group 0.449* -1.042*** -1.461***
(0.235) (0.304) (0.377)
larried 0.225*** 0.368*** 0.377***
(0.063) (0.070) (0.070)
)ther marital status -  divorced, 0.043 Dropped Dropped
fidowed or not stated. (0.146)
^omen 0.035 0.051 0.085
(0.096) (0.104) (0.106)
rainee 0.439*** 0.229* 0.251*
(0.111) (0.128) (0.129)
Jnskilled 0.597*** 0.254** 0.201**
(0.087) (0.098) (0.098)
ligh Skilled -  skilled, line 0.270* -0.679*** -0.649***
waders, or engineers. (0.155) (0.226) (0.225)
tged < 26 years -0.152 0.081 0.052
(0.095) (0.112) (0.112)
tged 26-35 years 0.003 x 101 0.279*** 0.288***
(0.751) x 10'1 (0.091) (0.091)
Lged 46 years and older 0.111 0.117 0.186
(0.138) (0.161) (0.163)
'romoted this year -0.887*** -0.803*** -0.689***
(0.080) (0.106) (0.107)
,ives less than 2 miles away -0.019 -0.281*** -0.288***
(0.064) (0.072) (0.073)
,ives more than 5 miles away 0.041 0.115 0.113
(0.068) (0.075) (0.075)
'enure -0.152 x 10-2*** 0.128 x 10'2*** -0.132 xlO'2***
(0.012) x 10"2 (0.015) x 10'2 (0.015) x 10'2
fight shifts -0.100* -0.287*** -0.361***
(0.055) (0.063) (0.066)
)ther shifts -  afternoons, -0.191 0.004 0.013
lornings or rotating (0.235) (0.237) (0.231)
(Jext month’s plant employment N/a -0.028 -0.014
(0.023) (0.024)
Last month’s local unemployment N/a -0.058 0.329l . |ate (0.685) (0.695)
nteraction term N/a 0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Lagged voluntary total days off N/a N/a 0.014***
[ (0.003)
{To of obs 2788 2485 2485
Log likelihood -1572.3404 -1185.0843 -1173.0877
rseudo R2 18.61% 16.28% 17.13%
Constant 0.525 0.212 -3.512
absences, voluntary and involuntary. Column 2 uses voluntary absences and adds in external 
and internal pressures. Column 3 adds lagged total days off as an explanatory variable.
The default category is semi-skilled ethnically Asian men, who are single, aged 36-45 years, living 2-5 
miles from the plant, and working days. *** indicates significance at the 1% level of confidence, ** at the 
5% level, * at the 10% level.
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Appendix B13. Marginal Coefficients Results Corresponding To Table 15- Pressures On Voluntary Labour Turnover
Pressures Model 1-last 
month’s 
employment & 
last month’s 
unemp’
Model 2 - last 
month’s 
employment & 
this month’s 
unemp’
Model 3 - last 
month’s 
employment & 
next month’s 
unemp’
Model 4 - this 
month’s 
employment & 
last month’s 
unemp’
Model 5 - this 
month’s 
employment & 
this month’s 
unemp’
Model 6- this 
month’s 
employment & 
next month’s 
unemp’
Model 7- next 
month’s 
employment & 
last month’s 
unemp’
Model 8- next 
month’s 
employment & 
this month’s 
unemp’
Model 9- next 
month’s 
employment & 
next month’s 
unemp’
Afro-Caribbean -0.041
(0.033)
-0.034
(0.032)
-0.021
(0.032)
-0.038
(0.033)
-0.084***
(0.021)
-0.023
(0.032)
-0.040
(0.034)
-0.035
(0.033)
-0.023
(0.033)
White or other ethnic 
group
0.03943
(0.157)
0.048
(0.143)
0.007
(0.126)
0.058
(0.160)
-0.175***
(0.021)
-0.027
(0.124)
0.241*
(0.125)
0.149
(0.116)
0.050
(0.102)
Married -0.0243
(0.031)
0.007
(0.030)
0.011
(0.030)
-0.023
(0.031)
0.098***
(0.019)
0.004
(0.030)
-0.015
(0.033)
-0.008
(0.031)
-0.012
(0.032)
Other marital status 
-  divorced, widowed 
or not stated.
0.0535
(0.078)
0.114
(0.069)
0.121*
(0.071)
0.042
(0.079)
Dropped 0.114
(0.069)
0.111
(0.080)
0.112
(0.072)
0.010
(0.073)
Women -0.023
(0.044)
-0.021
(0.042)
-0.024
(0.043)
-0.043
(0.045)
0.006
(0.029)
-0.020
(0.043)
-0.029
(0.046)
-0.014
(0.043)
-0.014
(0.044)
Trainee 0.100*
(0.058)
0.066
(0.055)
0.054
(0.056)
0.109*
(0.058)
0.079**
(0.042)
0.060
(0.055)
0.038
(0.062)
0.036
(0.058)
0.035
(0.058)
Unskilled 0.070
(0.044)
0.053
(0.040)
0.039
(0.040)
0.071
(0.044)
0.071***
(0.025)
0.043
(0.040)
0.035
(0.044)
0.036
(0.041)
0.028
(0.041)
High Skilled -  
skilled, line leaders, 
or engineers.
0.039
(0.074)
0.015
(0.066)
0.010
(0.065)
0.029
(0.076)
-0.136***
(0.033)
0.016
(0.064)
0.044
(0.069)
0.032
(0.064)
0.029
(0.063)
Aged < 26 years -0.015
(0.048)
0.017
(0.046)
0.018
(0.047)
-0.023
(0.049)
0.021
(0.032)
0.014
(0.046)
-0.002
(0.051)
-0.001
(0.048)
-0.008
(0.048)
Aged 26-35 years -0.028
(0.036)
-0.002
(0.035)
-0.004
(0.035)
-0.027
(0.037)
0.075***
(0.025)
-0.006
(0.035)
0.002
(0.039)
-0.001
(0.036)
-0.009
(0.036)
Aged 46 years and 
older
-0.069
(0.059)
-0.061
(0.056)
-0.041
(0.056)
-0.081
(0.058)
0.035
(0.049)
-0.038
(0.057)
-0.065
(0.059)
-0.062
(0.058)
-0.038
(0.059)
Promoted this year 0.026
(0.051)
0.075*
(0.044)
0.069
(0.044)
0.032
(0.051)
-0.162***
(0.017)
0.063
(0.043)
0.084*
(0.051)
0.062
(0.047)
0.036
(0.048)
Unemployment information is from the National Office of Statistics, and refers to the monthly unemployment rate for the North London travel-to-work area. This table presents 
marginal coefficients from a robust probit regression. *** indicates significance at the 1% level of confidence, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. This table attempts to find the 
best combination of external and internal pressures to explain voluntary labour turnover, similarly to appendix B6.
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Appendix B13. Marginal Coefficients Corresponding To Table 15 - Pressures On Voluntary Labour Turnover (Cont.)
Pressures Model 1-last Model 2 - last Model 3 - last Model 4 - this Model 5 - this Model 6- this Model 7- next Model 8- next Model 9- next
month’s month’s month’s month’s month’s month’s month’s month’s month’s
employment & employment & employment & employment & employment & employment & employment & employment & employment &
last month’s this month’s next month’s last month’s this month’s next month’s last month’s this month’s next month’s
unemployment unemployment unemployment unemployment unemployment unemployment unemployment unemployment unemployment
Lives less than 2 0.015 0.012 0.001 0.007 -0.075*** -0.001 0.009 -0.016 -0.032
miles away (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.033) (0.018) (0.030) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032)
Lives more than 5 -0.018 -0.010 0.004 -0.021 0.028 0.005 -0.013 -0.012 0.005
miles away (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.022) (0.033) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034)
Tenure -0.017 xlO'2 -0.017 xlO'2 -0.019 xlO'2 -0.016 xlO'2 -0.035 x 10‘2 -0.021 x 10’2 -0.014 xlO'2 -0.018 xlO'2 -0.023 x 10‘2
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
(0.004) x 10‘2 (0.004) x 10'2 (0.004) x 10'2 (0.004) x 10'2 (0.004) x 10'2 (0.004) x 10'2 (0.004) x 10'2 (0.004) x 10 2 (0.004) x 10’2
Night shifts 0.041 0.062** 0.055** 0.037 -0.084*** 0.054** 0.0476 0.041 0.027
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.018) (0.027) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
Other shifts - -0.090 -0.080 -0.058 -0.109 0.006 -0.058 -0.067 -0.070 -0.041
afternoons, (0.138) (0.106) (0.106) (0.135) (0.065) (0.108) (0.109) (0.104) (0.113)
mornings or
rotating
Plant employment 0.055*** -0.026 -0.085** 0.091*** -0.006 0.020 0.132*** 0.071*** 0.064***
variable (0.007) (0.030) (0.038) (0.008) (0.005) (0.018) (0.018) (0.007) (0.006)
Unemployment 0.614*** -1.921 -4.024*** 1.710*** 0.063 -0.0412 2.575*** 1.247*** 1.099***
rate variable (0.206) (1.002) (1.242) (0.202) (0.151) (0.581) (0.525) (0.191) (0.179)
Interaction term -0.006*** 0.003 0.009** -0.010*** 0.008 x 10-1 -0.002 -0.013*** -0.008*** -0.007***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) x 10-1 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Diagnostics
N 2629 2629 2629 2654 2536 2654 2602 2602 2602
Log likelihood -933.1299 -1081.0193 1056.7855 -928.6131 -1177.4838 -1062.0945 -885.4970 -991.4804 -964.8335
Pseudo R2 48.56% 40.41% 41.75% 49.35% 17.68 42.07 50.79% 44.89% 46.38%
This table presents marginal coefficients from a robust probit regression. Unemployment information is from the National Office of Statistics, and refers to the monthly unemployment 
rate for the North London travel-to-work area.
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Appendix B14. Probit And Marginal Coefficients From Estimates Of The
Probability Of Leaving July 1995 -  June 1996, Using Lagged Spells Of Absence
Model Probit coefficients Marginal coefficients
Variable Coefficient (sd) Coefficient (sd)
dro-Caribbean -0.353*** -0.104***
(0.071) (0.022)
Vhite or other ethnic group -1.204*** -0.188***
(0.326) (0.020)
Carried 0.366*** 0.105***
(0.070) (0.020)
)ther marital status -  divorced, Dropped Dropped
/idowed or not stated.
Vomen 0.086 0.025
(0.106) (0.032)
’rainee 0.286** 0.089**
(0.130) (0.043)
Jnskilled 0.222** 0.061**
(0.098) (0.026)
^igh Skilled -  skilled, line leaders, or -0.643*** -0.140***
ingineers. (0.225) (0.034)
^ged < 26 years 0.028 0.008
(0.113) (0.033)
.^ged 26-35 years 0.276*** 0.077***
(0.091) (0.025)
.^ged 46 years and older 0.167 0.050
(0.162) (0.052)
'romoted this year -0.680*** -0.157***
(0.108) (0.019)
dves less than 2 miles away -0.293*** -0.080***
(0.073) (0.019)
dves more than 5 miles away 0.121 0.035
(0.075) (0.022)
"enure -0.013 xlO'1*** -0.038 xlO'2***
(0.002) x 101 (0.004) x 10'2
light shifts -0.334*** -0.096***
(0.065) (0.019)
)ther shifts -  afternoons, mornings or 0.049 0.014
otating (0.0230 (0.068)
Jext month’s plant employment -0.011 -0.003
(0.024) (0.007)
,ast month s local unemployment rate 0.408 0.116
(0.699) (0.199)
nteraction term 0.001 0.003 x 10'1
(0.002) (0.007) x 10’1
Ipells off last year 0.037*** 0.011***
(0.008) (0.002)
Jo of obs 2485 2485
,og likelihood -1174.5671 -1174.5671
'seudo Rz 17.02% 17.02%
Predicted probability 0.205
Constant -4.301
The table presents robust marginal coefficients from a probit estimation. *** indicates significance at the 
1% level of confidence, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. The default category is semi-skilled 
ethnically Asian men, who are single, aged 36-45 years, working days.
All information refers to voluntary turnover and absenteeism.
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Appendix C -  Appendices For Chapter 4
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Appendix Cl. Probit Regressions Of The Influences On The Introduction Of
Workplace Change
Independent
variables
Whole
Sample
1979-1983 1987-91 1991-95 1996-2000
Up to 25 
employees
-0.036
(0.033)
-0.140**
(0.063)
-0.076
(0.067)
-0.013
(0.068)
0.164*
(0.090)
26-50
employees
-0.043
(0.033)
-0.055
(0.061)
-0.120*
(0.067)
-0.092
(0.074)
0.053
(0.095)
51-100
employees
-0.017
(0.031)
-0.048
(0.058)
0.002
(0.062)
0.055
(0.068)
0.014
(0.091)
201-500
employees
0.044
(0.031)
0.078
(0.058)
0.060
(0.063)
-0.039
(0.072)
-0.146
(0.097)
More than 500 
employees
0.073**
(0.033)
0.050
(0.065)
0.167**
(0.064)
-0.029
(0.073)
-0.031
(0.095)
Scotland -0.001
(0.037)
0.030
(0.073)
-0.019
(0.076)
0.168**
(0.080)
0.003
(0.106)
North East 0.095**
(0.044)
0.022
(0.085)
0.158*
(0.084)
0.093
(0.092)
0.068
(0.133)
Yorkshire -0.159***
(0.042)
-0.164**
(0.074)
-0.225***
(0.086)
-0.167*
(0.094)
-0.032
(0.119)
East Midlands -0.215***
(0.045)
-0.164**
(0.082)
-0.346***
(0.098)
-0.176*
(0.103)
-0.116
(0.124)
East Anglia -0.219***
(0.059)
-0.292**
(0.125)
-0.427***
(0.121)
-0.198
(0.122)
-0.056
(0.150)
South East -0.105***
(0.034)
-0.084
(0.062)
-0.181***
(0.067)
-0.108
(0.075)
-0.275**
(0.110)
South West -0.141***
(0.044)
-0.224***
(0.085)
-0.189**
(0.085)
-0.051
(0.094)
-0.172
(0.131)
West Midlands 0.005
(0.038)
0.004
(0.070)
-0.045
(0.078)
0.031
(0.085)
0.075
(0.103)
Wales 0.015
(0.046)
0.035
(0.087)
0.023
(0.093)
0.015
(0.101)
-0.007
(0.139)
Food, drink & 
tobacco
0.101*
(0.054)
0.117
(0.096)
-0.041
(0.113)
0.211
(0.137)
-0.054
(0.149)
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Appendix Cl. Probit Regressions Of The Influences On The Introduction Of
Workplace Change, continued
Chemicals -0.000
(0.051)
-0.041
(0.094)
-0.098
(0.105)
0.305**
(0.124)
-0.234*
(0.136)
Metals 0.073
(0.058)
-0.017
(0.105)
-0.050
(0.122)
0.284**
(0.139)
-0.114
(0.150)
Mechanical
engineering
0.090*
(0.048)
0.077
(0.087)
0.039
(0.100)
0.142
(0.122)
-0.130
(0.126)
Instrument
engineering
0.021
(0.053)
0.041
(0.094)
-0.063
(0.109)
-0.020
(0.135)
-0.111
(0.144)
Textiles -0.126**
(0.061)
-0.386***
(0.112)
-0.198
(0.124)
0.163
(0.146)
-0.145
(0.160)
Paper & 
publishing
0.322***
(0.057)
0.336***
(0.099)
0.332***
(0.118)
0.276*
(0.144)
-0.007
(0.162)
Construction -0.568**
(0.226)
N/a -0.153
(0.395)
0.336**
(0.143)
-0.085
(0.342)
Transport & 
Communications
0.023
(0.074)
N/a 0.110
(0.143)
0.109
(0.155)
Distributive
Trades
-0.256***
(0.073)
N/a -0.501***
(0.133)
0.104
(0.147)
0.080
(0.155)
Insurance -0.636***
(0.099)
N/a -0.721***
(0.158)
-0.301
(0.186)
-0.559**
(0.243)
Prof. Services -0.372***
(0.067)
N/a -0.428***
(0.139)
0.107
(0.133)
-0.586***
(0.165)
Leisure Services -0.373**
(0.166)
N/a -0 914*** 
(0.329)
0.234
(0.251)
0.016
(0.313)
Misc. Services -0.387**
(0.191)
N/a -0.435
(0.299)
0.169
(0.260)
-0.287
(0.445)
Manuals 0.140***
(0.025)
-0.028
(0.053)
0.360***
(0.052)
0.090
(0.056)
0.107
(0.071)
Non-manuals -0.178***
(0.026)
-0.315***
(0.056)
-0.067
(0.055)
-0.244***
(0.058)
-0.135*
(0.075)
Unionised 0.370***
(0.020)
0.412***
(0.058)
0.117***
(0.038)
0.279***
(0.042)
0.597***
(0.058)
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Appendix Cl. Probit Regressions Of The Influences On The Introduction Of
Workplace Change, continued
Workplace 
change last year
0.722***
(0.024)
0.564***
(0.047)
0.714***
(0.045)
0.667***
(0.054)
0.561***
(0.081)
Emp’ drop over 
last year (10% 
or more)
0.005
(0.024)
-0.109**
(0.053)
-0.010
(0.046)
0.082*
(0.049)
-0.043
(0.100)
Last time firm is 
in data set
-0.032
(0.035)
-0.099
(0.067)
-0.005
(0.076)
-0.023
(0.077)
-0.0126
(0.219)
Interaction of 
the above
0.020
(0.075)
-0.009
(0.166)
-0.052
(0.141)
-0.044
(0.0157)
0.218***
(0.063)
No. of Obs. 30041 6390 6924 8317 6474
Pseudo R 11.05% 6.44% 12.55 9.29 11.76
Log likelihood -11103.761 -3242.4812 -2809.5932 -2264.5499 -1253.8865
♦indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level.
+ represents construction and transport and distribution. The default categories are 101 to 200 
employees; brick industry ; mixed settlement groups; the North West.
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Appendix C2. Probit Estimates Of Influences On The Introduction Of The
Separate Constituents Of Workplace Change
Independent vari­
ables
Flexible
working
practices
1985-2000
Shift working 
1979-2000
End of restric­
tive practices 
1979-2000
New
technology
1979-2000
Other pro­
ductivity 
agreements 
1979-97
Up to 25 employees 0.101**
(0.050)
-0.155**
(0.067)
-0.160***
(0.050)
-0.013
(0.045)
-0.104**
(0.042)
26 - 50 employees 0.059
(0.052)
-0.103
(0.065)
-0.130**
(0.050)
-0.105**
(0.047)
-0.046
(0.041)
51-100 employees 0.103**
(0.048)
-0.011
(0.059)
-0.047
(0.045)
-0.051
(0.044)
0.011
(0.038)
201-500 employees 0.135***
(0.049)
0.054
(0.057)
0.060
(0.044)
0.056
(0.043)
0.067*
(0.039)
More than 500 
employees
0.140***
(0.051)
0.022
(0.063)
0.166***
(0.046)
0.097**
(0.046)
0.126***
(0.041)
Scotland -0.065
(0.056)
0.041
(0.069)
0.106**
(0.053)
0.132**
(0.052)
-0.086*
(0.046)
North East 0.038
(0.065)
0.030
(0.083)
0.098
(0.063)
0.133**
(0.060)
0.028
(0.053)
Yorkshire -0.124**
(0.063)
-0.068
(0.078)
-0.157**
(0.062)
-0.099*
(0.060)
-0.213***
(0.052)
East Midlands -0.176**
(0.069)
-0.325***
(0.098)
-0.167**
(0.068)
-0.054
(0.063)
-0.248***
(0.057)
East Anglia -0.180**
(0.083)
-0.310**
(0.130)
-0.140
(0.090)
-0.110
(0.086)
-0.409***
(0.081)
South East -0.115**
(0.052)
-0.120*
(0.065)
-0.037
(0.049)
-0.087*
(0.049)
-0.111***
(0.040)
South West -0.203***
(0.068)
-0.085
(0.082)
-0.108*
(0.065)
-0.051
(0.062)
-0.173***
(0.054)
West Midlands -0.042
(0.057)
-0.018
(0.071)
0.084
(0.054)
0.074
(0.052)
0.006
(0.045)
Wales -0.071
(0.073)
0.094
(0.083)
0.076
(0.066)
0.175***
(0.062)
-0.045
(0.056)
Food, drink & to­
bacco
0.051
(0.086)
0.158
(0.104)
-0.022
(0.076)
0.037
(0.073)
0.046
(0.068)
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Appendix C2. Probit Estimates Of Influences On The Introduction Of The
Separate Constituents Of Workplace Change, continued
Chemicals -0.053
(0.080)
0.074
(0.100)
-0.089
(0.072)
0.004
(0.070)
-0.009
(0.064)
Metals 0.101
(0.090)
0.018
(0.114)
0.081
(0.079)
-0.018
(0.079)
0.123*
(0.071)
Mechanical
engineering
0.020
(0.076)
0.123
(0.095)
0.005
(0.067)
0.010
(0.066)
0.098
(0.060)
Instrument
engineering
-0.028
(0.084)
0.034
(0.104)
-0.097
(0.076)
-0.085
(0.073)
0.094
(0.065)
Textiles 0.155*
(0.089)
0.017
(0.117)
-0.383***
(0.095)
-0.164*
(0.084)
-0.195**
(0.078)
Paper & publishing 0.264***
(0.089)
0.086
(0.114)
0.330***
(0.077)
0.213***
(0.076)
0.326***
(0.069)
Construction -0.388
(0.289)
-0.165
(0.368)
-0.544
(0.374)
-0.387
(0.287)
-0.683*
(0.377)
Transport & 
Communications
0.321***
(0.096)
0.002
(0.148)
-0.158
(0.112)
-0.396***
(0.123)
-0.316***
(0.114)
Distributive Trades -0.038
(0.098)
-0.210
(0.159)
-0.458***
(0.121)
-0.373***
(0.111)
-0.574***
(0.116)
Insurance -0.480***
(0.139)
-0.718**
(0.317)
-0.795***
(0.188)
-0.743***
(0.165)
-0.812***
(0.154)
Prof. Services -0.184**
(0.094)
-0.540***
(0.183)
-0.301***
(0.103)
-0.518***
(0.102)
-0.365***
(0.093)
Leisure Services -0.053
(0.191)
N/a -0.736*
(0.383)
-0.813**
(0.361)
-0.563**
(0.246)
Misc. Services -0.085
(0.215)
N/a -0.319
(0.305)
0.070
(0.199)
-0.182
(0.243)
Leisure & Misc 
combined
N/a -0.429
(0.352)
N/a N/a N/a
Non-manuals -0.131***
(0.042)
-0.288***
(0.054)
-0.204***
(0.042)
-0.084**
(0.036)
-0.222***
(0.034)
Manuals 0.200***
(0.038)
0.040
(0.046)
0.244***
(0.036)
-0.042
(0.035)
0.083***
(0.031)
Unionised 0.236***
(0.029)
0.133***
(0.039)
0.384***
(0.030)
0.297***
(0.028)
0.410***
(0.026)
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Appendix C2. Probit Estimates Of Influences On The Introduction Of The
Separate Constituents Of Workplace Change, continued
Workplace Change 
Last Year
0.519***
(0.036)
0.416***
(0.042)
0.516***
(0.032)
0.655***
(0.031)
0.561***
(0.028)
Emp’ drop over last 
year (10% or more)
0.109***
(0.034)
0.044
(0.045)
0.078**
(0.032)
-0.077**
(0.035)
-0.059*
(0.031)
Last time firm is in 
data set
-0.023
(0.054)
-0.054
(0.072)
0.038
(0.050)
0.023
(0.048)
-0.065
(0.046)
Interaction of the 
above
0.089
(0.101)
0.027
(0.143)
0.124
(0.101)
0.062
(0.104)
0.082
(0.095)
Pseudo R2 7.64% 7.25% 12.42% 9.32% 10.73%
No. of Obs. 22389 30041 30041 30041 26476
Log likelihood -4442.2007 -2486.8454 -4756.314 -5079.5695 -6772.5798
* indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level.. The default categories are 101 to 200 employees; brick industry; 
mixed settlement groups; in the North West.
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Appendix C3. OLS Estimates of Real Wage Increases
Independent
variables
Whole
Sample
1979-1983 1987-91 1991-95 1996-2000
Up to 25 employees -0.111**
(0.054)
0.122
(0.160)
-0.122
(0.114)
0.080
(0.071)
-0.222***
(0.079)
26 - 50 employees -0.204***
(0.054)
0.003
(0.154)
-0.410***
(0.103)
-0.056
(0.068)
-0.154**
(0.073)
51 -100 employees -0.081
(0.050)
0.102
(0.143)
-0.220**
(0.095)
-0.078
(0.065)
-0.063
(0.073)
201-500 employees -0.030
(0.051)
-0.059
(0.143)
0.016
(0.090)
-0.028
(0.063)
-0.023
(0.074)
More than 500 
employees
0.183***
(0.051)
0.231
(0.159)
0.238**
(0.095)
0.126*
(0.065)
0.041
(0.074)
Scotland 0.090
(0.063)
0.241
(0.186)
-0.254**
(0.124)
0.120
(0.087)
0.165*
(0.090)
North East -0.142*
(0.074)
-0.276
(0.210)
-0.291**
(0.130)
0.060
(0.108)
-0.183*
(0.105)
Yorkshire -0.312***
(0.070)
-0.359*
(0.187)
-0.303**
(0.130)
-0.199*
(0.102)
-0.252**
(0.098)
East Midlands -0.065
(0.071)
-0.106
(0.202)
-0.126
(0.145)
-0.072
(0.091)
-0.033
(0.092)
East Anglia 0.113
(0.087)
0.290
(0.267)
-0.179
(0.187)
-0.053
(0.112)
0.254*
(0.140)
South East 0.078
(0.056)
0.240
(0.151)
-0.021
(0.115)
-0.010
(0.078)
0.337***
(0.084)
South West -0.029
(0.070)
0.350*
(0.207)
-0.454***
(0.136)
-0.224**
(0.093)
0.056
(0.102)
West Midlands -0.318***
(0.067)
-0.661***
(0.184)
-0.481***
(0.133)
-0.112
(0.092)
-0.136
(0.087)
Wales -0.101
(0.082)
-0.097
(0.213)
-0.274
(0.171)
-0.118
(0.116)
0.170
(0.125)
Food, drink & 
tobacco
0.585***
(0.086)
1.100***
(0.231)
1.145***
(0.169)
0.487***
(0.117)
0.038
(0.108)
Chemicals 0.616***
(0.082)
0.806***
(0.226)
1.118***
(0.164)
0.500***
(0.115)
0.244**
(0.100)
240
Appendix C3. OLS Estimates of Real Wage Increases, continued
Metals -0.133
(0.100)
-0.517*
(0.273)
0.382**
(0.193)
0.350***
(0.129)
0.026
(0.113)
Mechanical
engineering
-0.187**
(0.081)
-0.713***
(0.218)
0.569***
(0.162)
0.141
(0.113)
-0.062
(0.092)
Instrument
engineering
0.066
(0.088)
-0.254
(0.236)
0.582***
(0.175)
0.220*
(0.121)
0.126
(0.111)
Textiles -0.100
(0.101)
-0.190
(0.271)
0.600***
(0.189)
0.118
(0.132)
-0.417***
(0.123)
Paper & publishing 0.098
(0.096)
0.597**
(0.251)
0.331*
(0.191)
0.134
(0.124)
0.030
(0.112)
Construction 0.217
(0.196)
N/a -1.402***
(0.469)
-0.583**
(0.230)
0.909***
(0.264)
Transport & 
Communications
0.517***
(0.098)
N/a 0.493**
(0.220)
0.238*
(0.132)
0.250**
(0.119)
Distributive Trades 0.501***
(0.096)
N/a 0.376*
(0.201)
0.151
(0.135)
0.333***
(0.117)
Insurance 1.267***
(0.108)
N/a 1.572***
(0.218)
1.009***
(0.151)
0.769***
(0.146)
Prof. Services 0.831***
(0.093)
N/a 0.546**
(0.221)
0.421***
(0.127)
0.873***
(0.117)
Leisure Services 0.309*
(0.162)
N/a -0.252
(0.330)
0.131
(0.239)
0.246
(0.204)
Misc. Services 0.434**
(0.178)
N/a 0.868*
(0.446)
0.413
(0.254)
-0.140
(0.174)
Non-manuals 0.443***
(0.042)
0.819***
(0.137)
0.104
(0.084)
0.103*
(0.055)
0.257***
(0.056)
Manuals 0.272***
(0.043)
0.481***
(0.135)
-0.085
(0.082)
-0.047
(0.055)
-0.039
(0.057)
Unionised -0.543***
(0.032)
-0.673***
(0.134)
0.159***
(0.059)
-0.063
(0.044)
-0.026
(0.046)
Workplace change 
this year
0.293***
(0.051)
0.293**
(0.112)
0.715***
(0.082)
0.597***
(0.085)
0.442***
(0.084)
Workplace change 
last year
-0.003
(0.048)
0.519***
(0.125)
-0.285***
(0.080)
-0.293***
(0.064)
-0.105
(0.082)
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Appendix C3. OLS Estimates of Real Wage Increases, continued
10% drop in 
employment last year
-0.008
(0.036)
-0.094
(0.128)
-0.237***
(0.068)
-0.224***
(0.048)
-0.100*
(0.056)
Last time in dataset -0.379***
(0.060)
-0.598***
(0.178)
0.026
(0.136)
-0.254***
(0.086)
-0.444***
(0.071)
Last time in & big 
fall in employment
0.150
(0.124)
0.104
(0.413)
-0.399*
(0.233)
-0.003
(0.182)
0.148
(0.186)
No. of Obs. 30017 6386 6924 8317 6464
Constant 0.032 -1.639 -0.167 0.304** 0.563***
Adjusted R2 5.24% 6.03% 5.54% 3.77 8.25%
* indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. The default categories are 101 to 200 employees; brick industry; 
mixed settlement groups; the North West.
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Appendix C4. Marginal Effects From Probit Regressions On Changes To Working
Hours
Independent variables Whole
Sample
1979-1983 1987-91 1991-95 1996-2000
Up to 25 employees 0.008*
(0.004)
0.009
(0.015)
-0.001
(0.009)
0.002
(0.005)
-0.003
(0.002)
26 - 50 employees 0.005
(0.004)
0.018
(0.015)
-0.012
(0.008)
-0.001
(0.005)
-0.003
(0.002)
51 -100 employees 0.011***
(0.004)
0.025*
(0.014)
0.008
(0.009)
0.000
(0.005)
0.001
(0.002)
201-500 employees 0.009**
(0.004)
0.020
(0.015)
0.004
(0.009)
0.013**
(0.006)
-0.003
(0.002)
More than 500 
employees
0.002
(0.004)
0.005
(0.016)
-0.011
(0.008)
0.007
(0.006)
-0.001
(0.002)
Scotland -0.007
(0.004)
0.010
(0.017)
-0.002
(0.011)
-0.005
(0.004)
-0.005**
(0.002)
North East -0.005
(0.005)
-0.016
(0.018)
0.032**
(0.017)
-0.009*
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.002)
Yorkshire -0.005
(0.004)
-0.023
(0.015)
0.021
(0.015)
-0.002
(0.004)
-0.004
(0.002)
East Midlands -0.004
(0.005)
-0.008
(0.017)
0.027*
(0.017)
-0.006
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.002)
East Anglia -0.006
(0.006)
0.001
(0.027)
0.009
(0.017)
-0.006
(0.005)
dropped
South East 0.007*
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.014)
0.018*
(0.011)
0.003
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.002)
South West 0.000
(0.005)
0.021
(0.020)
0.014
(0.014)
-0.005
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.003)
West Midlands - 0.000
(0.004)
0.008
(0.016)
0.009
(0.013)
-0.001
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.002)
Wales -0.007
(0.005)
-0.023
(0.018)
0.002
(0.015)
-0.009
(0.004)
0.001
(0.004)
Food drink, tobacco -0.005
(0.005)
-0.052***
(0.015)
0.025
(0.022)
0.016
(0.016)
0.001
(0.004)
Chemicals -0.005
(0.005)
-0.028
(0.017)
0.024
(0.020)
0.012
(0.013)
-0.003
(0.002)
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Appendix C4. Marginal Effects From Probit Regressions On Changes To Working
Hours, continued
Metals -0.009
(0.005)
-0.029
(0.019)
0.002
(0.019)
0.015
(0.016)
-0.005**
(0.001)
Mechanical
engineering
-0.006
(0.005)
-0.040**
(0.017)
0.008
(0.016)
0.016
(0.013)
-0.006**
(0.002)
Instrument
engineering
-0.010*
(0.005)
-0.049***
(0.016)
0.013
(0.018)
0.019
(0.016)
-0.005**
(0.001)
Textiles 0.000
(0.006)
-0.046**
(0.017)
0.038*
(0.025)
0.023
(0.021)
-0.001
(0.003)
Paper & publishing -0.004
(0.006)
-0.033
(0.018)
0.009
(0.021)
0.010
(0.015)
-0.002
(0.003)
Construction -0.024
(0.010)
N/a 0.096
(0.085)
N/a N/a
Transport & 
Communications
-0.027***
(0.004)
N/a 0.017
(0.025)
N/a N/a
Distributive Trades -0.024***
(0.004)
N/a 0.014
(0.021)
0.009
(0.014)
N/a
Insurance -0.020***
(0.005)
N/a 0.044*
(0.028)
-0.003
(0.009)
N/a
Prof. Services -0.036***
(0.003)
N/a -0.001
(0.018)
-0.005
(0.008)
N/a
Leisure Services -0.034**
(0.006)
N/a N/a N/a N/a
Misc. Services -0.020
(0.011)
N/a N/a N/a N/a
Leisure &
Miscellaneous
services
N/a N/a -0.032
(0.015)
0.020
(0.023)
N/a
Construction & 
transport/comm’s
N/a N/a N/a -0.001
(0.010)
N/a
All services N/a N/a N/a N/a -0.009***
(0.002)
Manuals -0.013***
(0.003)
0.003
(0.012)
0.000
(0.007)
-0.002
(0.003)
- 0.000
(0.002)
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Appendix C4. Marginal Effects From Probit Regressions On Changes To Working
Hours, continued
Non-manuals -0.011***
(0.003)
0.003
(0.012)
-0.002
(0.007)
0.002
(0.003)
0.002
(0.002)
Unionised 0.043***
(0.003)
0.005
(0.012)
0.050***
(0.005)
0.015***
(0.003)
0.010***
(0.002)
Workplace change 0.018***
(0.004)
0.011
(0.010)
0.013*
(0.008)
0.011**
(0.005)
0.025***
(0.009)
Workplace change 
last year
-0.005*
(0.003)
-0.017
(0.011)
-0.014**
(0.007)
0.004
(0.004)
0.005
(0.004)
10% drop in 
employment last year
-0.011***
(0.003)
-0.041***
(0.010)
0.008
(0.007)
0.010***
(0.004)
-0.003*
(0.002)
Last time in data set 0.003
(0.004)
-0.005
(0.014)
0.018*
(0.011)
0.003
(0.005)
0.002
(0.003)
Last time in and big 
fall in emp.
0.012
(0.011)
0.089*
(0.053)
0.004
(0.018)
-0.006
(0.006)
dropped
No. of Obs. 30041 6390 6924 8317 6034
Log Likelihood -5570.1394 -2343.8887 1458.6219 -739.5890 -319.7646
Pseudo R2 5.33% 0.90% 4.59% 5.98% 15.21%
Predicted probability 
(at sample means)
0.040 0.120 0.050 0.015 0.005
* indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates
significance at the 1% level. The default categories are 101 to 200 employees; brick industry;
mixed settlement groups; the North West.
Appendix C5. Probit Regression Results on Changes to Working Hours
Independent variables Whole
Sample
1979-1983 1987-91 1991-95 1996-2000
Up to 25 employees 0.083*
(0.044)
0.047
(0.072)
-0.011
(0.088)
0.064
(0.118)
-0.267
(0.184)
26 - 50 employees 0.061
(0.045)
0.085
(0.070)
-0.122
(0.091)
-0.030
(0.130)
-0.257
(0.181)
51 -100 employees 0.119***
(0.042)
0.122*
(0.066)
0.077
(0.082)
0.013
(0.120)
0.034
(0.140)
201-500 employees 0.101**
(0.043)
0.096
(0.069)
0.035
(0.083)
0.273**
(0.112)
-0.205
(0.163)
More than 500 
employees
0.026
(0.047)
0.027
(0.078)
-0.108
(0.089)
0.162
(0.120)
-0.061
(0.157)
Scotland -0.080
(0.052)
0.050
(0.084)
-0.021
(0.113)
-0.170
(0.136)
-0.403**
(0.189)
North East -0.065
(0.063)
-0.084
(0.101)
0.259**
(0.119)
-0.337*
(0.183)
-0.178
(0.230)
Yorkshire -0.055
(0.056)
-0.123
(0.086)
0.179
(0.115)
-0.064
(0.146)
-0.348
(0.216)
East Midlands -0.046
(0.059)
-0.039
(0.091)
0.225*
(0.124)
-0.180
(0.163)
-0.230
(0.223)
East Anglia -0.072
(0.077)
0.005
(0.133)
0.078
(0.145)
-0.204
(0.197)
dropped
South East 0.074*
(0.044)
-0.007
(0.070)
0.168*
(0.095)
0.074
(0.112)
-0.200
(0.163)
South West 0.003
(0.057)
0.101
(0.091)
0.121
(0.119)
-0.157
(0.154)
-0.108
(0.213)
West Midlands -0.001
(0.051)
0.038
(0.080)
0.084
(0.115)
-0.035
(0.136)
-0.089
(0.179)
Wales -0.084
(0.066)
-0.122
(0.104)
0.020
(0.142)
-0.316
(0.194)
0.059
(0.220)
Food drink, tobacco -0.056
(0.069)
-0.303***
(0.104)
0.211
(0.162)
0.311
(0.250)
0.046
(0.203)
Chemicals -0.060
(0.064)
-0.151
(0.098)
0.210
(0.150)
0.270
(0.237)
-0.192
(0.188)
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Appendix C5. Probit Regression Results on Changes to Working Hours, continued
Metals -0.120
(0.075)
-0.160
(0.114)
0.016
(0.180)
0.298
(0.256)
-0.639**
(0.254)
Mechanical
engineering
-0.066
(0.060)
-0.208**
(0.090)
0.071
(0.144)
0.339
(0.229)
-0.506**
(0.195)
Instrument
engineering
-0.123*
(0.066)
-0.277***
(0.101)
0.115
(0.154)
0.367
(0.238)
-0.594**
(0.251)
Textiles 0.002
(0.073)
-0.262**
(0.112)
0.300*
(0.165)
0.414
(0.262)
-0.059
(0.226)
Paper & publishing -0.053
(0.074)
-0.179
(0.110)
0.085
(0.178)
0.217
(0.270)
-0.118
(0.221)
Construction -0.378
(0.246)
N/a 0.594
(0.373)
N/a N/a
Transport & 
Communications
-0.468***
(0.116)
N/a 0.144
(0.199)
N/a N/a
Distributive Trades -0.365***
(0.097)
N/a 0.124
(0.171)
0.192
(0.259)
N/a
Insurance -0.300***
(0.101)
N/a 0.336*
(0.175)
-0.085
(0.292)
N/a
Prof. Services -0.669***
(0.096)
N/a -0.014
(0.177)
-0.145
(0.256)
N/a
Leisure Services -0.710**
(0.282)
N/a N/a N/a N/a
Misc. Services -0.307
(0.220)
N/a N/a N/a N/a
Leisure &
Miscellaneous
services
N/a N/a -0.436
(0.318)
0.362
(0.306)
N/a
Construction &
transport/communicati
on
N/a N/a N/a -0.019
(0.286)
N/a
All services N/a N/a N/a N/a -0.719***
(0.211)
Manuals -0.150***
(0.032)
0.014
(0.058)
0.003
(0.068)
-0.055
(0.095)
-0.016
(0.139)
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Appendix C5. Probit Regression Results on Changes to Working Hours, continued
Non-manuals -0.132***
(0.034)
0.017
(0.060)
-0.016
(0.069)
0.047
(0.094)
0.101
(0.139)
Unionised 0.478***
(0.028)
0.026
(0.059)
0.491***
(0.053)
0.350***
(0.070)
0.465***
(0.119)
Workplace change 0.190***
(0.034)
0.053
(0.050)
0.120*
(0.067)
0.232**
(0.098)
0.707***
(0.135)
Workplace change -0.065* -0.088 -0.152** 0.090 0.223
last year (0.039) (0.060) (0.076) (0.099) (0.157)
10% drop in -0.134*** -0.227*** 0.073 0.230*** -0.258*
employment last year (0.035) (0.064) (0.061) (0.075) (0.145)
Last time in data set 0.032
(0.045)
-0.026
(0.074)
0.161*
(0.093)
0.071
(0.126)
0.117
(0.145)
Last time in and big 
fall in emp.
0.122
(0.101)
0.366*
(0.188)
0.041
(0.167)
-0.202
(0.254)
dropped
No. of Obs. 30041 6390 6924 8317 6034
Log Likelihood -5570.1394 -2343.8887 1458.6219 -739.5890 -319.7646
Pseudo R2 5.33% 0.90% 4.59% 5.98% 15.21%
Constant -1.774 -1.019 -2.147 -2.576 -1.949
* indicates significance at the 10% leve ; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates
significance at the 1% level. The default categories are 101 to 200 employees; brick industry; 
mixed settlement groups; the North West.
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Appendix C6. The Marginal Effects From Probit Regressions On Changes To
Holidays
Independent variables Whole
Sample
1979-1983 1987-91 1991-95 1996-2000
Up to 25 employees -0.003
(0.006)
-0.047***
(0.017)
0.005
(0.011)
-0.005
(0.005)
0.004
(0.007)
26 - 50 employees 0.007
(0.006)
0.004
(0.018)
0.006
(0.011)
-0.008
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.007)
51-100 employees 0.003
(0.005)
-0.009
(0.017)
0.004
(0.010)
-0.000
(0.006)
-0.005
(0.006)
201-500 employees 0.007
(0.006)
0.016
(0.018)
-0.001
(0.010)
-0.007
(0.005)
0.008
(0.008)
More than 500 
employees
0.025***
(0.007)
-0.006
(0.020)
0.040
(0.013)
0.015**
(0.007)
0.030
(0.010)
Scotland -0.018***
(0.006)
0.029
(0.023)
-0.027**
(0.009)
-0.012**
(0.005)
-0.014**
(0.005)
North East 0.003
(0.008)
-0.046*
(0.024)
0.033**
(0.017)
-0.004
(0.007)
0.001
(0.009)
Yorkshire -0.020***
(0.006)
-0.073***
(0.019)
-0.024**
(0.010)
-0.005
(0.006)
-0.008
(0.007)
East Midlands -0.010
(0.007)
-0.035
(0.022)
0.008
(0.015)
-0.011
(0.006)
-0.000
(0.008)
East Anglia -0.020**
(0.008)
-0.045
(0.031)
-0.001
(0.016)
-0.008
(0.006)
-0.014
(0.006)
South East -0.007*
(0.006)
-0.019
(0.018)
-0.009
(0.010)
-0.018***
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.007)
South West -0.008
(0.007)
0.049*
(0.026)
-0.024**
(0.010)
-0.018
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.008)
West Midlands -0.026***
(0.006)
-0.061***
(0.019)
-0.017
(0.011)
-0.004
(0.006)
-0.021***
(0.004)
Wales 0.040***
(0.010)
0.095***
(0.029)
0.012
(0.017)
-0.001
(0.008)
0.026**
(0.016)
Food, drink, tobacco 0.009
(0.009)
0.061**
(0.031)
0.005
(0.016)
-0.001
(0.009)
-0.010
(0.007)
Chemicals -0.024***
(0.007)
0.016
(0.029)
-0.045***
(0.009)
-0.025***
(0.004)
-0.020***
(0.005)
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Appendix C6. The Marginal Effects From Probit Regressions On Changes To
Holidays, continued
Metals -0.043***
(0.006)
0.010
(0.032)
-0.059***
(0.006)
-0.028***
(0.003)
-0.018**
(0.005)
Mechanical
engineering
-0.052***
(0.006)
-0.029
(0.025)
-0.079***
(0.008)
-0.027***
(0.004)
-0.021***
(0.005)
Instrument
engineering
-0.040***
(0.006)
0.015
(0.029)
-0.059***
(0.007)
-0.019***
(0.005)
-0.013*
(0.006)
Textiles 0.034***
(0.011)
0.090***
(0.035)
0.013
(0.018)
-0.015*
(0.006)
0.008
(0.012)
Paper & publishing -0.002
(0.009)
-0.033
(0.029)
-0.032**
(0.011)
-0.002
(0.009)
-0.008
(0.008)
Construction N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a
Transport & Com. N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a
Distributive Trades -0.040***
(0.008)
N/a -0.021
(0.013)
-0.012
(0.007)
-0.003
(0.009)
Insurance -0.052***
(0.007)
N/a -0.045***
(0.009)
-0.009
(0.008)
-0.009
(0.008)
Prof. Services -0.049***
(0.006)
N/a -0.036***
(0.010)
-0.005
(0.008)
-0.002
(0.009)
Leisure Services -0.020
(0.018)
N/a -0.016
(0.022)
0.022
(0.023)
-0.005
(0.014)
Misc. Services -0.006
(0.022)
N/a 0.018
(0.034)
0.007
(0.019)
-0.004
(0.018)
Construction &
transport/communicati
on
-0.065***
(0.005)
N/a -0.023
(0.013)
-0.011
(0.007)
-0.023***
(0.004)
Manuals -0.014***
(0.004)
-0.007
(0.016)
-0.007
(0.008)
-0.003
(0.005)
0.003
(0.005)
Non-manuals -0.030***
(0.004)
-0.040**
(0.016)
-0.008
(0.008)
-0.005
(0.005)
-0.002
(0.005)
Unionised 0.081***
(0.004)
0.087***
(0.015)
0.013**
(0.006)
0.017***
(0.004)
0.033***
(0.007)
Workplace change 0.035***
(0.005)
0.027**
(0.013)
0.014
(0.009)
0.002
(0.006)
0.035***
(0.012)
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Appendix C6. The Marginal Effects From Probit Regressions On Changes To
Holidays, continued
Workplace change 
last year
-0.009*
(0.005)
-0.055***
(0.014)
-0.006
(0.008)
0.013**
(0.007)
-0.002
(0.007)
10% drop in 
employment last year
-0.023***
(0.004)
-0.037**
(0.015)
-0.004
(0.007)
-0.001
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.004)
Last time in data set -0.001
(0.006)
0.014
(0.020)
-0.009
(0.011)
-0.003
(0.006)
-0.007
(0.005)
Last time in and big 
fall in emp.
0.011
(0.014)
0.086
(0.057)
0.010
(0.024)
-0.010
(0.010)
0.003
(0.016)
No. of Obs. 30041 6390 6924 8317 6474
Log Likelihood -9240.9211 -3444.2418 1745.4826 -1152.1208 -889.3860
Pseudo R2 7.08% 3.11% 6.97% 6.19% 9.27%
Predicted probability 
(at sample means)
0.087 0.237 0.064 0.027 0.025
* indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. The defaults are 101 to 200 employees; brick industry; mixed 
settlement groups; the North West.
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Appendix C7. Probit Regressions of the Impact of Workplace Change on Changes
to Holidays
Independent variables Whole
Sample
1979-1983 1987-91 1991-95 1996-2000
Up to 25 employees -0.020
(0.036)
-0.160***
(0.061)
0.041
(0.082)
-0.088
(0.096)
0.065
(0.113)
26 - 50 employees 0.044
(0.036)
0.018
(0.059)
0.044
(0.084)
-0.148
(0.104)
-0.009
(0.121)
51-100 employees 0.018
(0.034)
-0.030
(0.056)
0.033
(0.081)
-0.002
(0.094)
-0.098
(0.118)
201-500 employees 0.046
(0.034)
0.050
(0.057)
-0.009
(0.082)
-0.131
(0.103)
0.131
(0.109)
More than 500 
employees
0.146***
(0.036)
-0.021
(0.065)
0.282
(0.077)
0.205**
(0.091)
0.391
(0.103)
Scotland -0.119*** 
(0.041)
0.091
(0.071)
-0.254**
(0.099)
-0.240**
(0.107)
-0.306**
(0.133)
North East 0.019
(0.048)
-0.158*
(0.086)
0.229**
(0.102)
-0.069
(0.125)
0.017
(0.157)
Yorkshire -0.135***
(0.045)
-0.255***
(0.074)
-0.224**
(0.108)
-0.091
(0.117)
-0.146
(0.146)
East Midlands -0.068
(0.046)
-0.117
(0.077)
0.060
(0.110)
-0.203
(0.133)
-0.004
(0.132)
East Anglia -0.141**
(0.061)
-0.154
(0.114)
-0.010
(0.127)
-0.150
(0.145)
-0.307
(0.200)
South East -0.046
(0.036)
-0.063
(0.060)
-0.073
(0.083)
-0.330***
(0.095)
-0.026
(0.117)
South West -0.052
(0.046)
0.153*
(0.079)
-0.224**
(0.111)
-0.413
(0.132)
-0.017
(0.145)
West Midlands -0.181***
(0.044)
-0.209***
(0.071)
-0.153
(0.106)
-0.075
(0.110)
-0.542***
(0.163)
Wales 0.221***
(0.048)
0.285***
(0.080)
0.088
(0.118)
-0.015
(0.133)
0.331**
(0.147)
Food drink, tobacco 0.056
(0.054)
0.189**
(0.093)
0.042
(0.122)
-0.018
(0.144)
-0.196
(0.176)
Chemicals -0.161***
(0.052)
0.050
(0.090)
-0.459***
(0.118)
-0.601***
(0.148)
-0.474***
(0.165)
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Appendix C7. Probit Regressions of the Impact of Workplace Change on Changes
to Holidays, continued
Metals -0.330***
(0.061)
0.032
(0.101)
-0.844***
(0.166)
-0.921***
(0.217)
-0.442**
(0.196)
Mechanical
engineering
-0.370***
(0.050)
-0.096
(0.084)
-0.867***
(0.117)
-0.595***
(0.137)
-0.459***
(0.151)
Instrument
engineering
-0.300***
(0.055)
0.048
(0.090)
-0.707***
(0.130)
-0.415***
(0.147)
-0.273*
(0.164)
Textiles 0.191***
(0.057)
0.270***
(0.098)
0.098
(0.127)
-0.330*
(0.170)
0.122
(0.167)
Paper & publishing -0.013
(0.059)
-0.110
(0.100)
-0.321**
(0.139)
-0.035
(0.155)
-0.178
(0.191)
Distributive Trades -0.310***
(0.073)
N/a -0.192
(0.131)
-0.232
(0.159)
-0.053
(0.173)
Insurance -0.436***
(0.083)
N/a -0.521***
(0.152)
-0.170
(0.170)
-0.193
(0.198)
Prof. Services -0.391***
(0.065)
N/a -0.367***
(0.138)
-0.088
(0.137)
-0.029
(0.156)
Leisure Services -0.141
(0.135)
N/a -0.146
(0.222)
0.278
(0.228)
-0.097
(0.287)
Misc. Services -0.036
(0.144)
N/a 0.128
(0.229)
0.100
(0.251)
-0.078
(0.358)
Construction & 
transport/comm’s
-0.611*** 
(0.086)
N/a -0.220
(0.150)
-0.206
(0.160)
-0.680***
(0.213)
Manuals -0.087***
(0.026)
-0.023
(0.052)
-0.058
(0.064)
-0.055
(0.078)
0.051
(0.086)
Non-manuals -0.186***
(0.028)
-0.131**
(0.055)
-0.065
(0.064)
-0.084
(0.076)
-0.038
(0.084)
Unionised 0.499***
(0.022)
0.298***
(0.055)
0.108**
(0.047)
0.246***
(0.059)
0.448***
(0.073)
Workplace change 0.201***
(0.028)
0.086**
(0.042)
0.104
(0.065)
0.027
(0.094)
0.423***
(0.107)
Workplace change 
last year
-0.059*
(0.032)
-0.186***
(0.052)
-0.046
(0.070)
0.188**
(0.086)
-0.037
(0.130)
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Appendix C7. Probit Regressions of the Impact of Workplace Change on Changes
to Holidays, continued
10% drop in 
employment last year
-0.155***
(0.028)
-0.125**
(0.053)
-0.030
(0.059)
-0.024
(0.068)
-0.049
(0.081)
Last time in data set -0.006
(0.036)
0.046
(0.063)
-0.079
(0.094)
-0.048
(0.100)
-0.132
(0.108)
Last time in and big 
fall in emp.
0.068
(0.083)
0.257
(0.160)
0.078
(0.175)
-0.191
(0.233)
0.051
(0.257)
No. of Obs. 30041 6390 6924 8317 6474
Log Likelihood -9240.9211 -3444.2418 1745.4826 -1152.1208 -889.3860
Pseudo R2 7.08% 3.11% 6.97% 6.19% 9.27%
Constant -1.229*** -0.822*** -1.036*** -1.387 -1.754***
* indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. The default categories are 101 to 200 employees; brick industry; 
mixed settlement groups; the North West.
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Appendix C8. OLS Estimates of Real Wage Increases
Independent variables Whole
Sample
1979-1983 1987-91 1991-95 1996-2000
Up to 25 employees -0.110**
(0.054)
0.121
(0.160)
-0.120
(0.114)
-0.079
(0.070)
-0.221***
(0.079)
26 - 50 employees -0.203***
(0.054)
0.001
(0.154)
-0.413***
(0.103)
-0.055
(0.068)
-0.153
(0.073)
51 - 100 employees -0.082
(0.050)
0.101
(0.143)
-0.225**
(0.095)
-0.080
(0.065)
-0.062
(0.073)
101 - 250 employees -0.033
(0.051)
-0.061
(0.143)
0.011
(0.090)
-0.035
(0.063)
-0.021
(0.074)
251 -500 employees 0.179***
(0.051)
0.228
(0.159)
0.235**
(0.095)
0.121*
(0.065)
0.043
(0.074)
Scotland 0.088
(0.063)
0.245
(0.186)
-0.253**
(0.124)
0.110
(0.087)
0.162*
(0.090)
North East -0.143*
(0.074)
-0.273
(0.210)
-0.281**
(0.130)
0.062
(0.108)
-0.188*
(0.105)
Yorkshire -0.311***
(0.070)
-0.356*
(0.187)
-0.295**
(0.130)
-0.199*
(0.102)
-0.255***
(0.098)
East Midlands -0.065
(0.071)
-0.106
(0.202)
-0.118
(0.145)
-0.069
(0.091)
-0.037
(0.092)
East Anglia 0.115
(0.087)
0.292
(0.267)
-0.167
(0.187)
-0.051
(0.112)
0.249*
(0.140)
South East 0.078
(0.056)
0.242
(0.151)
-0.012
(0.115)
-0.008
(0.078)
0.334***
(0.084)
South West -0.028
(0.070)
0.352*
(0.207)
-0.443***
(0.136)
-0.217**
(0.094)
0.052
(0.102)
West Midlands -0.320***
(0.067)
-0.659***
(0.184)
-0.478***
(0.133)
-0.113
(0.093)
-0.139
(0.087)
Wales -0.103
(0.082)
-0.099
(0.213)
-0.260
(0.172)
-0.113
(0.116)
0.168
(0.125)
Food, drink & tobacco 0.587***
(0.086)
1.102***
(0.232)
1.143***
(0.169)
0.484***
(0.116)
0.037
(0.108)
Chemicals 0.617***
(0.082)
0.806***
(0.226)
1.118***
(0.165)
0.497***
(0.115)
0.245**
(0.100)
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Appendix C8. OLS Estimates of Real Wage Increases, continued
Metals -0.135
(0.100)
-0.518*
(0.273)
0.382**
(0.193)
0.345***
(0.128)
0.024
(0.113)
Mechanical engineering -0.186**
(0.081)
-0.713***
(0.218)
0.569***
(0.163)
0.141
(0.113)
-0.064
(0.092)
Instrument engineering 0.067
(0.088)
-0.255
(0.236)
0.579***
(0.175)
0.221*
(0.121)
0.125
(0.111)
Textiles -0.098
(0.101)
-0.190
(0.271)
0.598***
(0.190)
0.121
(0.132)
-0.419***
(0.123)
Paper & publishing 0.094
(0.096)
0.596**
(0.252)
0.334*
(0.192)
0.136
(0.124)
0.030
(0.112)
Construction 0.218
(0.196)
N/a -1.398***
(0.471)
-0.582**
(0.230)
0.912***
(0.264)
Transport & 
Communications
0.520***
(0.098)
N/a 0.492**
(0.221)
0.240*
(0.132)
0.249**
(0.119)
Distributive Trades 0.504***
(0.096)
N/a 0.381*
(0.201)
0.152
(0.135)
0.333***
(0.117)
Insurance 1.270***
(0.108)
N/a 1.573***
(0.218)
1.012***
(0.151)
0.767***
(0.146)
Prof. Services 0.830***
(0.093)
N/a 0.544**
(0.221)
0.418***
(0.127)
0.873***
(0.117)
Leisure Services 0.314*
(0.162)
N/a -0.254
(0.330)
0.131
(0.238)
0.244
(0.204)
Misc. Services 0.428**
(0.177)
N/a 0.861*
(0.445)
0.401
(0.252)
-0.134
(0.173)
Non-manual 0.444***
(0.042)
0.820***
(0.137)
0.106
(0.084)
0.103*
(0.055)
0.257***
(0.056)
Manual 0.270***
(0.043)
0.480***
(0.135)
-0.090
(0.082)
-0.049
(0.056)
-0.041
(0.057)
Unionised -0.543***
(0.032)
-0.673***
(0.136)
0.157***
(0.059)
-0.062
(0.044)
-0.025
(0.046)
1 type of change 0.218***
(0.061)
0.300**
(0.131)
0.586***
(0.098)
0.462***
(0.100)
0.466***
(0.100)
2 types of change 0.370***
(0.098)
0.219
(0.206)
0.873***
(0.140)
0.917***
(0.173)
0.500***
(0.171)
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Appendix C8. OLS Estimates of Real Wage Increases, continued
3 types of change 0.560***
(0.140)
0.434
(0.315)
1.001***
(0.198)
0.663***
(0.245)
0.112
(0.254)
Workplace change last 
year
-0.009
(0.047)
0.519***
(0.125)
-0.292***
(0.080)
-0.301***
(0.063)
-0.102
(0.082)
Big fall in employment -0.009
(0.036)
-0.095
(0.128)
0.237***
(0.068)
-0.224***
(0.048)
-0.100*
(0.056)
Last time in data set -0.379***
(0.060)
-0.596***
(0.177)
0.030
(0.136)
-0.255***
(0.086)
-0.445***
(0.071)
Big fall in emp & last time 
in dataset
0.145
(0.124)
0.103
(0.413)
-0.412*
(232)
-0.001
(0.182)
0.150
(0.185)
Constant 0.034 -1.639*** -0.168 0.307** 0.566***
No. of Obs. 30017 6386 6924 8317 6464
Adjusted 5.27% 6.04% 5.62% 3.86 8.27%
* indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. The defaults are 101 to 200 employees; brick industry; mixed 
settlement groups; the North West.
257
Appendix C9. The Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Changes to
Working Hours
Independent variables Whole
Sample
1979-1983 1987-91 1991-95 1996-2000
Up to 25 employees 0.008*
(0.004)
0.009
(0.015)
-0.001
(0.009)
0.003
(0.005)
-0.004
(0.002)
26 - 50 employees 0.005
(0.004)
0.017
(0.015)
-0.012
(0.008)
-0.001
(0.005)
-0.003
(0.002)
51-100 employees 0.011***
(0.004)
0.025*
(0.014)
0.008
(0.009)
0.001
(0.005)
0.001
(0.002)
201-500 employees 0.009**
(0.004)
0.019
(0.015)
0.004
(0.009)
0.013**
(0.006)
-0.003
(0.002)
More than 500 
employees
0.002
(0.004)
0.005
(0.016)
-0.011
(0.008)
0.007
(0.006)
-0.001
(0.002)
Scotland -0.006
(0.004)
0.011
(0.018)
-0.002
(0.011)
-0.005
(0.004)
-0.004**
(0.002)
North East -0.005
(0.005)
-0.016
(0.018)
0.033**
(0.017)
-0.009*
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.003)
Yorkshire -0.004
(0.004)
-0.023
(0.015)
0.021
(0.015)
-0.002
(0.005)
-0.004
(0.002)
East Midlands -0.004
(0.005)
-0.008
(0.017)
0.028*
(0.017)
-0.006
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.002)
East Anglia -0.006
(0.006)
0.001
(0.027)
0.009
(0.017)
-0.006
(0.005)
dropped
South East 0.007*
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.014)
0.019*
(0.011)
0.003
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.002)
South West 0.000
(0.005)
0.021
(0.020)
0.014
(0.014)
-0.005
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.003)
West Midlands - 0.000
(0.004)
0.008
(0.016)
0.009
(0.013)
-0.001
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.002)
Wales -0.007
(0.005)
-0.023
(0.018)
0.003
(0.015)
-0.009*
(0.004)
0.001
(0.004)
Food drink, tobacco -0.005
(0.005)
-0.052***
(0.015)
0.025
(0.022)
0.015
(0.016)
0.001
(0.004)
Chemicals -0.005
(0.005)
-0.028
(0.017)
0.024
(0.020)
0.012
(0.013)
-0.003
(0.002)
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Appendix C9. The Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Changes to
Working Hours, continued
Metals -0.009
(0.005)
-0.029
(0.019)
0.002
(0.019)
0.015
(0.016)
-0.005**
(0.001)
Mechanical
engineering
-0.006
(0.005)
-0.040**
(0.016)
0.008
(0.016)
0.016
(0.013)
-0.005**
(0.002)
Instrument
engineering
-0.010*
(0.005)
-0.049***
(0.016)
0.013
(0.018)
0.019
(0.016)
-0.005**
(0.001)
Textiles 0.000
(0.006)
-0.046**
(0.017)
0.038*
(0.025)
0.023
(0.021)
- 0.000
(0.003)
Paper & publishing -0.004
(0.006)
-0.033*
(0.018)
0.009
(0.021)
0.010
(0.015)
-0.002
(0.003)
Construction -0.024
(0.010)
N/a 0.097
(0.085)
N/a N/a
Transport & 
Communications
-0.027***
(0.004)
N/a 0.017
(0.026)
N/a N/a
Distributive Trades -0.023***
(0.004)
N/a 0.014
(0.021)
0.009
(0.014)
N/a
Insurance -0.020***
(0.005)
N/a 0.044*
(0.028)
-0.003
(0.009)
N/a
Prof. Services -0.036***
(0.003)
N/a -0.001
(0.018)
-0.005
(0.008)
N/a
Leisure Services -0.033**
(0.006)
N/a N/a N/a N/a
Misc. Services -0.020
(0.011)
N/a N/a N/a N/a
Leisure &
Miscellaneous
services
N/a N/a -0.032
(0.015)
0.020
(0.023)
N/a
Construction &
transport/communicati
on
N/a N/a N/a -0.001
(0.010)
N/a
All services N/a N/a N/a N/a -0.009***
(0.002)
Manuals -0.013***
(0.003)
0.003
(0.012)
0.000
(0.007)
-0.002
(0.003)
- 0.000
(0.002)
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Appendix C9. The Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Changes to
Working Hours, continued
Non-manuals -0.011***
(0.003)
0.004
(0.012)
-0.002
(0.007)
0.002
(0.003)
0.002
(0.002)
Unionised 0.043***
(0.003)
0.005
(0.011)
0.050***
(0.005)
0.015***
(0.003)
0.010***
(0.004)
One workplace 
change
0.017***
(0.004)
0.010
(0.012)
0.012
(0.010)
0.014***
(0.007)
0.012**
(0.007)
Two workplace 
changes
0.016***
(0.007)
0.000
(0.018)
0.010
(0.014)
-0.004
(0.007)
0.051***
(0.024)
Three workplace 
changes
0.036***
(0.011)
0.042
(0.031)
0.027
(0.022)
0.023*
(0.018)
0.069***
(0.038)
Workplace change 
last year
-0.006*
(0.003)
-0.017
(0.011)
-0.015**
(0.007)
0.004
(0.004)
0.005
(0.004)
10% drop in 
employment last year
-0.011***
(0.003)
-0.041***
(0.010)
0.008
(0.007)
0.010***
(0.004)
-0.003*
(0.002)
Last time in data set 0.003
(0.004)
-0.005
(0.014)
0.019*
(0.012)
0.003
(0.005)
0.002
(0.003)
Last time in and big 
fall in emp.
0.011
(0.011)
0.088*
(0.053)
0.004
(0.018)
-0.006
(0.006)
dropped
No. of Obs. 30041 6390 6924 8317 6034
Log Likelihood -5568.6163 -2343.116 1458.3594 -737.8367 -316.8158
Pseudo R2 5.36% 0.92% 4.60% 6.21% 15.99%
Predicted probability 
(at sample means)
0.040 0.119 0.050 0.015 0.006
* indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. The default categories are 101 to 200 employees; brick industry; 
mixed settlement groups; the North West.
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Appendix CIO. Probit Regressions on Changes to Working Hours
Independent variables Whole
Sample
1979-1983 1987-91 1991-95 1996-2000
Up to 25 employees 0.084*
(0.044)
0.046
(0.072)
-0.012
(0.088)
0.070
(0.118)
-0.284
(0.186)
26 - 50 employees 0.061
(0.045)
0.084
(0.070)
-0.123
(0.091)
-0.026
(0.130)
-0.249
(0.180)
51-100 employees 0.118***
(0.042)
0.122*
(0.066)
0.075
(0.082)
0.016
(0.120)
0.031
(0.140)
201-500 employees 0.099**
(0.043)
0.093
(0.069)
0.034
(0.083)
0.280**
(0.112)
-0.212
(0.164)
More than 500 
employees
0.024
(0.047)
0.023
(0.078)
-0.108
(0.089)
0.167
(0.120)
-0.088
(0.159)
Scotland -0.079
(0.052)
0.053
(0.084)
-0.019
(0.113)
-0.165
(0.137)
-0.390**
(0.188)
North East -0.064
(0.063)
-0.084
(0.101)
0.263**
(0.119)
-0.341*
(0.183)
-0.154
(0.231)
Yorkshire -0.053
(0.056)
-0.121
(0.086)
0.183
(0.116)
-0.069
(0.146)
-0.313
(0.217)
East Midlands -0.046
(0.059)
-0.040
(0.091)
0.227*
(0.124)
-0.182
(0.164)
-0.225
(0.225)
East Anglia -0.070
(0.077)
0.007
(0.133)
0.082
(0.145)
-0.208
(0.197)
dropped
South East 0.075*
(0.044)
-0.006
(0.070)
0.171*
(0.095)
0.068
(0.111)
-0.188
(0.162)
South West 0.005
(0.057)
0.102
(0.091)
0.125
(0.119)
-0.166
(0.154)
-0.105
(0.215)
West Midlands -0.001
(0.052)
0.038
(0.080)
0.087
(0.115)
-0.033
(0.137)
-0.078
(0.181)
Wales -0.084
(0.066)
-0.125
(0.104)
0.024
(0.142)
-0.323*
(0.194)
0.064
(0.218)
Food drink, tobacco -0.055
(0.069)
-0.301***
(0.104)
0.211
(0.162)
0.308
(0.250)
0.050
(0.205)
Chemicals -0.059
(0.064)
-0.150
(0.098)
0.209
(0.150)
0.267
(0.237)
-0.194
(0.191)
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Appendix CIO. Probit Regressions on Changes to Working Hours, continued
Metals -0.120
(0.075)
-0.162
(0.114)
0.020
(0.180)
0.301
(0.257)
-0.613**
(0.256)
Mechanical
engineering
-0.066
(0.060)
-0.208**
(0.090)
0.072
(0.144)
0.340
(0.229)
-0.477**
(0.198)
Instrument
engineering
-0.123*
(0.066)
-0.277***
(0.101)
0.115
(0.154)
0.367
(0.239)
-0.582**
(0.255)
Textiles 0.004
(0.073)
-0.262**
(0.112)
0.297*
(0.165)
0.417
(0.262)
-0.033
(0.229)
Paper & publishing -0.055
(0.074)
-0.181*
(0.110)
0.086
(0.179)
0.219
(0.271)
-0.110
(0.222)
Construction -0.377
(0.246)
N/a 0.595
(0.373)
N/a N/a
Transport & 
Communications
-0.466***
(0.116)
N/a 0.146
(0.199)
N/a N/a
Distributive Trades -0.363***
(0.097)
N/a 0.126
(0.171)
0.196
(0.260)
N/a
Insurance -0.298***
(0.101)
N/a 0.337*
(0.175)
-0.084
(0.293)
N/a
Prof. Services -0.669***
(0.096)
N/a -0.013
(0.178)
-0.143
(0.256)
N/a
Leisure Services -0.707**
(0.282)
N/a N/a N/a N/a
Misc. Services -0.309
(0.220)
N/a N/a N/a N/a
Leisure &
Miscellaneous
services
N/a N/a -0.435
(0.318)
0.368
(0.307)
N/a
Construction & 
transport/comm’s
N/a N/a N/a -0.018
(0.287)
N/a
All services N/a N/a N/a N/a -0.697***
(0.213)
Manuals -0.151***
(0.032)
0.013
(0.058)
0.003
(0.068)
-0.052
(0.095)
-0.018
(0.140)
Non-manuals -0.132***
(0.034)
0.018
(0.060)
-0.015
(0.069)
0.045
(0.094)
0.098
(0.139)
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Appendix CIO. Probit Regressions on Changes to Working Hours, continued
Unionised 0.478***
(0.028)
0.026
(0.059)
0.492***
(0.053)
0.350***
(0.070)
0.468***
(0.118)
One workplace 0.175*** 0.051 0.109 0.294*** 0.446**
change (0.040) (0.058) (0.082) (0.111) (0.173)
Two workplace 0.164*** 0.002 0.094 -0.108 0.970***
changes (0.061) (0.090) (0.117) (0.250) (0.217)
Three workplace 0.318*** 0.189 0.219 0.409* 1.101***
changes (0.080) (0.126) (0.152) (0.223) (0.275)
Workplace change -0.067* -0.088 -0.156** 0.089 0.226
last year (0.039) (0.061) (0.076) (0.100) (0.158)
10% drop in -0.134*** -0.229*** 0.072 0.228*** -0.233*
employment last year (0.035) (0.064) (0.061) (0.075) (0.142)
Last time in data set 0.032
(0.045)
-0.025
(0.074)
0.162*
(0.093)
0.072
(0.126)
0.137
(0.144)
Last time in and big 
fall in emp.
0.120
(0.101)
0.366*
(0.188)
0.039
(0.168)
-0.210
(0.255)
dropped
No. of Obs. 30041 6390 6924 8317 6034
Log Likelihood -5568.6163 -2343.116 1458.3594 -737.8367 -316.8158
Pseudo R2 5.36% 0.92% 4.60% 6.21% 15.99%
Constant -1.774 -1.017 -2.150 -2.578 -1.971
* indicates significance at the 10% leve ; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates
significance at the 1% level. The default categories are 101 to 200 employees; brick industry; 
mixed settlement groups; the North West.
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Appendix C ll. The Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Concessions on
Holidays
Independent variables Whole
Sample
1979-1983 1987-91 1991-95 1996-2000
Up to 25 employees -0.003
(0.006)
-0.048***
(0.017)
0.005
(0.011)
-0.005
(0.005)
0.004
(0.007)
26 - 50 employees 0.007
(0.006)
0.003
(0.018)
0.006
(0.011)
-0.008
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.007)
51 - 100 employees 0.003
(0.005)
-0.010
(0.017)
0.004
(0.010)
0.000
(0.006)
-0.005
(0.006)
201-500 employees 0.008
(0.006)
0.016
(0.018)
-0.001
(0.010)
-0.007
(0.005)
0.009
(0.008)
More than 500 
employees
0.025***
(0.007)
-0.005
(0.020)
0.040***
(0.013)
0.015**
(0.007)
0.031***
(0.010)
Scotland -0.018***
(0.006)
0.029
(0.023)
-0.028**
(0.009)
-0.012
(0.005)
-0.015**
(0.005)
North East 0.003
(0.008)
-0.044*
(0.024)
0.032**
(0.017)
-0.004
(0.007)
0.000
(0.009)
Yorkshire -0.020***
(0.006)
-0.073***
(0.019)
-0.025**
(0.010)
-0.005
(0.006)
-0.008
(0.006)
East Midlands -0.010
(0.007)
-0.034
(0.022)
0.008
(0.015)
-0.011
(0.006)
-0.001
(0.007)
East Anglia -0.020**
(0.008)
-0.045
(0.031)
-0.002
(0.015)
-0.008
(0.007)
-0.014
(0.006)
South East -0.007
(0.006)
-0.018
(0.018)
-0.009
(0.010)
-0.018***
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.007)
South West -0.008
(0.007)
0.050**
(0.027)
-0.024**
(0.010)
-0.019***
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.008)
West Midlands -0.026***
(0.006)
-0.059***
(0.019)
-0.018
(0.011)
-0.005
(0.006)
-0.021***
(0.004)
Wales 0.040***
(0.010)
0.099***
(0.029)
0.011
(0.016)
-0.001
(0.008)
0.026**
(0.015)
Food drink, tobacco 0.009
(0.009)
0.060**
(0.031)
0.005
(0.016)
-0.001
(0.009)
-0.010
(0.007)
Chemicals -0.024***
(0.007)
0.015
(0.029)
-0.045***
(0.009)
-0.025***
(0.004)
-0.020***
(0.005)
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Appendix C ll. The Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Concessions on
Holidays, continued
Metals -0.043***
(0.006)
0.010
(0.032)
-0.060***
(0.006)
-0.027***
(0.003)
-0.018**
(0.005)
Mechanical
engineering
-0.052***
(0.006)
-0.030
(0.025)
-0.079***
(0.008)
-0.027***
(0.004)
-0.021***
(0.005)
Instrument
engineering
-0.041***
(0.006)
0.015
(0.029)
-0.059***
(0.007)
-0.019***
(0.005)
-0.013*
(0.006)
Textiles 0.034***
(0.011)
0.089***
(0.035)
0.013
(0.020)
-0.015**
(0.006)
0.008
(0.012)
Paper & publishing -0.002
(0.009)
-0.031
(0.029)
-0.032**
(0.011)
-0.002
(0.009)
-0.009
(0.008)
Distributive Trades -0.041***
(0.008)
N/a -0.021
(0.012)
-0.012
(0.007)
-0.004
(0.009)
Insurance -0.052***
(0.007)
N/a -0.045***
(0.009)
-0.009
(0.008)
-0.010
(0.008)
Prof. Services -0.049***
(0.006)
N/a -0.036***
(0.010)
-0.005
(0.008)
-0.002
(0.009)
Leisure Services -0.021
(0.017)
N/a -0.017
(0.022)
0.022
(0.023)
-0.006
(0.013)
Misc. Services -0.005
(0.022)
N/a 0.017
(0.034)
0.008
(0.019)
-0.004
(0.018)
Construction &
transport/communicati
on
-0.065***
(0.005)
N/a -0.024
(0.013)
-0.011
(0.007)
-0.022**
(0.004)
Manuals -0.014***
(0.004)
-0.007
(0.016)
-0.007
(0.008)
-0.003
(0.005)
0.003
(0.005)
Non-manuals -0.030***
(0.004)
-0.040**
(0.016)
-0.008
(0.008)
-0.005
(0.005)
-0.002
(0.005)
Unionised 0.081***
(0.004)
0.087***
(0.015)
0.013**
(0.006)
0.017***
(0.004)
0.033***
(0.007)
One workplace 
change
0.042***
(0.007)
0.040**
(0.016)
0.014
(0.011)
0.009
(0.008)
0.053***
(0.017)
Two workplace 
changes
0.032***
(0.010)
0.017
(0.024)
0.024
(0.017)
-0.008
(0.009)
0.014
(0.017)
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Appendix C ll. The Marginal Effects from Probit Regressions on Concessions on
Holidays, continued
Three workplace 
changes
0.007
(0.013)
-0.035
(0.033)
-0.005
(0.021)
-0.014
(0.011)
-0.013
(0.013)
Workplace change 
last year
-0.008*
(0.005)
-0.054***
(0.014)
-0.005
(0.008)
0.014**
(0.007)
-0.002
(0.007)
10% drop in 
employment last year
-0.023***
(0.004)
-0.037**
(0.015)
-0.004
(0.007)
-0.002
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.004)
Last time in data set -0.001
(0.006)
0.014
(0.020)
-0.009
(0.011)
-0.003
(0.006)
-0.007
(0.005)
Last time in and big 
fall in emp.
0.012
(0.014)
0.086
(0.057)
0.011
(0.024)
-0.010
(0.010)
0.004
(0.017)
No. of Obs. 30041 6390 6924 8317 6474
Log Likelihood -9237.7473 -3442.1748 1744.8049 -1150.5987 -886.6084
Pseudo R2 7.11% 3.17% 7.00% 6.31% 9.55%
Predicted probability 
(at sample means)
0.087 0.237 0.064 0.027 0.025
* indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. The default categories are 101 to 200 employees; brick industry; 
mixed settlement groups; the North West.
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Appendix C12: Probit Regressions on Changes to Holidays
Independent variables Whole
Sample
1979-1983 1987-91 1991-95 1996-2000
Up to 25 employees -0.021
(0.036)
-0.162***
(0.062)
0.040
(0.082)
-0.086
(0.095)
0.069
(0.114)
26 - 50 employees 0.043
(0.036)
0.009
(0.059)
0.046
(0.084)
-0.146
(0.104)
-0.009
(0.122)
51-100 employees 0.018
(0.034)
-0.032
(0.056)
0.034
(0.081)
0.003
(0.094)
-0.095
(0.119)
201-500 employees 0.047
(0.034)
0.052
(0.057)
-0.010
(0.082)
-0.121
(0.102)
0.138
(0.110)
More than 500 
employees
0.149***
(0.036)
-0.017
(0.065)
0.282***
(0.077)
0.212**
(0.092)
0.401***
(0.103)
Scotland -0.118***
(0.041)
0.092
(0.071)
-0.257**
(0.099)
-0.235
(0.107)
-0.316**
(0.134)
North East 0.020
(0.048)
-0.149*
(0.086)
0.225**
(0.102)
-0.071
(0.125)
0.006
(0.157)
Yorkshire -0.135***
(0.045)
-0.255***
(0.074)
-0.229**
(0.108)
-0.092
(0.117)
-0.156
(0.146)
East Midlands -0.067
(0.046)
-0.114
(0.077)
0.059
(0.110)
-0.206
(0.133)
-0.013
(0.132)
East Anglia -0.141**
(0.061)
-0.154
(0.114)
-0.015
(0.127)
-0.154
(0.145)
-0.315
(0.201)
South East -0.046
(0.036)
-0.060
(0.059)
-0.076
(0.083)
-0.332***
(0.094)
-0.032
(0.118)
South West -0.052
(0.046)
0.156**
(0.079)
-0.226**
(0.111)
-0.420***
(0.133)
-0.019
(0.145)
West Midlands -0.180***
(0.043)
-0.204***
(0.071)
-0.154
(0.106)
-0.077
(0.111)
-0.548***
(0.162)
Wales 0.222***
(0.048)
0.295***
(0.081)
0.083
(0.119)
-0.017
(0.133)
0.332**
(0.148)
Food drink, tobacco 0.054
(0.054)
0.185**
(0.093)
0.040
(0.122)
-0.014
(0.144)
-0.204
(0.176)
Chemicals -0.162***
(0.052)
0.047
(0.090)
-0.460***
(0.118)
-0.599***
(0.148)
-0.477***
(0.164)
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Metals -0.329***
(0.061)
0.033
(0.102)
-0.850***
(0.167)
-0.915***
(0.217)
-0.457**
(0.197)
Mechanical
engineering
-0.370***
(0.050)
-0.097
(0.084)
-0.868***
(0.117)
-0.593***
(0.136)
-0.475***
(0.151)
Instrument
engineering
-0.300***
(0.055)
0.047
(0.090)
-0.709***
(0.129)
-0.417***
(0.147)
-0.287*
(0.163)
Textiles 0.190***
(0.057)
0.268***
(0.098)
0.094
(0.127)
-0.335**
(0.170)
0.119
(0.167)
Paper & publishing -0.010
(0.059)
-0.103
(0.101)
-0.324**
(0.139)
-0.029
(0.155)
-0.180
(0.191)
Distributive Trades -0.312***
(0.073)
N/a -0.194
(0.131)
-0.233
(0.160)
-0.066
(0.173)
Insurance -0.438***
(0.083)
N/a -0.522***
(0.152)
-0.173
(0.170)
-0.209
(0.199)
Prof. Services -0.390***
(0.065)
N/a -0.367***
(0.138)
-0.084
(0.137)
-0.039
(0.156)
Leisure Services -0.144
(0.135)
N/a -0.149
(0.222)
0.277
(0.229)
-0.122
(0.288)
Misc. Services -0.033
(0.144)
N/a 0.125
(0.229)
0.122
(0.251)
-0.072
(0.358)
Construction & 
transport/comm’s
-0.615***
(0.086)
N/a -0.223
(0.150)
-0.209
(0.160)
-0.685**
(0.213)
Manuals -0.086***
(0.026)
-0.023
(0.052)
-0.057
(0.064)
-0.051
(0.077)
0.049
(0.087)
Non-manuals -0.187***
(0.028)
-0.134**
(0.055)
-0.066
(0.064)
-0.084
(0.076)
-0.041
(0.084)
Unionised 0.499***
(0.022)
0.301***
(0.055)
0.108**
(0.047)
0.246***
(0.058)
0.453***
(0.073)
One workplace 
change
0.235***
(0.032)
0.126**
(0.049)
0.102
(0.077)
0.128
(0.107)
0.557***
(0.122)
Two workplace 
changes
0.181***
(0.049)
0.055
(0.075)
0.169
(0.111)
-0.147
(0.189)
0.197
(0.212)
Three workplace 
changes
0.044
(0.075)
-0.117
(0.118)
-0.044
(0.176)
-0.293
(0.313)
-0.318
(0.431)
268
Appendix C12: Probit Regressions on Changes to Holidays, continued
Workplace change 
last year
-0.055*
(0.032)
-0.183***
(0.052)
-0.042
(0.070)
0.197**
(0.086)
-0.035
(0.131)
10% drop in 
employment last year
-0.155***
(0.028)
-0.122**
(0.053)
-0.029
(0.059)
-0.025
(0.068)
-0.053
(0.081)
Last time in data set -0.006
(0.036)
0.044
(0.063)
-0.079
(0.094)
-0.048
(0.100)
-0.139
(0.109)
Last time in and big 
fall in emp.
0.073
(0.083)
0.258
(0.161)
0.084
(0.175)
-0.188
(0.233)
0.073
(0.257)
No. of Obs. 30041 6390 6924 8317 6474
Log Likelihood -9237.7473 -3442.1748 1744.8049 -1150.5987 -886.6084
Pseudo R2 7.11% 3.17% 7.00% 6.31% 9.55%
Constant
(at sample means)
-1.230 -0.825 -1.033 -1.394 -1.742
* indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. The defaults are 101 to 200 employees; brick industry; mixed 
settlement groups; the North West.
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